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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Confusion among consumers is the grave iniquity against which 
trademark laws and jurisprudence are intended to guard.  In the guise of 
preventing confusion, however, trademark holders can interfere with 
competitors’ ability to market competing products, and everyone’s 
ability to mock or criticize trademarked goods or services.  Expansive 
constructions of trademark rights discourage third parties from using 
trademarks of their own that are even mildly similar to preexisting 
marks, impede legitimate competition, and dissuade and chill legally 
permissible free speech uses of trademarks. 
In the context of trademark litigation, trademark holders aggressively 
assert that consumers are extremely easy to confuse because judicial 
acceptance of this assumption facilitates victory in trademark infringement 
suits.  Convincing courts that consumers will be confused is sometimes 
required, and always useful, for succeeding in trademark dilution actions 
as well.  Trademark law is doctrinally structured to motivate trademark 
holders to negatively appraise the intelligence, powers of observation, 
and discernment of consumers. 
Those defending against charges of trademark infringement or dilution 
will typically and understandably respond to such claims with narrowly 
tailored arguments that consumers are unlikely to be confused by their 
specific marks or particularized usages.  Usually, for defendants in 
trademark suits, it is neither tactically effective nor efficient to offer 
expansive counter-assertions about the relative intelligence and acumen 
of consumers at large.  As a result, it is fact finders who are best situated 
to defend consumers against the broad negative generalizations and 
empirically unsupported disparagement aimed by mark holders at buyers 
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of goods and services.  However, familiarizing oneself with a broad 
range of federal court opinions in trademark cases raises a series of 
disturbing questions: Why, in trademark litigation decisions, do judges 
so often write about representative members of the public as if we are 
astoundingly naïve, stunningly gullible, and frankly stupid?  Do jurists 
truly believe that consumers are complete idiots?  What is it about 
trademark law that seems to elicit from courts such offensive and 
humiliating views of the citizenry? 
Admittedly, one can never decipher with any certainty what views, 
assumptions, notions, or biases lead a jurist to adopt a particular analytic 
approach or ground a given court’s legal conclusions.  Also, one can 
certainly pick and choose cases out of the fairly robust trademark 
jurisprudence to support or refute any number of conflicting theories.  
Judges’ assumptions about the ignorance and base confusability of 
consumers may, in fact, be merely pretextual, a populace-debasing and 
intellectually dishonest, but analytically efficient, normative platform 
from which to reach trademark-strengthening outcomes that appear 
doctrinally compliant.  This Article rejects that possibility,1 and assumes 
arguendo that the judicial rulings in the trademark cases discussed (and 
frequently criticized) throughout this work were rendered with good 
faith beliefs that these holdings were countenanced, and indeed required, 
by trademark law.  However, nothing in the Lanham Act directs courts 
to assume that the American public is comprised of unsophisticated, 
easily confused rubes; if indeed this is trademark law, it has been 
manufactured by judges at the behest of trademark holders. 
The primary objective of this Article is to illustrate the tendency of 
judges to inappropriately rely on personal intuition and subjective, 
internalized stereotypes when ruling on trademark disputes.  Where 
jurists perceive consumers as ludicrously easily confused, trademark 
holders can exploit these views to secure broad trademark “rights,” often 
without offering a shred of evidentiary corroboration concerning such 
confusion.  As a consequence, the proof required to support allegations 
 
 1. As a general matter, this Author certainly does not dismiss the possibility, but 
wishes to focus this particular scholarly work elsewhere.  Interested readers should 
review the excellent article by Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY 
L.J. 367 (1999) (arguing that the recent doctrinal shift from regarding trademarks as a 
source of product information to regarding trademark holders as possessing property-like 
rights in the mark has created market incentives for trademark holders to seek 
“trademark monopolies” which are fundamentally at odds with social welfare 
justifications for trademark protection). 
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that a trademark usage creates a likelihood of confusion is potentially 
lessened in all cases, making trademarks normatively stronger, broader, 
and ever easier to “protect” for mark holders.  Whether consumers 
realistically benefit from this, in terms of avoiding future confusion, 
seems highly questionable, especially if they were never actually 
bewildered or fooled in the first place. 
Where judges find defendants’ unauthorized uses of a trademark 
repugnant, such as in the context of ribald parodic sexual allusions, they 
are especially willing to find likelihood of confusion, often in circumstances 
where actual confusion, as most lay people understand the term, is 
improbable enough to render such decisions facially absurd.  However, 
when judges find a plaintiff’s marked product deserving of derision or 
ridicule, they are more likely to endorse the concept that free speech 
rights can supersede the interests of trademark owners.  Judicial biases 
result in inconsistent approaches to balancing speech rights against 
trademark interests, which in turn foment uncertainty and unfairness. 
Trademark rights should not be strengthened and expanded by reliance 
on unproven and demonstrably incorrect allegations about the ignorance, 
poor reasoning, and deficient observational powers of the public, nor 
should trademark rights be calibrated by how appalling or appealing a 
judge finds a product or service.  If trademark holders are to be broadly 
privileged by the courts without explicit direction by Congress, then an 
alternative doctrinal justification to protecting consumers is required,2 
and the resulting protections should adhere fairly consistently to all 
similarly situated trademarks. 
Part II of this Article discusses the foundation and development of 
pertinent aspects of trademark law and policy, and asserts that the true 
intended and actual beneficiaries of the Lanham Act are trademark 
holders, rather than consumers.  Part III explains the importance of 
context in trademark law, especially with regard to assessments of the 
likelihood of consumer confusion in trademark infringement actions.  
The use of consumer confusion analysis in trademark dilution cases is 
also critiqued.  In Part IV, the extreme and problematic subjectivity of 
 
 2. See generally Robert Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1664 
(1999).  The article asserts that Ralph Brown’s principal achievement 
was to win acceptance for a mode of analysis that tied the protection of 
trademarks to their economic role in the marketplace.  He had demonstrated 
that any extension of trademark protection beyond the limits of the confusion 
rationale was at least debatable, and after the publication of his article any case 
for expanded protection required more than unadorned allusions to property 
rights and unjust enrichment.  In the decades that followed, as the debate over 
the scope of trademark protection played out on several fronts, Ralph fought to 
retain consumer confusion as the touchstone for excluding copiers. 
Id. 
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the likelihood of confusion inquiry is explained and illustrated, as is the 
tendency of judges to assume that consumers are naïve and stupid.  
Special emphasis is given to the consequences of gender and class 
stereotyping by judges, with respect to trademark infringement analyses 
and case outcomes.  Part V charts the impact that the substantive defects 
in trademark jurisprudence identified by the previous portions of the 
Article have upon freedom of speech when trademark holders object to 
unauthorized communicative uses of their marks.  Finally, Part VI concludes 
that all consumers should be presumed reasonably prudent, and all 
trademarks should be treated in a gender and class neutral manner. 
II.  U.S. TRADEMARK LAW: THE LANHAM ACT AND THE                      
FEDERAL COURTS 
To fully understand the problematic manner in which the “likelihood 
of confusion” test is often applied, it is necessary to consider what 
trademarks are, why they are protected, the statutory and doctrinal limits 
of trademark rights, and the reasons that judges sometimes expand or 
ignore these limits.  A trademark is a word, short phrase, symbol, 
picture, design, or other feature that is used in trade, in conjunction with 
specific goods or services, to indicate the source of the goods or services 
and distinguish them from the commercial offerings of competitors.3  
Trademarks are intended to perform a source-identifying function with 
respect to goods or services in commerce,4 but trademark rights are not 
doctrinally intended to provide any right of exclusivity with respect to 
the underlying products and services that are identified by the marks.5  
Though popularly referred to as a form of intellectual property, there is 
very little that is “intellectual” about trademarks in the sense that 
protectable marks, unlike copyrighted works or patented inventions, are 
not required to reflect any innovation or creativity whatsoever.6 
 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).  Marks that identify the source of services (such as 
the name of a travel agency or dry cleaner) are correctly denominated as “service 
marks,” but are treated virtually identically to trademarks as a matter of law.  Id. § 1053.  
Trademarks usually appear on a product or on product packaging, while service marks 
appear in promotional material for services.  However, service marks are commonly 
incorporated within the general “trademark” rubric, and therefore “trademark” or “mark” 
will be used to denote both trademarks and service marks here, in conformity with 
common practice. 
 4. See id. § 1052. 
 5. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212–14 (2000). 
 6. The Lanham Act accords trademark protection based on use in commerce 
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Trademarks are creatures of commerce.  Patent owners receive a finite 
term of limited monopolistic control over their inventions to reward 
them for inventing (or investing in the invention of)7 new, useful, and 
nonobvious products and processes, and making the innovative 
knowledge underlying the inventions available to the public.8  Copyright 
owners also receive finite terms of monopolistic control over copyrighted 
works, though a copyright is enforceable far longer than a patent, and the 
nature of a copyright monopoly is somewhat different and narrower than 
the exclusivity conferred by a patent.9  Copyright owners are given their 
bundle of exclusive rights to reward them for creating original works of 
authorship.10  By contrast, trademark owners can assert and retain 
ownership of their marks in perpetuity (as long as they remain in 
commercial use)11 and are not even theoretically obliged to provide a 
marked product or service that is creative, unique, or of value to the 
 
rather than on the content of the mark.  Content based prohibitions are unrelated to 
creativity.  Section 1052, for example, states that “[n]o trademark by which the goods of 
the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration 
on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—” and sets categories of marks 
that may not be registered, such a mark which “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, 
deceptive, or scandalous matter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); see also Lunney, supra note 1, at 
373 (“Unlike patent and copyright, trademark law neither ties its prerequisites for 
protection to a need for additional incentive, nor defines its protection to ensure an 
appropriate incentive level.”); Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 32–36 (1999) (describing how public perception and use creates the 
“secondary meaning” accociated with a trademark). 
 7. Patent owners are often the corporate entities that employ human inventors.  
See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World, Unite!  A Call for Collective Action by 
Employee-Inventors, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 674–75 (1997). 
 8. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000). 
 9. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000). 
 10. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the 
Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 154–55 (1998). 
   The Copyright Act does not bestow absolute exclusive rights upon a 
copyright owner, but rather confers a limited monopoly with respect to use of 
the copyrighted work.  A copyright is intangible (or “intellectual”) property 
that is vested with a public interest, intended to achieve an “important public 
purpose.”  There is a societal bargain implicit in the copyright law.  Copyright 
owners are given tools in the form of exclusive rights with which to exploit 
creative endeavors financially, but this gift is conditioned upon an 
understanding that the ultimate goal of copyrights is to maximize the number 
of creative works available to the public, and not to benefit individual 
copyright owners.  Alternatively expressed, “copyright is a bargain between 
the public and publishers, in which the public consents to restrict its rights as a 
kind of bribe to publishers.”  To effectuate this bargain, copyrights should be 
no more restrictive than is necessary to create incentives for the promotion of 
knowledge and learning.  Where public interests conflict with those of 
copyright owners, the public interests should prevail. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–59 (2000). 
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public.12  Trademark laws do not materialize from the so-called Intellectual 
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the 
following enumerated power: “To promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”13  Rather, 
congressional power to federally regulate trademarks comes from the 
Commerce Clause.14 
Statutory U.S. trademark law has been expansively altered in recent 
years.15  When amendments to the Lanham Act made it possible for 
 
 12. Trademark rights are obtained by either using the mark in commerce (and 
perhaps subsequently registering the mark with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
or by filing an application to register the mark with the PTO and asserting (in the 
application) a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.  See id. § 1051.  Federal 
registration is not required to begin use of a mark, nor necessary to acquire rights in a 
mark, but it provides trademark owners with a host of significant advantages.  Holders of 
federally registered marks are the presumptive owners of the marks on a nationwide 
basis and can use the machinery of the federal court system to defend their trademark 
rights. The term of a federal trademark registration is ten years, with the ability to renew 
for a potentially unlimited number of subsequent ten-year terms.  Id. 
 13. Patents and copyrights are alluded to in Article 1, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, which is known as the Enumerated Powers Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art I, § 
8.  This constitutional power authorizes Congress to enact laws for certain purposes, 
such as the creation of money and to “promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts.”  Id.; see Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–95 (1879); Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 
F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1998). 
“[C]ommerce,” for purposes of delimiting “use in commerce” under the 
Lanham Act, is expressly defined by Section 45 to be “all commerce which 
may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”  We recently affirmed that the “history 
and text of the Lanham Act show that ‘use in commerce’ reflects Congress’s 
intent to legislate to the limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause.” 
Id. (citations omitted); United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 
128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:117 & n.2 (4th ed. 2003) (citing Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), for the proposition that “the power of Congress to 
register marks stems only from the ‘Commerce Clause’ of the U.S. Constitution”).  The 
Supreme Court, moreover, has made clear that Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause extends to activity that “substantially affects” interstate commerce.  
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
 14. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 5.3. 
 15. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American 
Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 829–
30 (2000). 
   Three major developments have happened in roughly the last decade.  First, 
in 1988, section 1051 of the Lanham Act was amended to provide for the 
reservation of marks which claimants intend to use in commerce.  In 1996, 
Congress passed the Federal Dilution statute, which was expanded in 1999 to 
include dilution as grounds for cancellation or opposition proceedings before 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”).  Also, but certainly not 
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entities to obtain trademark rights by simply asserting that they 
“intended to use” a trademark in commerce,16 the United States moved 
closer, in some respects, to harmonization with the laws of countries in 
which trademarks belong to the first entity to register them, rather than 
vesting trademark rights through commercial use.17  However, nations 
with strong trademark protections generally make trademark registrations 
far more difficult to obtain than in the United States.18 
The original justification for recognizing enforceable rights in trademarks 
was premised on the idea that trademarks could simultaneously benefit 
both consumers and producers of goods and services.  The classic 
description of the dual advantages of the trademark system describes 
 
finally, in 1999 Congress further amended the Lanham Act to add a new 
section 43(d), which provides for statutory damages and in rem jurisdiction 
when a cybersquatter registers another’s trademark as its domain name with 
the intent to traffic in the domain name.  This trend drastically expands the 
boundaries of what the common law had long settled as the scope of American 
trademark right.  None of the existing social, economic, or legal justifications 
supporting American trademark law encourage, let alone tolerate, such expansion. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also International Trademark Association, The Lanham Act, 
at http://www.inta.org/about/lanham.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.  The intent-to-use application allows federal clearance and 
approval for registration of a trademark (the entire examination and clearance procedure 
of federal registration) without a showing of actual use of the mark in commerce.  After 
an intent-to-use application has successfully made its way through the PTO, a Notice of 
Allowance, rather than a certificate of registration, issues: Actual use of the mark in 
commerce must be made before the mark can be registered.  The Notice of Allowance 
operates to assure registration once actual use in commerce has begun and the additional 
filing requirements have been met.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, What 
Happens After I File My Application?, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac 
/doc/basic/afterapp.htm#cert (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). 
If the mark is published based upon the applicant’s bona fide intention to use 
the mark in commerce, the USPTO will issue a NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE 
about twelve (12) weeks after the date the mark was published, if no party files 
either an opposition or request to extend the time to oppose.  The applicant then 
has six (6) months from the date of the NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE to either: 
 use the mark in commerce and submit a STATEMENT OF USE; or 
 request a six-month EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A STATEMENT 
OF USE. 
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (requiring trademark applicant to file a verified 
statement that the trademark is used in commerce with the PTO). 
 17. Port, supra note 15, at 831–32; see also Jenkins, Community Trade Marks, at 
http://www.jenkins-ip.com/serv/t_trad05.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004) (noting that 
unlike U.S. law, French trademark law generally provides protection based upon 
registration, regardless of prior use); Ladas & Parry, United Kingdom—New Trademark 
Law, Nov. 1994, at http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/1994/1194Bulletin/UK_New 
TMAct.html.  
[T]he United Kingdom has to a large extent moved to a first-to-file system, 
thus making it highly advisable for trademark owners to try and avoid a 
difficult and costly opposition based on prior use against a similar mark, by 
registering their marks before they are anticipated by others. 
Id. 
 18. Port, supra note 15, at 831–32. 
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how trademarks serve the interests of consumers by reducing search 
costs and allowing buyers to “make rational purchasing and repurchasing 
decisions with speed and assurance,” while simultaneously “creat[ing] 
incentives for firms to create and market products of desirable qualities, 
particularly when these qualities are not observable before purchase.”19  
That is a succinct articulation of the views contained in an influential 
and oft-cited20 law review article written by William Landes and Richard 
Posner in 1987, which purports to explain the economics of trademarks 
and endorses an expansive view of trademark strength and protectability.21  
However, when balanced against the unfettered ability of producers of 
goods and services to acquire new trademarks, jettison old trademarks, 
use multiple trademarks simultaneously, and communicate through 
advertisements, the Landes and Posner analysis can be seen to exaggerate 
the positive utility that shoppers derive from trademarks. 
A.  Problems with Broad Trademark Protection: Overstatement of 
Consumer Benefits 
Intended to both justify and reinforce court effectuated trademark 
protection of broad scope, the legal analysis of Landes and Posner 
conceptualizes trademarks as devices that reduce information gathering 
 
 19. Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1998); see also S. REP. NO. 79–133, at 3 (1946), reprinted 
in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (detailing the legislative history of the Lanham Act.) 
 20. See, e.g., Sport Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 335 F.3d 453, 460 
n.7 (5th Cir. 2003); Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 
F.3d 722, 734 (7th Cir. 1998); TMT N. Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 
882 (7th Cir. 1997); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 171 (7th 
Cir. 1996); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Q Div. Records, LLC v. Q Records, No. Civ.A. 99-10828-GAO, 2000 WL 
294875, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 11, 2000); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum 
Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
2007, 2081 n.237 (2003); Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic 
Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 699 n.15 (1998); Lawrence B. Ebert, The Supreme 
Court Decision in Qualitex v. Jacobson—A Comment, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 100, 101 
(1995); Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of 
Integrity Rights, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 307 n.47 (2003); Kenneth L. Port, The 
Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the 
Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 888 (2000); Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion Is the 
Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
543, 547 n.21 (2002); Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law, Functional Design 
Features, and the Trouble with Traffix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 29 n.119 (2001). 
 21. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987). 
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and transaction costs by allowing consumers to approximate the nature 
and quality of goods and services emanating from recognized sources.22  
According to Landes and Posner, 
[A] trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, 
“I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase 
because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the 
same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.”23 
One commentator provided this illustration: 
   Take laundry detergent for example.  Hypothetically, let us presume that Tidy 
brand detergent is desirable because it gets Emily’s clothes clean while Aller 
brand detergent is not because although it gets Emily’s clothes clean, it also 
makes her break out in a rash if she wears clothes washed in Aller brand 
detergent.  The economic function of trademarks in this setting is realized because 
Emily can make a quick and inexpensive choice between Tidy and Aller in the 
grocery store.  Although she knows they each share the quality function of 
getting her clothes clean, they also do not share the quality function because one 
makes her break out in a rash and the other does not.  As such, Emily can rely 
on the trademarks to identify one consistent product emanating from one 
consistent source, even if that source is not specifically known by Emily. 
   On the other hand, if Emily cannot rely on the source and quality functions of 
trademarks, she will be forced to research the chemical compositions of Tidy 
and Aller and determine precisely which chemical or combination of chemicals 
irritate her skin.  She will then be required to read each package of detergent 
and study the ingredients to determine which box of detergent contains the 
undesirable characteristics.  Consequently, Emily will incur a significantly 
higher total cost in purchasing the box of detergent if she cannot rely on 
trademarks to identify the information she desires about laundry detergent.24 
 
Trademarks can certainly convey information.  The obvious flaw in 
the above analysis, however, is the implicit (and stunningly incorrect) 
assumption that trademarks play a role in either restricting Tidy’s ability 
to alter its chemical composition to include the ingredient that irritates 
Emily’s skin, or in imposing a duty on Tidy to at least inform consumers 
 
 22. See, e.g., Anne M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine: Why 
the General Public Should Be Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3337, 3340–41 (1999). 
The first major principle of trademark protection is predicated on preventing 
consumer confusion that occurs when a junior user adopts a mark confusingly 
similar to that used by a senior user.  The importance of protecting the public 
from confusion is obvious.  Absent protection for the exclusive use of 
trademarks, consumers would be unable to distinguish between related goods 
sold under similar marks.  Similarly, consumers may falsely associate goods 
bearing similar marks as being derived from the same source.  Consumers, 
therefore, “would be forced to re-educate themselves with each purchase or 
possible purchase of a branded product.”  This outcome belies an important 
economic benefit attributed to trademarks by increasing consumer search costs. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 23. Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 268–70. 
 24. Port, supra note 15, at 889. 
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like Emily when it changes its constitutive formulation.  The manufacturer 
may tout a “new and improved formula” when it modifies a product’s 
components, or it may choose not to draw attention to such adjustments.  
Unless Emily continually monitors the small print on the Tidy label for 
changes, she may find her dermis red and itchy, lured by the Tidy 
trademark into a false sense of freedom from the risk of rashes. 
Theoretically, because a particular company is the only entity allowed 
to use trademarked words and logos on particular goods or services in 
the stream of commerce, consumers can be confident that when they buy 
a product bearing the company’s marks, it will comport with the 
company’s standards (whatever they are perceived to be).  In addition, 
there may be a belief that consumers can locate and contact the 
responsible party if they have questions about, or experience problems 
with, a product or service associated with that company’s mark.  The 
reality, however, is that trademarks do not impose any actual obligation 
upon a mark holder to include any particular features, to maintain any 
particular level of quality, or even to disclose the identity or location of 
the actual decision makers that orchestrate the production and distribution 
of the marked goods and services.25 
Consider the fact that the catalog clothing company Lands’ End is 
now owned by Sears Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”), which hopes to use the 
Lands’ End mark, associated by some consumers with “quality,” to lure 
affluent college-educated shoppers who are conditioned to paying “full 
price” to the clothing departments of Sears’ retail stores.26  Sears 
apparently believes that the Lands’ End mark connotes better products 
than its own Sears mark, but Sears is now the actual, factual producer of 
goods distributed bearing Lands’ End labels.  Sears advertises the fact 
that its retail stores now carry Lands’ End clothing, but it does not 
broadcast the fact that it is now the source of Lands’ End clothing.27  
 
 25. See, e.g., Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845, 1845 (2003) (writing that 
“[t]o the extent that the purpose of trademark law is to reduce consumer decision costs 
and to induce producers to make high-quality products, it ought to [but does not] reflect 
both positive and negative consumer preferences”).  But see Gerard N. Magliocca, One 
and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 
957 (2001) (writing that “[i]n a world with marks . . . consumers can easily gauge a 
product’s quality based on advertising or on the prior performance of items that bore the 
same mark”). 
 26. Sandra Guy, Sears Changes Look, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at 45; Doris 
Hajewski, Lands’ End in Stores; Sears Hopes Shoppers Bite as it Begins Brand Rollout, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 2002, at D1. 
 27. The Lands’ End homepage bears the following notice: “Sears® stores are now 
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One might say that in this instance trademark usage is intended to 
confuse consumers, rather than protect or inform them.28  While the use 
of trademarks to obfuscate source and deceive consumers may be an 
inevitable consequence of trademark protections generally, the possibility 
certainly ought to weigh against strong trademark rights. 
B.  Problems with Broad Trademark Protection: Value to               
Producers Underestimated 
Concurrently, Landes and Posner contend that companies benefit from 
trademark protection to the extent that the products or services 
associated with their marks enjoy a good reputation with consumers.29  
Corporate interests often view protected trademarks as mechanisms for 
insuring that they receive the full benefits of their investments in 
producing quality goods and services and as tools to strengthen the 
ability of commercial advertising to promote brand identification.30  
Advertising and the attributes of goods and services themselves give 
trademarks meaning.  Trademarks give consumers mechanisms for 
 
offering a colorful array of bestselling Lands’ End products.  See our Sears Store 
Directory for a location near you.”  Lands’ End, at http://www.landsend.com (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2004). 
 28. A recent commentator provides this example of the phenomomon: 
As AirTran Flight 446 taxied to the runway, the wild-eyed man in the seat next 
to me began to fidget, making me a bit uncomfortable facing my first flight on 
this new budget airline.  It was not until the plane actually began to take off 
that the man turned to me and, without introduction, stated plainly, “You know, 
AirTran used to be ValuJet.”  No, I hadn’t known.  But as the plane gained altitude 
and images of the much-publicized 1996 ValuJet crash in the Everglades 
drifted through my mind, I knew it would be a long flight back to Boston. 
Note, Badwill, supra note 25, at 1845, 1846 (observing also that “a company whose 
mark has captured significant consumer badwill because of dangers related to its 
associated product or service—for example, the badwill associated with the ValuJet 
Airlines mark after its 1996 crash—can shed this badwill by producing the product or 
service under a different mark”). 
 29. Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 270; see also United States v. Torkington, 
812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987). 
It . . . is important to recognize that the enforcement of trademark laws benefits 
consumers even in cases where there is no possibility that consumers will be 
defrauded.  For, to the extent that trademarks provide a means for the public to 
distinguish between manufacturers, they also provide incentives for manufacturers 
to provide quality goods.  Traffickers of these counterfeit goods, however, 
attract some customers who would otherwise purchase the authentic goods.  
Trademark holders’ returns to their investments in quality are thereby reduced.  
This reduction in profits may cause trademark holders to decrease their 
investments in quality below what they would spend were there no counterfeit 
goods.  This in turn harms those consumers who wish to purchase higher 
quality goods. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 30. Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 270. 
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responding to the perceived meanings of trademarks by facilitating the 
making or avoiding of purchases of marked goods. 
A mark’s meaning, however, may not be the marked product’s reality.  
Arguably, effective advertisements can substitute for investments in 
quality.  Research has demonstrated that consumers often prefer one 
brand of a product over another (even though the underlying products 
are identical) based on their subjective feelings about a trademark.31  For 
example, consumers have long paid premium prices for Wisk laundry 
detergent even though comparable, less expensive products are readily 
accessible, due to the success of the “Ring Around the Collar” 
advertising campaign.32  They attribute superlative cleansing properties 
to Wisk that they do not impute to products bearing less well-regarded 
trademarks, even though minimal experimentation might demonstrate 
that collar grime could be more economically eliminated through 
judicious use of alternate detergents (or perhaps by more effectively 
washing one’s neck).33  The premium prices paid for particular “elite” 
brands of bottled water also illustrate the market power of certain 
trademarks.34  Consumers are undoubtedly attracted to certain trademarks 
for a variety of reasons besides prior experience with the marked 
products or services, hence the extensive, diverse, colorful, not to 
mention well-compensated, output of the advertising industry.35 
 
 31. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the 
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1727–28 (1999). 
 32. What Type of Slogan Attracts the Most Attention?, at http://bellzinc. 
sympatico.ca/en/content/503045?skin=sli (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Wisk Laundry 
Detergent, Simpson’s Contemporary Quotations, at http://www.bartleby.com/63/83/ 
2483.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). 
 33. Landes and Posner assert that consumers will knowingly pay more for a 
product that can be found in cheaper, identical iterations because of the “assurance” that 
a particular trademark provides them.  Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 270. 
 34. See, e.g., AboutWater.com, Brands, at http://www.water.com/who_we_are/ 
swg1520_bra.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2003); The Bottled Water Web, Facts, at http://www. 
bottledwaterweb.com/indus.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2003); The Bottled Water Web, News, 
at http://www.bottledwaterweb.com/news/nw_061600.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2003). 
 35. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. 
REV. 657, 672–73 (1985). 
Empirical studies establish that consumers’ beliefs about a product are affected 
not only by advertising, but also by a number of other factors, including their 
prior experience with the product, their inspection of the product’s observable 
characteristics, the price of the product, the reputation of the seller, and the 
presence or absence of a warranty.  Since consumers are likely to differ in their 
knowledge of each of these factors, they will also differ in the inferences they 
draw from any given advertisement. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Judicious abstention of the use of certain trademarks can help an entity 
escape the repercussions of a bad reputation, as well as reap the benefits 
from the positive meanings represented by a trademark.  Referencing the 
earlier example of Sears, while this company hopes to benefit from the 
quality associations that the Lands’ End mark evokes due to business 
practices that occurred before Sears assumed ownership and control of 
the company, it simultaneously intends to avoid any negative connotations 
the Sears mark carries in connection with clothing by not appending the 
Sears mark to Lands’ End labels or tags, even though Sears is now the 
authentic source of the goods. 
The producers of commercial goods and services are arguably the true 
targeted and intended beneficiaries of the statutory, administrative, and 
legal trademark infrastructures.  That trademark usage accrues to the 
benefit of consumers at all is, in reality, only a coincidental byproduct of 
a labeling and identification system that mark holders are free to 
manipulate to their greatest commercial advantage.  Manufacturers and 
service providers can manipulate trademark usage to provide source 
identification to consumers when it is useful, or obfuscate information 
when doing that appears beneficial.  If consumer associations with a 
trademark are positive in nature, the mark holder can continue to invest 
in the mark, commercially exploit the positive associations as profitably 
as is feasible, and protect the mark from use by competitors.  If a mark 
acquires negative associations, the mark holder can attempt to change 
the perception of the marked products or services by improving quality, 
by lowering prices, or through aggressive and creative advertising. 
Alternatively, the mark can simply be jettisoned and replaced, 
providing the underlying product or service with a clean associative slate 
and a fresh start in the marketplace.  Producers are not burdened by 
trademark law with any legal obligation to inform the public about 
trademark changes that are made to goods and services that continue to 
be offered or manufactured by the same entity.  A consumer who 
contracts food poisoning from a commercially purchased prepared food 
can certainly steer clear of products bearing the trademarks of the 
product that sickened her.  She cannot, however, avoid goods from the 
same source that bear different, unrelated trademarks, such as those that 
might be adopted in the wake of bad publicity, at least not by relying on 
the “information” provided by trademarks alone. 
Over the past few years, the corporation long known as Philip Morris 
Companies, Inc. received widespread criticism and censure for 
disingenuousness and dishonesty about the addictive properties and 
deleterious health effects of cigarettes and other tobacco products.36  
 
 36. See, e.g., BBC News, Q & A: Tobacco Litigation (June 7, 2001), at http://news. 
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Apparently to escape lingering negative associations in the future, the 
entity has decided to change its name to Altria Group, Inc.37  The 
company currently avoids negative associations in the present by 
marketing many of its products under other rubrics, such as the Kraft 
Foods umbrella, which in turn utilizes hundreds of other trademarks 
across a broad range of products including the following: Sanka, Yuban, 
General Foods International Coffees, Maxim, and Maxwell House for 
coffee, a long list of Post breakfast cereals,38 Good Seasons and Seven 
Seas for salad dressings, and Athenos, Churny, Di Giorno, Hoffman’s, 
and Polly-O for cheeses.39  A grocery shopper has a pretty formidable task 
in terms of self-education and selective shopping if she affirmatively 
undertakes to avoid enriching Philip Morris, Inc. by eschewing the 
corporation’s brands. 
Adding to the difficulty of cognitively linking sources to products due 
to the mutability of trademarks (which can be changed at will) is the fact 
that trademarks can be transferred to other entities.  That the same 
trademark appears on a product over time does not even remotely 
guarantee that the same source was producing it during that interval.  For 
example, the Philip Morris website listed Claussen Pickles as one of its 
trademarked products at the time this sentence was written.40  However, 
 
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1374938.stm; Media Backgrounder & Commentary, Brooklyn 
Jury in Smoker’s Trial Issues First Punitive Damages Award on East Coast in a Tobacco 
Case—$20 Million, Jan. 9, 2004, at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/litigation/cases/Backgrounders/ 
frankson2.htm; Barry Meier, Punitive Damages Added in Smoking Case Verdict (Nov. 
28, 2000), at http://www.yourlawyer.com/practice/news.htm?story_id=3802&topic= 
Light%20Cigarettes; Statement of Matthew L. Myers President, Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids, Illinois Verdict Against Philip Morris Is Appropriate Response to Decades of 
Deception About Light Cigarettes (Mar. 21, 2003), at http://tobaccofreekids.org/ 
Script/DisplayPressRelease.php3?Display=617; Phillip Morris Hit with Record Tobacco 
Liability Verdict, CNN.COM (Mar. 30, 1999), at http://www. cnn.com/US/9903/30/ 
tobacco.trial.02/.  See generally Philip Morris USA, Inc., at www.pmdocs.com (providing a 
complete database of documents from Philip Morris Tobacco Litigations). 
 37. See Altria, Altria Group, Inc. Overview, at http://www.altria.com/about_altria 
/01_00_AboutAltriaOver.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Altria, Corporate Identity, at 
http://www.altria.com/about_altria/01_01_corpidenchange.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). 
 38. These include Alpha-Bits, Banana Nut Crunch, Blueberry Morning, Cinna-
Cluster Raisin Bran, Cranberry Almond Crunch, Frosted Shredded Wheat, Fruit & Fibre, 
Golden Crisp, Grape-Nuts, Grape-Nuts O’s, Great Grains, Honey Bunches Of Oats, 
Honeycomb, Natural Bran Flakes, Oreo O’s, Pebbles, Raisin Bran, Shredded Wheat, 
Shredded Wheat ‘N Bran, Spoon Size Shredded Wheat, Toasties, Waffle Crisp, and 
100% Bran.  See  http://www.altria.com/about_altria/01_04_02_KraftFoodsNorth.Ameria.asp 
(last visited May 1, 2004). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
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a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) action in October of 200241 
pertained to the possible acquisition of the Claussen mark by another 
entity.  The FTC’s description of the “parties to the transaction” is 
instructive with respect to the manner in which the sources of 
trademarked goods can change: 
Vlasic, which makes and sells shelf-stable and refrigerated pickles, was spun off 
by Campbell Soup Company as Vlasic Food International in 1998, after which 
it was purchased by Hicks, Muse in May 2001.  Hicks, Muse is a Dallas-based 
private investment firm that owns Pinnacle Food Corporation (Pinnacle), the 
firm that now operates the Vlasic business and which is the nation’s largest 
pickle producer.  Pinnacle produces Vlasic pickles at its plants in Imlay, 
Michigan and Millsboro, Delaware. 
Claussen, which makes and sells primarily refrigerated pickles, is a business 
operated by Kraft’s Oscar Mayer Foods division.  Oscar Mayer bought the 
Claussen Pickle Company in 1970, before being acquired by Kraft, which is 
owned by Philip Morris.  Philip Morris is a Virginia corporation with its 
principle place of business in New York.  In addition to owning Kraft, it is a 
prominent producer of cigarettes, beer, and food, including Post cereal, 
Maxwell House coffee, Jell-O desserts, and Altoids mints. 
On May 4, 2002, Pinnacle and Kraft entered into an agreement under which 
Pinnacle would acquire Claussen’s pickle business, including relish, sauerkraut, 
and pickled tomatoes.  The Claussen assets being sold include the brand 
trademark, as well as a Kraft production facility in Woodstock, Illinois used to 
make dill pickles.42 
Thus, nothing definitive or permanent about the source of the pickles 
is established by the Claussen mark.  The actual source of the pickles has 
changed repeatedly and may do so again, without notice to consumers.  
The content and quality of the pickles may change as well; there is 
nothing in trademark law that prevents this, impedes this, or provides 
consumers with any notification at all.  Trademarks clearly do not 
provide information or assurance to consumers—quite the contrary. 
Consider a more ominous example: Television networks NBC and 
MSNBC are owned by General Electric,43 one of the largest defense 
contractors on earth.44  General Electric stands to make incredible profits 
 
 41. See Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission Votes to 
Challenge Hicks, Muse’s Proposed Acquisition of Claussen Pickle Company, Oct. 22, 
2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/vlasic.htm. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See General Electric, NBC, at http://www.ge.com/en/company/businesses/ge_ 
nbc.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). 
 44. See General Electric, Aircraft Engines, at http://www.ge.com/en/company/businesses/ 
ge_aircraft_engines.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003); see also Mike Ward, Top Ten 
Conspiracy Theories of 2002, Jan. 2, 2003, at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?storyID=14873. 
Examine this question for even a minute and you will stumble onto a proven, 
card-carrying evil conspiracy: It’s called the U.S. Congress, and conclusive 
evidence links them to a truly terrifying document known as the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
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from weapons build-ups and wars.  Trademark law does not require 
General Electric to remind television viewers that it is the owner of NBC 
and MSNBC news.  Instead, trademarks affirmatively hamper the ability 
of consumers to keep the “source” of the information in mind when 
General Electric’s subsidiary media outlets are reporting the news, 
enabling General Electric to rely on the shield of alternative trademarks 
to aid and abet any consumer confusion this corporation finds useful.45 
Reflection on the ways in which trademarks are actually deployed and 
employed by commercial interest makes the assertion that trademarks 
protect consumers from being confused, mistaken, or deceived in their 
purchasing decisions46 almost laughable, and the contention that broadly 
protecting trademarks permits consumers to rely on trademarks as 
accurate source indicators47 is bizarre indeed.48  The benefits allocation 
 
   This legislation is relevant post-9/11 because it allowed the megamergers of 
media conglomerates to become ultra-monstermergers.  As a result, today a 
handful of multinationals control most of what is said in the U.S. about 
military actions overseas and the reasons for them.  At least one of these 
companies—General Electric—has financial stakes in the weapons racket as 
well, but this blatant conflict of interest gets as much coverage as the 
Telecommunications Act originally got when it was on the floor of Congress: 
next to none.  Some media observers and academics, like MIT’s Noam 
Chomsky and Norman Solomon of Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, have 
doggedly pointed out that the bloated media emperor has no clothes.  Too bad 
they stand little chance of appearing regularly on Face the Nation. 
Id.; see also Annie Lawson, US Media Dig Deep for Politicians, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 
2003, available at http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,930075,00.html. 
 45. One apparently independent website, The Memory Hole, rather cleverly 
follows articles it reposts from MSNBC with the notice: “News article(s) copyright 2002 
MSNBC/Microsoft/NBC/General Electric.  Reprinted here for the purposes of education, 
media criticism, and political comment.”  See, e.g., The Memory Hold, at http://www. 
thememoryhole.org/media/msnbc-iaea-report.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). 
 46. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, at §§ 2.1–2.3. 
 47. Id. 
 48. On the other hand, trademarks can become undesirable for reasons that have 
nothing to do with product qualities or corporate behavior.  For example, at present, 
citizens of many countries are engaged in boycotts of American products that are 
recognized by American-identified trademarks such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola.  See, 
e.g., Erik Kirschbaum, EU: Boycott of American Goods over Iraq War Gains Momentum, 
CORPWATCH, Mar. 25, 2003, at http://www.corpwatch.org/news/PND.jsp? articleid=6072; 
Saudis Boycott American Products and Services, ARABICNEWS, May 8, 2002, at 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/020508/2002050806.html; UAE: May 11 
World Day to Boycott USA Products and Services, ARABICNEWS, May 6, 2002, at 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/020506/2002050602.html; David Pallister, Arab 
Boycott of American Consumer Goods Spreads, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 8, 2003, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,870412,00.html; Calls in Syria to 
Boycott American Goods, ARABICNEWS, Apr. 12, 2002, at http://www.arabicnews.com/ 
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generated by trademark rights is clearly tilted toward mark holders.  If 
trademark rights are to be further strengthened and broadened, such 
actions should be forthrightly linked to advantaging commercial 
interests, rather than pretextually and inaccurately justified as being 
helpful to consumers. 
III.  APPLICATION OF U.S. TRADEMARK LAW: CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING 
In most aspects and applications of U.S. trademark law, context is 
everything.  For example, whether a word can even function as a 
protectable trademark can only be determined within the context in 
which it is used in conjunction with the good or service.  The trademark 
taxonomy is generally deemed to contain four categories: “generic,” 
“descriptive,” “suggestive,” and “arbitrary or fanciful.”49  Sorting marks 
into these malleable categories is performed as a matter of law, and judges 
generally accomplish this task by referencing their internal visceral 
impressions.  This type of subjective contextualizing by courts deciding 
trademark disputes is seemingly required by extant legal doctrine and 
accustoms judges to using intuition, and to make instinctive rather than 
evidence driven legal determinations under the Lanham Act. 
A.  Trademark Categories 
1.  Generic Marks 
Words that are generic with respect to the associated product or 
service can never be protected as trademarks, because this would be 
unfair to competitors:50 For example, to allow one company a monopoly 
on the words “ice cream” when the product is ice cream would force 
another entity marketing the same substance to call its product 
something along the lines of “sweet frosty dairy confection.”  If that 
second company obtained an enforceable trademark on “sweet frosty 
dairy confection,” a third competitor might have to resort to the 
somewhat unappealing appellation “frozen flavored high fat milk solids” 
to communicate the nature of the goods it was selling to consumers.  A 
 
ansub/Daily/Day/020412/2002041216.html. 
 49. These are often referred to as the “Abercrombie & Fitch” categories because 
they were first specifically enunciated in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 50. See, e.g., Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1980).  
Trademarks can also become unprotectable over time if they “commit genericide”—that 
is, become used as the generic term for a product or service.  See, e.g., International 
Trademark Association, FAQs, at http://www.inta.org/info/faqsD.html#4 (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2004); Candi Hinton, When Good Marks Go Bad, International Trademark 
Association, at http://www.inta.org/press/news2002_10.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). 
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fourth competitor, if sufficiently cowed by the threat of a trademark 
infringement suit, might forgo entering the ice cream marketplace 
altogether, thus freezing out the presumptive benefits in terms of quality, 
price, and selection that consumers might otherwise milk from 
commercial competition.  Keep in mind the fact that ice cream is only 
generic in certain contexts, and would not be so if invoked as a 
trademark for, say, furniture polish. 
2.  Descriptive Marks 
A descriptive term references a quality or characteristic of the 
underlying good or service, such as “Arthriticare” for a topical heat 
analgesic designed to provide arthritis relief,51 “Pet Pals” for a program 
that promotes the well-being of pets,52 and “Skinvisible” when applied to 
medical and surgical tapes through which the skin of the user is visible.53  
A descriptive term can only function as a valid trademark if it acquires 
“secondary meaning,” which means the mark is recognized by the 
consuming public as referencing a particular product from a unitary 
source.54  For example, all businesses in which eyeglasses and contact 
 
 51. Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 964 F.2d 1338, 1339 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 52. P.A.W. Safety Charities v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 3-99-CV-0212-P, 
2000 WL 284193, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2000). 
The concept of descriptiveness is broadly construed.  A mark need not convey 
every relevant piece of information about the nature of a product to be 
characterized as descriptive.  Rather, it must only “immediately convey[] an 
important attribute of plaintiffs’ products.”  The noun “pet” commonly refers 
to “a domesticated animal kept for pleasure rather than utility.”  The dictionary 
defines “pal” as “a close friend.”  Thus, the literal interpretation of “pet pal” is 
one who is a friend to his or her pet.  It is a common and distinctive quality of 
friendship to care for and seek the well-being of one’s friend.  Thus, it takes no 
imagination or perception to conclude that a program called “Pet Pals” is one 
that promotes the well-being of pets.  The mark describes the essence of 
plaintiff’s program, even though it does not specifically spell out all the 
associated services. 
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
 53. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1179 
(C.C.P.A. 1972). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2000); see also Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 774 
F. Supp. 103, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
[W]here the issue [in a trademark infringement action] becomes one of 
establishing secondary meaning, the relevant inquiry focuses upon whether the 
mark, “although not inherently distinctive, comes through use to be uniquely 
associated with a single source,” that is, “whether the public is moved in any 
degree to buy an article because of its source.”  Moreover, the burden of proof 
rests upon the party claiming rights in the mark, and “entails vigorous 
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lenses are available for purchase may be referred to as “vision centers” 
but one specific enterprise cannot obtain a valid trademark in the 
descriptive words “Vision Center” unless it can demonstrate that the public 
distinctly associates the term “Vision Center” with its particular optical 
merchandise establishment.55  Though proving that a mark connotes a 
specific source rather than a general concept may sound as difficult and 
perhaps metaphysical as other aspects of trademark law, courts generally 
require mark holders to produce empirical evidence to that effect.56 
3.  Suggestive Marks 
A suggestive term is one that suggests, rather than describes, an 
attribute of the marked good or service, and requires imagination to 
cognitively link the trademark to the exact nature of the product.57  The 
term “Pizza Rolls” was held to be suggestive when “used in association 
with party snacks consisting of pillow shaped egg batter crusts filled 
with various food products to obtain different flavors.”58  The court concluded: 
The term PIZZA ROLLS could suggest a number of items, including small 
pizzas, pizza rolled up, pizza flavored candy, or a bread dough roll filled with 
pizza flavoring. It takes imagination and thought to perceive the nature, quality, 
characteristics or ingredients of plaintiff’s products based upon the mark PIZZA 
ROLLS, all of which clearly indicate that the term is suggestive.59 
Other marks that have been deemed to be suggestive include 
“psychocalisthenics” for a combination of “various yoga systems, dance 
and calisthenics” designed to produce “specific mental, emotional and 
spiritual results,”60 “brown-in-bag” for transparent plastic film bags in 
 
evidentiary requirements.”  Direct or circumstantial evidence may establish 
secondary meaning, including the use of survey evidence by a representative 
sample of consumers.  The extent of public exposure to the mark as determined 
by the sales volume, length of time of use, and promotional efforts may also be 
utilized to establish secondary meaning. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 55. See Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 119 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 56. See, e.g., Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 254 (5th Cir. 1997); Soweco, Inc. v. 
Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1980); First Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. U.S. 
Bancorp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1070–71 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 57. Soweco, Inc., 617 F.2d at 1184. 
 58. Jeno’s Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, 227 U.S.P.Q 224, 228 (D. 
Minn. 1985) (quoting Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 7–8). 
 59. Id. 
 60. W. & Co. v. Arica Inst., Inc., 557 F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1977). 
While “psychocalisthenics,” as noted, bears some relationship to the physical 
exercises conducted by Arica, this would be expected of any suggestive mark, 
and, in fact, would be one of the purposes of the mark.  But we cannot say that 
“psychocalisthenics” merely describes “a combination of various yoga 
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which foods could be cooked,61 and “The Money Store” for money 
lending services.62 
Trademarks held to be suggestive are deemed inherently distinctive 
and therefore valid and enforceable without proof of secondary 
meaning.63  This makes the distinction between “descriptive” and 
“suggestive” very important to the mark holder.64  However, where to 
situate the taxonomic division between the two categories can be 
difficult to ascertain.  According to one court: 
In the 1930s two courts split on the question of whether the trademark “Chicken 
of the Sea” for tuna was descriptive or suggestive.  The indirectness of the 
association between “Chicken of the Sea” and tuna may thus be taken as a 
rough indicator of where the borderline between descriptive and suggestive 
marks lies.65 
As another court observed, “The line between descriptive and 
suggestive terms is often blurred, and the categorization of a name as 
‘descriptive’ or ‘suggestive’ is frequently ‘made on an intuitive basis 
rather than as a result of a logical analysis susceptible of articulation.’”66 
4.  Arbitrary and Fanciful Marks 
“Arbitrary” trademarks are usually defined as those that adapt a 
 
systems, dance and calisthenics” which require continual motion and are 
designed to produce specific mental, emotional and spiritual results.  We think 
the term does “requir[e] imagination, thought and perception to reach a 
conclusion as to the nature of [the services].” 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 61. In re Application of Reynolds Metals Co., 480 F.2d 902, 904 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 62. The Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 673–74 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 63. See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
 64. See, e.g., W. & Co., 557 F.2d at 342. 
In the broad middle ground where most of the trademark battles are fought are 
the terms which are primarily descriptive and those which are only suggestive.  
The distinction, while not always readily apparent, is important, because those 
which are descriptive may obtain registration only if they have acquired 
secondary meaning, while suggestive terms are entitled to registration without 
such proof. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co., v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 661 (2d Cir. 
1970). 
 65. Lewis Mgmt. Co. v. Corel Corp., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1534, 1537 (S.D. Cal. 1995) 
(citations omitted). 
 66. Calamari Fisheries, Inc. v. The Village Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 994, 1008 (D. 
Mass. 1988) (quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1528 (1984)). 
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common word to an unfamiliar circumstance, such as “automobile” as a 
mark for a brand of paper napkins, for a line of plumbing supplies, or 
any other good or service not even remotely associated with motorized 
transportation.67  The identical word can be generic or arbitrary 
depending on context; generic if it is the name of the good or service in 
common parlance (“car” as a textual mark for an automobile), and 
arbitrary if it has no logical association whatsoever with the underlying 
product (“car” as a textual mark for fabric softener). 
The “fanciful” appellation is generally reserved for words and 
symbols that are “invented solely for their use as trademarks.”68 Fanciful 
marks include Kodak, Xerox, and “the word ‘CHAMS’ on the top side 
of a curved, inverted almost-equilateral triangle with a triple-bar wing-
like design and a heavy letter ‘C’ superimposed in the center of the 
shield,” embroidered on garments.69  Like trademarks held to be suggestive, 
arbitrary and fanciful marks are considered inherently distinctive and 
protectable without proof of secondary meaning.70 
Arbitrary and fanciful marks are the strongest marks in the sense that 
associations between these types of marks and the marketed goods and 
services can be accorded entirely to the mark holder’s efforts.  “Kodak” 
signifies cameras and film to the consuming public only because the 
Eastman Kodak Company has created this associative meaning through 
its long term, widespread production of Kodak goods and services and 
extensive marketing campaigns.71  However, made-up words are not 
strong trademarks in a commercial sense if few consumers recognize 
them or perceptually link them to underlying goods and services.  The 
strength of a mark is a function of both its categorical denotation and the 
quantum of recognition it enjoys among the targeted members of the 
consuming populace.72 
 
 67. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12; see also McKee Baking Co. v. 
Interstate Brands Corp., 738 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (explaining that 
fanciful marks are coined terms with no dictionary meaning, while arbitrary marks are 
common words applied in an unfamiliar, nondescriptive way). 
 68. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12. 
 69. Chams De Baron Ltd. v. H. Cotler Co., No. 84 Civ. 1237, 1984 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18993, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1984). 
 70. See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
 71. See, e.g., Kodak, History of Kodak: Introduction, at http://www.kodak.com/ 
US/en/corp/aboutKodak/kodakHistory/kodakHistory.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). 
 72. See, e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 
188, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
   It is well settled that the strength of a mark refers to “the distinctiveness, or 
more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as 
emanating from a particular, although possibly anonymous source.”  A mark’s 
strength is measured by considering two factors: “its inherent distinctiveness, 
and its distinctiveness in the marketplace.” 
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B.  Trademark Categorization Requires Context 
The word “apple” is the generic word for a particular tree-growing 
fruit, so “apple” cannot be a valid trademark for apples.  It is, however, 
an arbitrary or fanciful trademark for computers, or for musical sound 
recordings, hence Apple Computers73 and Apple Records.74  Similarly, 
“popcorn” is generic when it references eponymous kernels of snack 
food drenched in butter and salt, but was found suggestive when 
pertaining to a line of oddly shaped silver anodes.75 
The word “ice” is generic for cubes of frozen water, but was held to be 
a suggestive and therefore protectable mark with respect to chewing 
gum.76  “Ice” also has been used as a trademark for beer, and in one 
lawsuit was asserted to be generic by one litigant, while the mark holder 
claimed that the relationship between ice and beer was “either arbitrary, 
fanciful or suggestive.”77  The keys to correctly categorizing the mark are 
consumer understanding and common usage of the term at the time the 
issue is presented to a court.78  Thus, categorizing trademarks can require 
substantial amounts of intuitive contextualizing by jurists, who perhaps 
become acclimated to or enamored of the practice, and too readily apply 
it to other trademark precepts such as consumer-confusion analysis. 
 
Id. (citations omitted); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782 
F. Supp. 457, 462 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
[T]he Gallo mark itself has been held by a sister court of this Circuit to have 
achieved “virtually universal recognition as a trademark for wine,” and that it 
is “universally known both nationally and in California, and has become an 
extraordinarily strong and distinctive mark.”  This conclusion is further 
supported by Gallo’s undisputed showing that it has used the Gallo mark in 
relation to its wines for over 50 years; it has spent some $500 million in 
advertising its wines distributed under the mark; and it has sold to consumers 
some 2 billion bottles of wine bearing the Gallo mark. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 73. U.S. Trademark No. 78,170,383 (filed Oct. 2, 2002); see Apple Computer, 
Inc., at http://www.apple.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). 
 74. U.S. Trademark No. 74,693,839 (filed June 26, 1995); see Apple Records, at 
http://www.schomakers.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). 
 75. RFE Indus., Inc. v. SPM Corp., 105 F.3d 923, 925–26 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 76. Nabisco v. Warner-Lambert Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 690, 696–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(holding that to trademark “ice” for mint flavored chewing gum was suggestive). 
 77. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. John Labatt Ltd., No. 4:93CV02516, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5341, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 1995) (writing that “A-B [Anheuser-Busch] 
argues that the ‘ice’ marks are generic while Labatt argues that they are either arbitrary, 
fanciful or suggestive.”). 
 78. Id. 
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C.  Consumer-Confusion Analysis 
Legal protections for trademarks are doctrinally justified by the need 
to prevent consumer confusion, which potentially disadvantages both 
individuals who are tricked by confusing or deceptive trademarks into 
purchasing goods and services other than those they intended to procure, 
and the providers of goods and services who lose sales when consumers 
are confused or deceived.79  Alternatively phrased, trademark infringement 
occurs when one party adopts a trademark that is the same as or is so 
similar to an existing mark that, when it is applied to the second user’s 
goods or services, the purchasing public is likely to be confused, 
mistaken, or deceived about the source of goods or services themselves, 
or about the relationship between the parties that make the goods or 
provide the services.80  Referentially compressed into the term “likelihood 
of confusion,” this concept is the touchstone of trademark infringement 
liability.81 
 
 79. Leaffer, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
 A reliable, stable, and efficiently structured trademark system benefits 
consumer and business interests alike. Trademarks serve the interests of 
consumers because they reduce search costs and allow buyers to make rational 
purchasing and repurchasing decisions with speed and assurance. Just as 
important, a strong trademark system creates incentives for firms to create and 
market products of desirable qualities, particularly when these qualities are not 
observable before purchase. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 80. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000). 
 81. Id.; Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Rauh Rubber, Inc., 130 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (writing that the “likelihood of consumer confusion . . . is the ‘hallmark of any 
trademark infringement claim’”) (quoting Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 
80 (2d Cir. 1994).  See generaly Case Law, Sabel v. Puma, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135 
(1998) (discussing the German Supreme Court’s establishment of a uniform “likelihood 
of confusion” standard for trademark protection in the Federal Republic of Germany); 
Kristan Friday, How the Ninth Circuit Interprets “Likelihood of Confusion,” 12 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 246 (2001); Patricia J. Kaeding, Comment, Clearly Erroneous 
Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: The Likelihood of Confusion 
Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1291 (1992) (outlining features of 
the Ninth Circuit’s “likelihood of confusion” analysis); Richard L. Kirkpatrick, 
Likelihood of Confusion Issues: The Federal Circuit’s Standard of Review, 40 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1221 (1991) (outlining features of the Federal Circuit’s “likelihood of confusion” 
analysis); Lisa Kobialka, Note, Not Likely, But Possible: A Lesser Standard for 
Trademark Infringement in Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co., 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 477 
(1997) (arguing the Third Circuit had disrupted standard “likelihood of confusion” 
analysis in Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co.); David J. McKinley, Proving Likelihood of 
Confusion: Lanham Act vs. Restatement, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 239 (2001) 
(arguing that potentially relevant “likelihood of confusion” factors have converged for 
all the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal); Micah D. Nessan, Marca Mode CV v. Adidas 
AG: An End to the “Confusion”?, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 629 (2001) (discussing the 
European Court of Justices’ application of the “likelihood of confusion” test in Marca 
Mode CV v. Adidas AG, 2 C.M.L.R. 1061 (2000)); Jacqueline Pasquarella, Confusion 
over the Likelihood of Confusion?: Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar, 38 VILL. L. 
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A trademark can be infringed by the unauthorized use of exact replicas 
of the mark on the same products (where the act might be characterized 
as counterfeiting) or on related goods.82  Trademarks can also be infringed 
by the nonpermissive use of “colorable imitations” of the mark.83  
Whether a mark accused of infringing another mark is similar enough to 
constitute an actionable colorable imitation is a subjective decision that 
courts make and is usually articulated as a judgment about whether the 
contemporaneous coexistence of the marks underlying the dispute is 
likely to cause consumer confusion.84 
When trademark holders attempt to convince a court that the 
trademark related activities of another entity should be enjoined, they 
argue overtly or by implication that consumers are easily confused  
because this helps them prevail in both infringement and dilution 
actions, which in turn broadens the scope of, and increases the strength 
of, their trademarks.  Strong, broadly enforceable trademarks are desirable 
because they may discourage competitors from using otherwise attractive 
and advantageous trademarks of their own that are even mildly similar, 
and simultaneously frighten away those who might otherwise make 
noncompeting or even arguably noncommercial uses of the mark 
 
REV. 1317 (1993) (discussing the Third Circuit’s standard of review of lower court’s 
“likelihood of confusion” determinations); David M. Perry, Comment, Possibility of 
Confusion in Third Circuit Trademark Infringement: A Standard Without a Test, 71 
TEMPLE L. REV. 325 (1998) (outlining the development of the “likelihood of confusion” 
test in Third Circuit trademark cases); Jonathan Pavlovcak, Recent Decisions, Johnny 
Come Lately Gets Some Relief from the Third Circuit—A & H Sportswear Inc. v. 
Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 1999 WL 23441 (3d Cir. 1999), 17 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. 
J. 193 (1998) (discussing the Third Circuit’s formulation of the “likelihood of confusion” 
test in A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc.); Stephen C. Root, Trade 
Dress, the “Likelihood of Confusion,” and Wittgenstein’s Discussion of “Seeing As”: 
The Tangled Landscape of Resemblance, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 757 (2000) (arguing 
“likelihood of confusion” test will necessarily remain “contingent, incomplete, and . . .  
unsatisfactory” given the philosophical issues involved in determining “similarity”); 
Jeffrey J. Rupp, Trademark Law: The Third Circuit’s Rejection of the Possibility of 
Confusion Test, 5 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 16 (1999) (discussing the Third Circuit’s 
formulation of the “likelihood of confusion” test in A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria’s 
Secret Stores, Inc.); Richard E. Stanley, Jr., Comment, Reverse Confusion as Applied in 
Dream Team Collectibles, Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball, and Illinois High 
School Association, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1007 (1998) (discussing the application of the 
“likelihood of confusion” factors in “reverse confusion” cases among the Federal Courts 
of Appeals). 
 82. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
 83. Id. § 1114(1)(a). 
 84. See, e.g., Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 
488, 501 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
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without the mark holder’s explicit authorization. 
1.  Colorable Infringement 
Accusations of trademark infringement are generally raised when one 
entity makes use of a mark that is the same or similar to a mark that is 
“owned” by another.  In this context, the term “ownership” connotes the 
holding of trademark rights, often (but not always) by virtue of use of 
the mark in commerce,85 and by federal registration of the mark obtained 
through the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.  If a competitor makes 
unauthorized use of another’s exact trademark in a clearly deceptive 
manner, that rival may be accused of criminal counterfeiting86 as well as 
trademark infringement.87 
While there is fairly universal agreement that unauthorized uses of 
confusingly similar trademarks by competitors is unfair and should be 
prevented, a meaningful explanation of what “confusingly similar” 
means eludes even a careful reader of the Lanham Act, the federal statute 
 
 85. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1052; id. § 1127 (defining “commerce”). 
 86. See, e.g., Department of Justice, 1701 Trademark Counterfeiting—Introduction, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01701.htm (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2004). 
 The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, § 
1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178 (1984), and the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996), address the growing 
problem of trafficking in counterfeit trademark goods, which has primarily 
involved the clandestine manufacture and distribution of imitations of well-
known trademarked merchandise.  The 1984 Act created an offense, codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2320, which provides that “(w)hoever intentionally traffics or 
attempts to traffic in goods and services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark 
on or in connection with such goods or services” shall be guilty of a felony.  18 
U.S.C. § 2320(a).  Section 2320(b) enables the United States to obtain an order 
for the destruction of articles in the possession of a defendant in a prosecution 
under this section upon a determination by the preponderance of the evidence 
that such articles bear counterfeit marks. 
 These Acts also amend the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., to create 
stronger remedies in civil cases involving the intentional use of a counterfeit 
trademark.  They provide mechanisms for obtaining statutory damages, treble 
damages and attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1117.  The Lanham Act also 
provides for ex parte application by a trademark owner for a court order to 
seize counterfeit materials and instrumentalities where it can be shown that the 
defendant is likely to conceal or transfer the materials.  Id. § 1116(d).  New 
amendments permit the seizure order to be served and executed either by 
federal law enforcement officers or by state or local law enforcement officers.  
Id. § 1116(d)(9).  The Lanham Act also requires applicants to file a notice of 
application for an ex parte seizure order with the United States Attorney, who 
may participate in such proceedings if they appear to affect evidence of a 
federal crime. 
Id. 
 87. “Counterfeit” is defined as “a spurious mark which is identical with, or 
substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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underpinning trademark law.  The Lanham Act defines infringement as the 
“use in commerce of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark” in commerce in a manner “likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,”88 and then rather 
circularly and unhelpfully defines “colorable imitation” as a term that 
“includes any mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely 
to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.”89  This means that for all 
practical purposes, a confusingly similar mark is statutorily defined as a 
mark likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive that is used in a 
manner likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.  This 
certainly provides a powerful conceptual illustration of the word 
“confusing,” but gives little guidance to courts about when a competing 
mark accused of being infringing is “confusingly similar.”  As a result, 
federal judges give meaning to the term on a case-by-case basis as they 
issue verdicts and opinions in the context of trademark litigation. 
Actual confusion of consumers need not be demonstrated to prevail in 
an infringement action, merely likelihood thereof.90  If the judges 
assume the average shopper is rather guileless and simpleminded, then 
anything that is even arguably mildly perplexing can be understood to 
meet this low threshold.  Once it is met, the jurist’s task is essentially 
complete because likelihood of confusion connotes likelihood of success 
on a trademark infringement claim, and irreparable injury to the mark 
holder is then presumed.91  Judges who enjoin infringers conveniently 
 
 88. Id. §§ 1114(1), 1125. 
 89. Id. §§ 1114(1), 1127. 
 90. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 
875 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Of course, it is black letter law that actual confusion need not be 
shown to prevail under the Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove 
and the Act requires only a likelihood of confusion as to source.”); Scarves by Vera, Inc. 
v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1175 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that “‘a showing of 
actual confusion is not necessary and in fact is very difficult to demonstrate’ with 
reliable proof”) (quoting W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d 1970); 
see also Kobialka, supra note 81, at 488. 
The “likelihood of confusion” standard is a happy medium between a 
“possibility of confusion” standard and an “actual confusion” standard.  
Demonstrating a possibility of confusion is quite easy.  On the other hand, 
proof of actual confusion is difficult, if not impossible, to establish.  However, 
evidence of actual confusion is only one of several factors employed to make a 
likelihood of confusion determination.  Any proof of actual confusion is 
persuasive evidence that there is a likelihood of confusion, but a lack of actual 
confusion is not dispositive. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 91. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., 799 F.2d at 875. 
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escape the difficult task of precisely articulating how likely confusion 
has to be before “likelihood of confusion” is found.  They are not required 
to ground their determinations in even euphemistically quantitative 
constructs like “preponderance of the evidence,”92 by finding that a 
majority of consumers are likely to be confused.  Nor do they typically 
elucidate any theory of causation, neither explaining how likelihood of 
confusion in a given context leads to harm, nor specifying how to 
measure the amount of confusion that is likely to be generated by a 
particular usage or substantiality of similarity. 
Even the very nature of the confusion inquiry is ambiguous.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition characterizes the conclusion 
that “likelihood of confusion [is] a question of fact subject to the clearly 
erroneous rule” as “the better view, adopted by the majority of courts.”93  
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, views likelihood 
of confusion as a question of law,94 while the Second and Sixth Circuits 
assert that it is a mixed question of law and fact.95  The authors of one of 
 
 92. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th ed. 1999). 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. m (1993). 
 94. See, e.g., Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1569 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 Some circuit courts hold that the question of likelihood of confusion is one 
of fact and is subject to the “clearly erroneous” standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
52(a).  However, other courts hold that it is a conclusion of law.  Our 
predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, recognized in Du 
Pont that the question of likelihood of confusion “has been termed a question 
of fact” by other courts, but did not specifically adopt that view.  It went on to 
say that “if labeled a mixed question or one of law, it is necessarily drawn from 
the probative facts in evidence.”  Subsequently in the case of Interstate Brands 
v. Celestial Seasonings, Chief Judge Markey . . . stated for the majority that the 
question of likelihood of confusion “is a legal conclusion” and cannot be 
“admitted” as a fact. 
 However the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion is characterized, it is 
clear that our predecessor court did not apply the “clearly erroneous” standard 
of review to the issue.  In Du Pont, Chief Judge Markey wrote that “ . . . it is 
the duty of the examiner, the board, and this court (emphasis added) . . . “ to 
determine the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion.  A review of cases in 
which the CCPA reversed the decision of the TTAB on this issue will 
demonstrate that our predecessor court did not consider itself bound by a 
narrow standard of review of the question.  We have held that the decisions of 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are binding upon us.  Therefore, we 
hold that the issue of likelihood of confusion is the ultimate conclusion of law 
to be decided by the court, and that the clearly erroneous rule is not applicable. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 
1043 (2d Cir. 1992). 
In this Circuit, a district court’s determination of the individual Polaroid 
factors are subject to review as findings of fact, subject to reversal only if 
clearly erroneous, while the ultimate balancing of all the Polaroid factors to 
determine the likelihood of confusion in any given case is done de novo by this 
Court. 
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the leading trademark law textbooks have written: “Predictably, the 
diverging viewpoints in this area have produced a muddled body of case 
law, characterized by such inconsistency among and within the circuits 
that it has become difficult to predict how a court will deal with a 
particular case.”96 
Trademark holders of textual trademarks do not “own” the words that 
their trademarks are comprised of for all communicative purposes.97  
Neither do they hold a monopoly over all uses of these words for 
 
Id.; Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988). 
This Circuit considers the question of whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion a mixed question of fact and law.  When reviewing a lower court’s 
decision in these cases, we apply a clearly erroneous standard to findings of 
fact supporting the likelihood of confusion factors, but review de novo the 
legal question whether, given the foundational facts as found by the lower 
court, those facts constitute a “likelihood of confusion.” 
Id. 
 96. JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 419 (3d 
ed. 2001).  Because this Article critiques published opinions, the emphasis here is on 
judicial rather than jury-based “likelihood of confusion” determinations, regardless of 
whether they are characterized as factual or legal in nature.  One might surmise that 
juries asked to decide whether consumer confusion is likely could be greatly influenced 
by the manner in which the inquiry was framed: “Are you likely be confused?” is apt to 
generate more negative responses than “Is anyone likely to be confused?”  In 
consequence, both jury biases, and judicial biases that improperly affect or color jury 
instructions, could lead to unjust and unjustified outcomes for individual parties, but 
such issues are not specifically considered here. 
 97. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is 
Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 720 (1992) (“Certainly, one may conceptualize 
trademarks as property in the Lockean sense . . . .  In American law, of course, it is axiomatic 
that trademarks are not property in this sense.”); Megan E. Gray, Defending Against a 
Dilution Claim: A Practitioner’s Guide, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 205, 209–10 (1996). 
The trademark right is an exclusionary right, not a property right in the word 
itself.  To be more specific, trademark owners do not actually own the 
underlying mark at issue—they only possess a right to exclude others from 
using the mark in a manner that would harm consumers.  A pure ownership 
right in a mark has not been granted, nor is it likely to be granted, because of 
the potential monopolization of language to which this could lead.  Dilution 
statutes obviously grant broader protection than traditional trademark law since 
a dilution cause of action allows a trademark owner to exclude those who use 
the mark in a non-confusing manner.  However, dilution statutes only grant a 
quasi-property right in a mark. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  But cf. Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property 
Paradigm and Trademark Incontestability: A Call for Rewriting the Lanham Act, 13 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 303, 306 (2000) (“Trademarks are not—or at least, were not—
property prior to the passage of the Lanham Act; incontestability . . . raises a serious 
question, descriptively speaking, as to whether trademarks now are property.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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trademark purposes.98  If two products or markets are sufficiently unrelated, 
two entities can use the same words as trademarks without triggering 
legally actionable consumer confusion.  As one court put it: 
[T]wo marks that serve to identify products in two unrelated markets may very 
well coexist without confusion in the public’s eye.  Thus Notre Dame brand 
imported french cheese has been permitted to coexist with Notre Dame 
University; Bulova watches with Bulova shoes; Alligator raincoats with 
Alligator cigarettes; “This Bud’s for you” in beer commercials with the same 
phrase used by a florist; White House tea and coffee with White House milk; 
Blue Shield medical care plan with Blue Shield mattresses; Family Circle 
magazine with Family Circle department store; Ole’ cigars with Ole’ tequila; 
and Sunkist fruits with Sunkist bakery products.  The list continues.99 
Two parties may have legitimate, discrete national trademark rights 
that conflict only when they operate conterminously in a specific 
marketplace using the same or similar trademarks on the same or similar 
products or services.  This is what might be described as a classic 
“innocent” trademark dispute in the sense that there is no indication 
either party has chosen its mark with any nefarious “free riding” or 
“palming off” motivation, but cognizable numbers of consumers could 
plausibly be confused, to the detriment of both mark holders.  The mark 
holders would not fully reap the benefits of their “good reputations” and 
“desirable product features” and might be forced to invest in communicative 
advertising simply to distinguish its goods or services from those offered 
by competitors.  They may alternatively feel compelled to change their 
trademarks, or to use whatever legal mechanisms are available to try to 
get a competitor to stop using a mark, or both.  These cases can arise 
when companies expand into new geographic regions,100 when two 
companies begin using the same or similar marks contemporaneously,101 
when an entity adopts a mark unaware that another business has been 
using it, or when a mark is adopted with knowledge of prior use but with 
the assumption that either the preexisting marks or the underlying goods 
and services are sufficiently dissimilar such that the adoption and use of 
 
 98. Trademarks deemed “famous” receive very broad protections under the 
Lanham Act.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000).  Section 1125(c) lists eight 
factors for determining whether a mark is famous, but application of these factors by the 
courts has been varied.  See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, A Circus Among the Circuits: Would 
the Truly Famous and Diluted Performer Please Stand up? The Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act and Its Challenges, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 158, 173–90 (1999). 
 99. Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 210 (D. Md. 1988). 
 100. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 94–95 
(1918); Thrifty Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1179 (1st Cir. 
1987); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 101. See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1262–63 (5th Cir. 
1975); Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 253, 254–55 (D. 
Del. 1997); Shalom Children’s Wear Inc. v. In-Wear A/S, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516, 1517 
(T.T.A.B. 1993). 
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a particular mark will not be viewed as a problem.102 
2.  Trademark Dilution and Even More Confusion 
In the United States, holders of “famous” trademarks103 can assert a 
statutory right to prevent others from “diluting” their marks.104  Dilution 
as defined by the Lanham Act “means the lessening of the capacity of a 
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of 
the presence or absence of—(1) competition between the owner of the 
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, 
 
 102. See, e.g., Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 
1080–81 (7th Cir. 1988); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 
1185, 1190–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 103. A definition of famous is not provided in the Lanham Act and has developed 
somewhat inconsistently in case law.  See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar 
Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2001) (using legislative intent to find 
that “famous marks” under the Landham Act must carry “a substantial degree of fame”); 
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 163–66 
(3d Cir. 2000) (determining a mark can be “famous” within “a niche market”); Avery 
Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that famous 
marks are “truly famous and registered”); Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. 
Supp. 1030, 1033 (D. Haw. 1996) (using eight nonexclusive factors from the act to 
determine famous marks); Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 
688, 692 (D. Md. 1996) (failing to define “famous marks”).  See generally Edward E. 
Vassallo & Maryanne Dickey, Protection in the United States for “Famous Marks”: The 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act Revisited, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
503 (1999) (providing an overview of “famous marks” case law).  As one commentator 
has observed: 
The Dilution Act unfortunately provides no instructions for resolving its 
ambiguous language.  The Act mandates that for a mark to enjoy protection it 
must be “famous,” but does not define the term famous.  On one hand, the Act 
extends protection to famous marks against diluting use of that mark after it 
has become famous.  On the other hand, the act requires the diluting use to 
cause “dilution of the distinctive quality of the [famous] mark” and provides 
eight factors to determine whether the mark is “distinctive and famous.”  This 
leads to numerous unanswered questions.  Must a mark be both famous and 
distinctive?  Is distinctive a synonym for fame?  Should an independent inquiry 
for distinctiveness be conducted in addition to a fame analysis?  What are the 
factors a mark must possess in order to be distinctive or famous?  Can a mark 
be distinctive and not famous?  Is a famous mark automatically a distinctive 
mark?  Is a distinctive mark also a famous mark? Can a famous mark be 
distinctive?  Does distinctive under the Dilution Act have the same meaning as 
distinctive in the traditional trademark infringement context?  Given such 
ambiguity, it is not a surprise to see that the terms distinctive and famous have 
been subject to a wide range of interpretations. 
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving Fame and Dilution 
Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REV. 201, 209–10 (1999). 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
BARTOW.DOC 9/16/2019  3:49 PM 
 
752 
or deception.”105  Trademark dilution is thus the use of a mark, or the use 
of a “too-similar” mark, by an unauthorized entity that does not fit 
traditional notions of infringing conduct because there is little risk that 
consumers will be confused or misled by the use.106  A mark holder 
could argue that unauthorized use of a trademark on a dissimilar, 
noncompeting good or service diluted the mark, undermining the mark’s 
uniqueness and unfairly usurping the goodwill associated with the mark 
that the mark holder had worked hard to generate.  The nationwide right 
to enjoin trademark dilution is a fairly recent development, as it was 
codified in the federal trademark statute in 1995,107 though many states 
had antidilution laws previously.108 
By giving famous mark owners the ability to prevent dilution, in 
addition to infringement, some critics assert that these mark holders are 
given improperly expansive property rights (sometimes called 
“trademarks in gross”) in words and symbols.109  Customarily, a mark 
 
 105. Id. § 1127. 
 106. See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at 163; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, 985 F. Supp. 949, 959 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also Jacqueline R. Knapp, 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act: The Circuit Split Makes a Desparate Call to the 
Supreme Court for Uniformity, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 877–78 (2003); Dickerson M. 
Downing, From Odol to Lingerie: Dilution and the “Victoria’s Secret” Decisions, 744 
PLI/PAT 273, 283 (2003).  But see Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217–
18 (2d Cir. 1999); Terry Ahearn, Comment, Dilution by Blurring Under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: What Is It and How Is It Shown?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 893, 907 (2001) (“Although still used in some state court cases, judges and 
commentators have largely discredited the test for being too similar to the tests used for 
determining likelihood of confusion in traditional trademark infringement cases.”). 
 107. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 took effect on January 16, 1996. 
 108. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 97, at 207–08. 
 Dilution statutes are a relatively new phenomenon in the trademark 
protection field. The first dilution law was passed in Massachusetts in 1947.  
Since then, approximately twenty-five states have adopted dilution laws of 
their own.  Three states include dilution as part of their common law.  In fact, 
one court has recently noted that a dilution claim is practically boilerplate in 
trademark actions.  The vast majority of states with dilution laws have adopted 
statutes that are much the same as section 12 of the Model State Trademark 
Bill.  Despite this similarity in language, courts have been wildly inconsistent 
in their interpretations of dilution statutes. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 109. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 875 (noting that dilution laws, 
“much more so than infringement and unfair competition laws, tread very close to 
granting ‘rights in gross’ in a trademark”); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999) (“This 
radical dilution proposal, whose practical effect if fully adopted would be to create as the 
whole of trademark-protection law property rights in gross in suitably ‘unique’ marks, 
never has been legislatively adopted by any jurisdiction in anything approaching that 
extreme form.”); see also Matthew D. Caudill, Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What 
“Causes Dilution” Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)—A Recommendation to Whittle Away the 
Liberal Application of Trademark Dilution to Internet Domain Names, 13 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231 (contending that the liberal application of dilution 
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could not be registered unless it was in use, or the registration applicant 
asserted an intention to begin using the mark in commerce shortly.  
Warehousing of trademarks for future uses remains doctrinally 
discouraged.110  Under antidilution principles, however, famous mark 
owners gain the ability to “reserve” preexisting marks for a wide variety 
of future uses, even if they have no intention of ever utilizing the marks 
in alternative ways.  For example, the General Motors Corporation may 
have no interest in making or marketing Chevrolet ice cream, but can 
bring a trademark dilution suit against any dairy company that attempts 
it.  As one commentator explained: 
Trademark dilution is based not on the notion of protecting consumers from 
deception, but on protecting mark owners from a possible diminution in the 
value of their marks.  The theory of dilution . . . is that a second use of a well-
known mark, even where the second use does not confuse consumers, gradually 
erodes the unique symbolism of that mark.  Over time, many such uses erode 
the unique connection between a well-known mark and goods produced by the 
mark’s owner.  Once that connection is partially severed by the presence of 
other (usually non-competing or non-similar) goods with the same brand name, 
the value of the trademark as a marketing device is eroded.  Dilution proponents 
have cited these as potential examples of diluting uses of a mark: Buick candy 
bars, Kodak laundry detergent, and the like.  In contrast to ordinary trademark 
infringement, dilution is not predicated on any showing of likelihood of 
confusion.  The injury is the reduced marketing value of the mark, rather than 
confusion in the marketplace.111 
 
laws produces property rights in gross and frustrates the purpose of trademark law); 
Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for 
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 864–66 (1997) (finding the FTDA may 
create property rights in gross for holders of famous marks).  But see Paul J. Heald, 
Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS 
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 642–43 (1996). 
Article 16 of TRIPS requires that a dissimilar use “indicate a connection 
between [the infringing] goods or services and the owner of the registered 
trademark.”  The requirement of a mistaken belief in a “connection between 
those goods” seems much closer to the traditional Lanham Act false 
sponsorship cause of action than to a cause of action for dilution. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original). 
 110. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 
1185, 1203–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Buti v. 
Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1998); Michael B. Landau, Problems 
Arising out of the Use of “WWW.Trademark.Com”: The Application of Principles of 
Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 467 
(1997) (writing that “[o]ne cannot simply create ‘catchy’ marks, not use them and then 
assert them against the users.  In order to maintain rights in a mark, the trademark owner 
must maintain the mark’s usage in connection with goods and/or services”). 
 111. David S. Welkowitz, Protection Against Trademark Dilution in the U.K. and 
Canada: Inexorable Trend or Will Tradition Triumph?, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
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Thus, dilution was intended to create a cause of action for famous 
mark holders who objected to uses of the same or similar marks in 
commerce on unrelated goods or services that did not confuse consumers.  
Consumer confusion plays no overt role in dilution analysis where the 
interloper uses the exact same mark as the famous one.  Judicial confusion 
is often apparent when U.S. courts attempt to articulate what it means to 
“lessen distinctiveness,”112 as is judicial bewilderment, judicial bafflement, 
and judicial befuddlement; on the other hand, whether consumers are 
perplexed or deceived by the use of a preexisting mark on unrelated 
goods is, at least according to some courts, doctrinally irrelevant.113 
However, dilution claims are not limited to exact copying.  Famous 
marks are also protected from dilution by similar marks, and deciding 
whether an accused mark is similar enough to trigger dilution concerns 
requires a determination of whether or not it is similar enough to be 
confused with the famous mark.  In the context of dilution claims by 
similar marks, some courts have even required proof of consumer 
confusion.114  Though consumer confusion in the dilution context is 
theoretically a somewhat different construct, the reasoning used by many 
courts in making this subjective determination often substantially 
 
REV. 63, 67–68 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 112. See, e.g., Port, supra note 15, at 831.  Port analyzed section 43(c) of the 
Lanham Act and concluded: 
[T]his congressional expansion of the trademark right in the United States has 
created a state where circuit courts have no real idea of what a likelihood of 
dilution means and therefore, conclude, in most instances, that a famous mark 
is a diluted mark without any real justification for this conclusion. 
Id.; see also Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in 
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 953 (2001). 
Courts repeatedly throw up their hands in frustration when asked “to identify 
the legal interest sought to be protected from ‘dilution,’ [and] hence the legal 
harm sought to be prevented.”  Since any concurrent use of a mark diminishes 
that mark’s distinctiveness in some sense, separating unauthorized uses that 
dilute from those that do not has proven quite difficult.  Unless dilution is read 
to prohibit virtually all unauthorized uses of a given mark, the doctrine can 
begin “to lose its coherence as a legally enforceable norm.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original). 
 113. Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
trademark dilution laws protect “distinctive” or “famous” trademarks from certain 
unauthorized uses of the marks regardless of a showing of competition or likelihood of 
confusion). 
 114. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 
1026, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989). 
   Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to hold that, although violation of an 
antidilution statute does not require confusion of product or source, the marks 
in question must be sufficiently similar that confusion may be created as 
between the marks themselves. We need not go that far.  We hold only that the 
marks must be “very” or “substantially” similar and that, absent such 
similarity, there can be no viable claim of dilution. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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parallels the analyses applied when ascertaining whether consumer 
confusion is likely in trademark infringement disputes.  For example, 
one of the first dilution cases was brought by a company that owned the 
mark Wawa for convenience stores, against an entity that began using 
the mark HaHa for its own convenience stores.115  Wawa submitted a 
marketing survey in support of its dilution claim, and the court found the 
survey persuasive, writing: “Plaintiff buttresses its position by introducing 
evidence of a marketing survey which concludes that persons in 
HAHA’s neighborhood who were interviewed about Defendant’s market 
tended, in 29% of the cases, to associate Defendant’s market with a 
Wawa market.”116  How this “tendency to associate” differed from a 
likelihood of confusion was not articulated and is difficult to distill from 
the wildly oscillating and inconsistent case law that has developed 
subsequent to this decision.117  Several courts have overtly adopted 
aspects of the trademark infringement analysis pertaining to consumer 
confusion for use in deciding trademark dilution cases.118 
 
 115. Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 116. Id. at 1632. 
 117. Criticism of the inconsistent ways in which courts apply antidilution laws 
come from a variety of normative viewpoints.  See, e.g., W. Whitaker Rayner, In Search 
of a Dilution Solution: Implementation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 20 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 93, 93–94 (1999) (“[F]ederal courts have struggled with the development of a 
body of case law interpreting the FTDA.  As more fully described below, the various 
circuits have, on occasion, reached diametrically opposed conclusions as to the 
interpretation of certain provisions of the FTDA.”); Ahearn, supra note 106, at 893–94. 
The FTDA was designed to provide uniform national protection to the value of 
trademarks and replace the “patch quilt system” of state laws that had 
produced inconsistent and unenforceable results.  However, dilution theory has 
never been unanimously accepted as a viable extension of traditional 
trademark protection, and as previous failed legislation and state court 
experience has shown, the application of dilution theory is intensely debated 
and begrudgingly applied. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); Nguyen, supra note 98, at 158. 
Each of the circuit courts that has had the opportunity to address the Act has its 
own idea about dilution and fame, the meaning of dilution, how to establish 
fame, and how to prove dilution.  With the conflicting rulings from these 
circuits, there is a circus among the circuits.  Each performer at the circus is 
carrying its own act leaving trademark owners a federal anti-dilution system 
that is almost as chaotic as the original patchwork system of more than twenty-
five state statutes. 
Id. 
 118. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 476 (6th Cir. 
2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports 
News, 212 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2001); Mead Data Cent., Inc., 875 F.2d at 1031; 
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
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As one observer has written, “the harm that dilution seeks to address 
might best be described as a loss of consumer attention due to the 
proliferation of similar or identical symbols of trade.”119  Generally, 
judges do not address what, in fact, causes consumers to lose attention 
and how to quantify attendant damages.  In fact, U.S. courts have not 
consistently required evidence of any actual harm to substantiate claims 
of trademark dilution.  In one case, the court stated that requiring proof 
of lost revenue “seem[ed] inappropriate,”120 as did judicially setting 
forth any specific definition of, or test for, trademark dilution.  Instead, 
the judge wrote that “courts would do better to feel their way from case 
to case, setting forth in each those factors that seem to bear on the 
resolution of that case . . . .”121  This approach cannot help but create great 
uncertainty among any entity that is considering adopting a new mark. 
There is some possibility that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue122 will bring needed clarity to the 
meaning and correct application of the trademark dilution statute.  After 
the Court heard oral argument in this case on November 12, 2002, 
courtroom observers opined that the lawyers on both sides had a hard 
time articulating a consistent definition of trademark dilution, and the 
Justices seemed quite frustrated by the exercise.123  Ultimately, on 
March 4, 2003 the Court concluded that under the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act mark holders were required to show “actual dilution” to 
prevail.124  The Court stopped short of requiring proof of the consequences 
 
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000); Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. 
Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 797–98 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev’d, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 119. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 713 (2d ed. 2001) (emphasis in original). 
 120. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 223. 
 121. Id. at 227. 
 122. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 123. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Thong of the South: How a Kentucky Smut Shop Put 
the Starch in Victoria’s Secret’s Shorts, SLATE, Nov. 12, 2002, at http://slate.msn.com/ 
?id=2073884. 
The case end[ed] on the same confused note on which it began.  There is a 
trademark dilution statute that is supposed to protect more than traditional 
trademark law, but no one is quite sure how much more or how to prove it.  
It’s not at all clear to me, or the court, that Victoria’s Secret cat litter or 
aluminum siding really tarnishes the image of the lingerie giant.  Nor is it clear 
why the cat litter people would choose that name unless they intended to 
unfairly profit from Victoria’s Secret’s success.  The court will need to decide 
how much copycatting is acceptable, and how much more trademark 
protection to afford the famous, merely because they’re famous. 
Id.; see also Bill Adair, Victor v. Victoria, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at A1; 
Joan Biskupic, High Court Mulls What’s in a Name, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 2002, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2002-11-12-victor-usat_x.htm; 
Tony Mauro, Victoria’s Trademark May Carry the Day, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 18, 2002, at 6. 
 124. See, e.g., Bassam N. Ibrahim & Bryce J. Maynard, Supreme Court Opinion 
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of dilution, such as actual loss of sales or profits, but held: “[A]t least 
where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers 
mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not 
sufficient to establish actionable dilution.”125  How a mark holder might 
adequately demonstrate a reduction in the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify the goods of its owners was not spelled out, though the opinion 
suggested that establishing that the defendant’s mark caused consumers 
to “form a different impression” of the plaintiff’s mark was necessary.126 
The Court did not appear to explicate the concept of trademark 
dilution in a manner straightforward enough to allow for consistent 
application across a broad range of factual situations.  Mark holders, 
courts, and defendants still have little additional guidance beyond the list 
of eight nonexclusive factors for assessing distinctiveness and fame, 
which do not address how distinctive and famous the mark should be, or 
what degree of fame, notoriety, or recognition the mark should possess,  
to qualify for protection.127  It is possible, however, that the Court’s 
holding that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires a showing of 
actual dilution will curtail the invocation of “likelihood of confusion” 
analysis when considering dilution claims.  It is also worth considering 
that if more than a mental association is required to sustain a dilution 
claim pertaining to nonidentical marks, than something beyond mere 
mental associations may be necessary to support likelihood of confusion 
assertions concerning “colorable imitations” as well. 
A recent decision by the Second Circuit in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue suggests that some 
judges will avoid the remaining uncertainties pertaining to the trademark 
dilution doctrine by shoehorning dilution analysis into the trademark 
infringement framework.  For example, in Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. 
Nawab128 in the context of an appeal from a denial of a preliminary 
injunction, the court ruled that Virgin Enterprises was entitled to enjoin 
the use of the marks “Virgin Wireless” and “Virgin Mobile” by another 
entity that had used these marks in commerce and had pursued 
 
Rules That the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) Requires Proof of Actual 
Dilution, FINDLAW, at http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/00320/008759/ 
title/Subject/topic/Intellectual%20Property%20Law_Trademark/filename/intellectualpro
pertylaw_1_237 (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). 
 125. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 1124. 
 126. Id. at 1125. 
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). 
 128. 335 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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registration of them with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.129 
One disquieting aspect of the case is the certitude of the language used 
by the court to express its finding that “Plaintiff’s VIRGIN mark 
undoubtedly scored high on both concepts of strength,”130 though it does 
not appear to be supported by any evidence, such as the extent of the 
advertising invested in the mark, or the volume of sales in Virgin 
stores.131  In another place the opinion states, “There can be no doubt 
that plaintiff’s VIRGIN mark, as used on consumer electronic 
equipment, is a strong mark . . . .”132  This is a startling conclusion for 
the court to reach at all, no less with “no doubt,” because there is no 
indication anywhere else in the opinion concerning how often the 
plaintiff was using the Virgin mark on consumer electronic equipment.  
The equipment listed at the company’s website appears to bear only the 
trademarks of the manufacturers of the equipment, such as Sanyo, 
Nintendo, and IBM.133  The plaintiff’s trademark registration with the 
 
 129. See ITU Serial Numbers 75,845,508, 75,845,511 (abandoned Apr. 9, 2003) (on 
file with USPTO, accessible via TESS, at http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Oct. 24, 
2003)).  After stating that its inquiry was whether “a significant number of consumers 
would be confused about the sponsorship of defendants’ retail stores,” the Virgin court 
decided there was a significant likelihood of confusion, writing that “[c]onsumer 
confusion was more than likely; it was virtually inevitable,” without ever defining or 
quantifying “significant” in any way.  Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 146, 151.  The 
only evidence on this point that is discussed in the opinion is an affidavit from a former 
employee of the defendant who worked at a Virgin Wireless mall kiosk, stating that 
individuals used to ask him if the kiosk was affiliated with plaintiff’s Virgin stores.  Id. 
at 151.  The exact number of people who asked him is not articulated, and whether they 
were still confused when he answered “no” is not addressed either.  Assuming arguendo 
that the result was correct, it is still unsettling that the court seems to base the holding on 
intuition rather than consumer survey evidence. 
 130. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 148. 
 131. See, e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 
188, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 In the instant case, as Kendall-Jackson argues and Banfi more or less 
concedes, ROBERT PEPI COLLINE DI SASSI is an arbitrary mark because it 
has no meaning to the average consumer, nor does it suggest the qualities and 
features of the wine.  However, a finding that a particular mark is arbitrary 
does not guarantee a determination that the mark is strong.  Instead, this Court 
still must evaluate the mark’s distinctiveness in the marketplace. 
 Courts may consider several factors in determining a particular mark’s 
distinctiveness in the marketplace.  For example, the “strength of a mark is . . . 
often ascertained by looking at the extent of advertising invested in it, and by 
the volume of sales of the product.”  In addition, “extensive third-party use can 
dilute the strength of a mark.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 132. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 149. 
 133. A search on the Virgin.net website under the word “electronics” reveals as 
much.  See Virgin.net, Search Results, at http://gps.virgin.net/search/sitesearch?submit. 
x=1&start=0&format=1&num=10&restrict=site&sitefilter=site%2Fsite_filter.hts&si
teresults=site%2Fsite_results.hts&sitescorethreshold=28&scope=virgin&q=electronics (last 
visisted Feb. 20. 2004). 
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U.S. Patent & Trademark Office134 lists Virgin goods and services that 
include: 
[direct mail advertising for others]; dissemination of advertising materials for 
others; preparing advertising, promotions, and public relations materials for 
other; [management of promotional and incentive plans and services for others]; 
business organization promotional consulting for others; demonstration of the 
goods and services of others and the promotion thereof; promoting and 
advertising the goods and services of others by [aircraft], airships and air 
balloons; outdoor advertising such as by billboards; and distribution of 
advertising, promotional materials and sample materials of others. . . . 
. . . transportation of goods and passengers by road, [rail], air [and sea]; freight 
transportation services; [tourist agency services]; travel agency services; 
[arranging travel tours; and transportation reservation services]. . . . 
. . . [clubs, nightclubs]; bars; [hotels; resorts; hotel reservation services; hotel 
and resort management for others; carry-out restaurant and restaurant services; 
catering; computer programming for others; computer software design services 
for others; artwork and graphic design services for others]; and retail store 
services in the fields of [cosmetics and laundry preparations, metal hardware], 
cameras, records, audio and video tapes, [audio and video recorders], computers 
and electronic apparatus, [jewelry, clocks] and watches, [musical instruments, 
stationery], sheet music, books and photography, handbags, purses, luggage and 
leather goods, clothing, [lace, embroidery, gifts and sewing materials, toys], 
games, video game machines and video game cartridges, [processed foods, 
jellies and jams, coffee, tea, bakery items and candy, beer, ale, mineral and 
aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks, wines, spirits and liqueurs, and 
tobacco and smokers’ articles].135 
Given this diverse range of uses, whether the Virgin mark is strong in 
terms of consumer recognition with respect to any particular good or 
service listed cannot reasonably be a matter of judicial intuition.  
Whether the mark is actually “strong” with respect to consumer electronic 
equipment, because significant numbers of consumers associate it with 
consumer electronic equipment, is susceptible to evidentiary proof, which 
the court ought to have required, and to have referenced in its opinion. 
Far more problematic is the court’s repeated assertion that the Virgin 
mark is “famous.”136 Marks do not have to be famous to receive 
protection from infringement; famousness is not relevant to an infringement 
inquiry at all.  Famousness is, however, a requirement to receive federal 
dilution protection under the Lanham Act, which requires a mark holder 
 
 134. U.S. Trademark No. 1,851,817 (issued Aug. 30, 1994). 
 135. Id. (brackets in original). 
 136. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 146 (writing that “the district court accorded 
plaintiff too narrow a scope of protection for its famous, arbitrary, and distinctive 
mark”); see also id. at 149 (writing that “Plaintiff’s VIRGIN mark was also famous”). 
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asserting famousness to make a fairly substantial evidentiary showing.137  
While Virgin may have been able to make such a showing, there is no 
indication that it actually did.  In addition, even though the court never 
mentions the word “dilution” in the entire opinion, it appears to award 
dilution style protection to the mark holder, a right to own the mark in 
gross.  After asserting, without statutory or case law support, that “the law 
accords broad, muscular protection to marks that are arbitrary or fanciful 
in relation to the products on which they are used,”138 the court stated: 
If a mark is arbitrary or fanciful, and makes no reference to the nature of the 
goods it designates, consumers who see the mark on different objects offered in 
the marketplace will be likely to assume, because of the arbitrariness of the 
choice of mark, that they all come from the same source.  For example, if 
consumers become familiar with a toothpaste sold under an unusual, arbitrary 
brand name, such as ZzaaqQ, and later see that same inherently distinctive 
brand name appearing on a different product, they are likely to assume, 
notwithstanding the product difference, that the second product comes from the 
same producer as the first.139 
This is a description of the trademark “problem” that the dilution 
cause of action is intended to remedy.  It does not accurately portray an 
infringement claim, as absent dilution protections, a mark holder cannot 
prevent others from using the same trademark on products or in markets 
that are sufficiently unrelated.140  One can observe additional creeping 
dilution analysis in this subsequent passage from the opinion: 
 
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 states in pertinent part: 
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider 
factors such as, but not limited to— 
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; 
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or 
services with which the mark is used; 
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; 
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; 
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of 
trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction is 
sought; 
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; 
and 
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the 
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 138. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 147.  In fact, this statement is contrary to 
much case law.  See, e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. 
Supp. 2d 188, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that “a finding that a particular mark is 
arbitrary does not guarantee a determination that the mark is strong”). 
 139. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 148. 
 140. See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text; infra notes 260–351 and 
accompanying text. 
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If a mark has been long, prominently and notoriously used in commerce, there 
is a high likelihood that consumers will recognize it from its prior use.  
Widespread consumer recognition of a mark previously used in commerce 
increases the likelihood that consumers will assume it identifies the previously 
familiar user, and therefore increases the likelihood of consumer confusion if 
the new user is in fact not related to the first.  A mark’s fame also gives 
unscrupulous traders an incentive to seek to create consumer confusion by 
associating themselves in consumers’ minds with a famous mark.  The added 
likelihood of consumer confusion resulting from a second user’s use of a famous 
mark gives reason for according such a famous mark a broader scope of 
protection, at least when it is also inherently distinctive.141 
Again, the court is articulating the rationale for dilution protection for 
famous marks, but couching it in “likelihood of confusion” language.142  
In so doing, it accorded the mark holder dilution-like protection without 
ever inquiring into, no less finding as an evidentiary matter the “actual 
dilution” that the Supreme Court’s Moseley opinion seems to require.143 
IV.  CONSUMER-CONFUSION ANALYSIS, JUDICIAL SUBJECTIVITY, AND 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
The court takes no offense at the possible inference, accurate or 
not, that Georgia might be a more advantageous forum because 
there are more rednecks here than in Connecticut.144 
In an infringement dispute, a federal court will consider allegedly 
conflicting trademarks in the contexts in which they are used and make a 
determination about whether the dual usages create a “likelihood of 
 
 141. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 148 (citation omitted). 
 142. Id.  The court ultimately concluded: “Because there is no intrinsic reason for a 
merchant to use the word ‘virgin’ in the sale of consumer electronic equipment, a 
consumer seeing VIRGIN used in two different stores selling such equipment will likely 
assume that the stores are related.”  Id. at 149.  While this may be correct, the trademarks 
were different in appearance, as “Defendants’ logo used a difference typeface and 
different colors from plaintiff’s.”  Id.  In addition, the trademarks were somewhat 
different textually (Virgin Megastores versus Virgin Wireless), the stores were very 
different (large retail space versus mall kiosks), and the goods were different (plaintiff 
sold a wide range of products but did not sell telephones, while the defendant sold only 
telephones and related equipment).  Therefore, the conlsuion may have been incorrect 
and is not a one a court should reach simply on the basis of intuition. 
 143. See, e.g., Bassam N. Ibrahim & Bryce J. Maynard, Supreme Court Opinion 
Rules That the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) Requires Proof of Actual 
Dilution, FINDLAW, at http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00320/008759/title/subject/ 
topic/intellectual%20property%20law_trademark/filename/intellectualpropertylaw_1_237 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
 144. Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1208 n.11 (N.D. Ga. 
1995). 
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confusion.”  If so, the mark holder with inferior rights to the disputed 
mark (usually because usage commenced later in time) may be restricted 
to using the mark in a limited geographic area or may be ordered to stop 
using it in commerce altogether.145 
As a general policy matter, when the goods produced by the alleged 
infringer compete for sales with those of the trademark owner, 
infringement usually will be found if the marks are deemed sufficiently 
similar that confusion can be expected.146  For example, an attempt to 
launch a line of “Levy” denim jeans would almost certainly be met with 
a trademark suit and would likely be found to infringe the “Levi’s” 
trademark even if “Levy” was the surname of the individual behind this 
doomed entrepreneurial effort.147 
When the goods are related, but not competitive, several other factors 
are added to the confusion calculus including strength of the plaintiff 
mark, proximity of the goods or services, similarity of the marks, 
evidence of actual confusion, marketing channels used, type of goods or 
services, the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, 
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, and the likelihood of expansion 
of the product lines.148  The mark “Ben’s Bread” was deemed confusingly 
similar to the Uncle Ben’s mark for rice products, premised in part on 
the observation that: “While there are some obvious differences between 
the marks UNCLE BEN’S and BEN’S BREAD, they both contain the 
possessive form of the name ‘BEN.’”149  That both products were sold in 
grocery stores, and that Uncle Ben’s also used its mark on stuffing mix, 
were also deemed important.150  In a similar vein, the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board held that artificial sweeter and salt are “closely 
related, complimentary products,”151 and concluded: 
 
 145. See, e.g., Thrifty Rent-a-Car Sys. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1180–81 
(1st Cir. 1987). 
 146. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 147. Under the Lanham Act, trademarks that are “primarily merely a surname” 
cannot be registered with the USPTO on the principal register.  15 U.S.C. § 1502(e)(4) 
(2000).  “The common law also recognizes that surnames are shared by more than one 
individual, each of whom may have an interest in using his surname in business, and by 
the requirement for evidence of distinctiveness, in effect, delays appropriation of 
exclusive rights in the name.”  In re Etablissements Darty Et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985), aff’d, 222 U.S.P.Q. 260 (T.T.A.B. 1984). 
 148. AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 348. 
 149. Uncle Ben’s, Inc. v. Stubenberg Int’l, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1310, 1312 (T.T.A.B. 
1998). 
 150. Id. at 1313. 
 151. NutraSweet Company v. K & S Foods, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1964, 1967 (T.T.A.B. 
1987). 
While artificial sweeteners and salt with trace minerals are obviously different 
products, we think it likely that they would be sold in the same sections of 
grocery stores and supermarkets and would appear side by side in restaurants 
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We think it quite likely that purchasers familiar with the NUTRASWEET 
product, either as an ingredient in EQUAL artificial sweetener or as an 
ingredient in various other food products, would, upon viewing NUTRA SALT 
salt with trace minerals, be likely to believe that this was a new product line put 
out by the same producer as the NUTRASWEET producer or that the salt 
product was somehow associated with or sponsored by the people producing the 
NUTRASWEET product.152 
If the goods are totally unrelated, as a doctrinal matter an infringement 
action should not be supportable because confusion is unlikely.153  For 
this reason, Smith Brothers’ Auto Repair and Smith Brothers’ Cough 
Drops can independently coexist without spawning trademark infringement 
litigation,154 and there are (for exampled) almost three hundred different 
federally registered trademarks featuring the word “lighthouse.”155 
In assessing whether confusion is likely, judges are relatively free to 
base their findings on their purely subjective reactions.  As one judicial 
opinion proclaimed: “The determinative test cannot focus on how close 
or related the industries or products are, but rather by whether confusion 
is created so that an appreciable number of typical consumers will likely 
be confused.”156  Note that the test is not premised on proof that an 
appreciable number of typical consumers have been confused, only that 
they are likely to be confused in the court’s estimation. 
Though evidence of actual confusion is helpful to trademark holders, 
the absence of any actual confusion does not usually affect them at all, 
as courts embrace the idea that a showing of actual confusion would be 
very difficult to demonstrate with reliable proof.157  In consequence, 
 
and on kitchen tabletops of ordinary consumers. We further note that the 
respective products are low-cost impulse type items where the purchasing 
decision is not likely to be as careful as it would be with a higher-priced 
product.  In short, we conclude that the artificial sweetener and salt products 
are closely related, complementary products and that the use of the same or of 
a similar mark in connection with these products would likely result in 
confusion as to source or sponsorship. 
Id. 
 152. Id. at 1968. 
 153. AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 348. 
 154. Trademark dilution, however, is another matter, as is discussed above.  See 
supra Part III.C.2. 
 155. Per free search conducted by Author via TESS, Free Form Search, at 
http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). 
 156. Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 210 (D. Md. 
1988). 
 157. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 
875 (2d Cir. 1986).  “Of course, it is black letter law that actual confusion need not be 
shown to prevail under the Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove 
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mark holders do not have to prove much of anything to prevail; they 
simply have to persuade a judge that it is likely that some consumers 
could be confused some of the time.  Given the low opinions of 
consumers that some judges hold, this can be fairly easy to accomplish.  
One has a difficult time imagining a judge holding that a plaintiff in a 
personal injury suit did not have to submit evidence of soft tissue 
damage or psychological impairment because such injuries would be too 
difficult to prove and that compensable harm could be presumed from 
the fact that the plaintiff had been involved in some sort of accident.  
Nevertheless, in the realm of likelihood of confusion, evidentiary 
showings are not required, and judges are free to decide whether 
consumer confusion is likely to occur based upon their own gut 
reactions. 
It is the application of the likelihood of confusion test that is the 
problem, rather than the test itself, but the net effect is that judges appear 
to address the confusion requirement through a framework of judicial 
notice,158 rather than by weighing evidentiary showings.  Although it is 
reversible error to explicitly rule in favor of trademark holders based on 
findings of “possibility of confusion,”159 courts rarely require more from 
plaintiffs than articulations of plausible scenarios in which some 
unquantified cohort of harried, inattentive, and uninformed consumers 
are likely to experience confusion.  Judges start with the proposition that 
“[t]he category of a buyer protected by trademark law against this 
confusion includes not only the careful or discriminating buyer, but also 
the ignorant, the inexperienced, and the gullible.”160 
A.  Bad Intent 
It is fairly well established by case law that “[p]roof of an intent to 
confuse the public is not necessary to a finding of a likelihood of 
confusion,” but “[i]f a mark was adopted with the intent to confuse the 
public, that alone may be sufficient to justify an inference of a likelihood 
of confusion.”161  In consequence, if something about a defendant’s behavior 
 
and the Act requires only a likelihood of confusion as to source.”  Id.; see also Scarves 
by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1175 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that “‘a 
showing of actual confusion is not necessary and in fact is very difficult to demonstrate’ 
with reliable proof”) (quoting W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d 
Cir. 1970)); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Chattem, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 3671, 1986 WL 6167 
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1986). 
 158. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201. 
 159. See, e.g., A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 
197, 199 (3d Cir. 1999); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 208 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 160. Geoffrey, Inc. v. Stratton, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1691, 1696 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
 161. Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 203 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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strikes a judge as evidencing bad intent, likelihood of confusion can be 
sustainably inferred regardless of lack of similarity in the disputed marks 
or underlying goods or services. 
A paradigmatic indicator of bad intentions is intentional copying.  
Acts of intentional trademark copying fall along a continuum, and at the 
scurrilously evil end is counterfeiting—the exact duplication of a mark 
to fool customers about the nature or origin of a product or service.  At 
the other extremity of the continuum, the “lawful and justifiable behavior” 
side, is copying or colorable imitation of only descriptive marks, or 
aspects of descriptive marks, because doing so seems necessary to 
communicate attributes of the product or service itself to potential 
customers.  Consider this tart example: The dominant brand of bottled 
lemonade may have a fanciful picture of a ripe yellow lemon on its label 
that it has registered and advertised as a trademark.  A competitor may 
also choose to put a picture of a lemon on its retail container, not so that 
customers confuse the two products or sources, but to communicate to 
consumers the fact that inside is a citrus juice beverage.  The lemon 
image is thus legitimately used to convey product attributes. 
In the middle of the intentional copying continuum are trademark and 
packaging similarities in goods that deliberately market themselves as 
lower priced, comparable alternatives to brand name products.  Many 
successful “national” producers hate this sort of “off brand” or “store 
brand” competition and will tenaciously work to increase barriers to 
entry to slow or incapacitate any entity that attempts to compete with 
them.  As a result, mark holders of this ilk will bring trademark suits if 
there is a reasonable possibility they can prevail and thereby hinder a 
competitor.  Meanwhile, the manufacturers of cheaper, private label 
alternatives seek to increase their sales and may prefer to do this without 
incurring advertising expenses by packaging their goods in ways that 
evoke brand name products and selling them in the same venues, and 
even from the same shelves where possible.  These competing desires 
are clearly in direct conflict and inexorably lead to trademark litigation, 
the result of which may be difficult to predict.  Some courts have 
decided that marketing lower priced comparable products in packaging 
that evocates national brands is legitimate, lawful competition,162 while 
 
 162. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1564 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994); see also Andrew Corydon Finch, Comment, When Imitation Is the Sincerest 
Form of Flattery: Private Label Products and the Role of Intention in Determining 
Trade Dress Infringement, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1243, 1275–76 (1996). 
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other courts have deemed it illegitimate, actionable free riding.163 
While it is easy to see why reasonable minds might disagree on how 
“off brand” behavior ought to be characterized, application of “likelihood of 
confusion” analysis in this type of trademark dispute is apt to be 
convoluted and unsatisfactory to all concerned.  Whether trademark law 
allows a store brand of shampoo, with its own trademark, to adopt a 
formula, color, scent, and bottle style and shape similar to those of a 
highly advertised and correspondingly more expensive national brand 
may be a confusing query.  However, any question about whether consumers 
can tell the difference between the two can usually be straightforwardly 
answered as follows: Of course they can.  Enjoining a producer from 
calling a fragrant green shampoo in an ovoid bottle “Herbs of 
Reference,” may seem like a fair and appropriate response to a plea for 
relief from the mark holder that makes and markets the eerily similar 
“Herbal Essence,” but premising the injunction on probable likelihood 
of consumer confusion is preposterous, as label and price disparities will 
clearly signal the differences between the goods and sources to the vast 
majority of consumers.  Yet, a likelihood of confusion finding is what 
trademark law requires to support an infringement holding. 
B.  Confusion in Gross 
Before passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, statutory law 
granted mark holders protectable interests in trademarks that were 
restricted in scope to the use of the marks in commerce.  Mark holders 
were not accorded “trademarks in gross,”164 and did not have a right to 
 
   The presumption of a likelihood of confusion from intentional copying has 
outlived its usefulness. With the explosion of private label manufacturing, it no 
longer makes sense to infer that one who deliberately copies the trade dress of 
a competitor does so with the intention of confusing consumers.  By copying 
the trade dresses of their brand name competitors, private label manufacturers 
can effectively describe to consumers the brand name products to which their 
private label products correspond.  A presumption of a likelihood of confusion 
from intentional copying would discourage such instances of beneficial 
copying and therefore harm rather than protect consumers by depriving them 
of information about—and access to—lower-cost alternatives to brand name 
products.  Thus, unless a clear intent to confuse consumers is proved by direct 
evidence, courts should decline to infer anything at all from evidence of 
intentional copying. Instead, courts should focus their efforts on the real issue: 
whether two trade dresses are so similar as to create a genuine likelihood of 
confusion among consumers. 
Id. 
 163. See, e.g., McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Guardian Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 
(E.D. Mich. 1997). 
 164. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331, 
1334–35 (D. Or. 1997). 
   Unlike a patent or copyright, a trademark does not confer on its owner any 
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prevent usage of even an identical mark on an unrelated product or 
service unless this was deemed likely to confuse consumers.  As 
discussed above, dilution protection creates something akin to 
trademarks in gross for eligible marks.  However, even absent dilution 
doctrine or analysis, where a large corporation uses the same mark on a 
diverse variety of products, some courts have been willing to accord a 
presumptive right on the part of the entity to be the only user of the mark 
in any commercial context on the grounds that multiple users of a mark 
will cause consumer confusion.165  For example, the fact that Virgin 
Enterprises Limited and its related companies (collectively, the “Virgin 
Group”) operated various worldwide businesses that included an airline, 
a travel-related company, a limousine service, a soft drink bottler and 
distributor, and a chain of retail stores selling CDs, books, and clothing, 
all using the Virgin trademark and service mark, gave it the right to 
prevent an unrelated retail gasoline establishment from calling itself 
“Virgin Petroleum.”166  This despite the fact that the Virgin Group was 
not in the fuel business at all, and there were of hundreds of federally 
registered trademarks using the word “virgin,” most of which had no 
connection to the Virgin Group and many of which predated Virgin 
Group’s assertion of broad trademark rights in the word.167 
Similarly, the use of the name Phones-R-Us by a business that sold 
retail phones, accessories and answering machines was found “likely ‘to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive’ consumers into believing 
some sponsorship, association, affiliation, connection or endorsement 
exists” between the toy store chain Toys “R” Us and the defendant.168  
While Toys “R” Us might now be able to reasonably assert dominion over 
“Anything R Us” through a dilution claim under the FTDA, a likelihood 
of confusion determination and subsequent infringement finding gave the 
company de facto dilution protection and trademark rights in gross five 
years before Congress authorized federal dilution causes of action. 
 
rights in gross or at large.  The law does not per se prohibit the use of 
trademarks or service marks as domain names.  Rather, the law prohibits only 
uses that infringe or dilute an owner’s trademark or service mark. 
Id. 
 165. This right is doctrinally available only to famous marks under dilution 
principles.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 166. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Virgin Petroleum, Inc., No. CV 99-12826, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8100, at *1–2, *42 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000). 
 167. A “TESS” query returned 320 trademarks using or referencing the word 
“virgin.”  TESS, Free Form Search, at http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). 
 168. Geoffrey, Inc. v. Stratton, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1691, 1694 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
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Mobil Oil Corporation was deemed to have confusion-rooted 
trademark dominion over the word “mobile” in any automotive context, 
even though mobility is a defining feature of automobiles, and mobile is 
a descriptive term for movable goods and services.  In Mobil Oil 
Corporation v. Mobile Mechanics,169 the court held: 
 Here the marks are so similar that confusion is not only likely but 
practically inevitable.  The mark “mobile” differs from “Mobil” only by the 
addition of one letter and by the absence of an initial capital. . . . 
 The minor variations defendants point out do not sufficiently differentiate 
their name from plaintiff’s mark.  The fact that they make the letter “o” larger 
than the other letters and accent it with a gear or wheel design if anything 
increases the likelihood of confusion.170 
Rather than requiring Mobil Oil Corporation to prove likelihood of 
confusion between a large, well-known petroleum company and a small 
start up mobile auto repair service, this court opined that: “It was 
defendants’ obligation to avoid confusion and it remains defendants’ 
burden as subsequent user to demonstrate that confusion is not likely to 
result.”171 
C.  Confusion Deemed Incurable 
Likelihood of confusion can be found even when it is anticipated that 
consumers will resolve or overcome any actual confusion well before 
reaching the point of sale.  Mark holders can win infringement suits 
simply by proving so called “initial interest” confusion, which is what 
piano consumers were deemed likely to experience when they were 
drawn to Grotrian-Steinweg pianos, though it was clear to the court that 
no one would actually purchase a Grotrian-Steinweg piano believing it 
to be a product of the Steinway & Sons company.172  One somewhat 
stunning articulation of the adequacy of initial interest confusion to 
support an infringement finding occurred in a dispute between the 
Blockbuster chain and an upstart competitor that called itself Video 
 
 169. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Mobile Mechs., Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 744 (D. Conn. 1976). 
 170. Id. at 747. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975). 
   The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a Grotrian-
Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway or that Grotrian had some connection 
with Steinway and Sons.  The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a 
consumer, hearing the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name and thinking it had some 
connection with “Steinway,” would consider it on that basis.  The “Grotrian-Steinweg” 
name therefore would attract potential customers based on the reputation built 
up by Steinway in this country for many years.  The harm to Steinway in short 
is the likelihood that potential piano purchasers will think that there is some 
connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway pianos. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Busters.  The fact that even clueless consumers would quickly figure out 
that Video Busters was a different entity was deemed “unimportant” and 
“irrelevant” by a court that held: 
[T]he issue in this case is the degree of likelihood that the name “Video 
Busters” would attract potential customers based on the reputation built by 
Blockbuster.  That a customer would recognize that Video Busters is not 
connected to Blockbuster after entry into a Video Busters store and viewing 
the Video Busters membership application, brochure, video cassette jacket, 
and store layout is unimportant.  The critical issue is the degree to which 
Video Busters might attract potential customers based on the similarity to 
the Blockbuster name.  The court finds that Video Busters might attract 
some potential customers based on the similarity to the Blockbuster name.  
Because the names are so similar and the products sold are identical, some 
unwitting customers might enter a Video Busters store thinking it is 
somehow connected to Blockbuster.  Those customers probably will realize 
shortly that Video Busters is not related to Blockbuster, but . . . that is 
irrelevant.173 
The implication that a mark holder only has to convince a court that 
consumers are likely to be confused momentarily suggests the burden of 
proof on this issue can be feather-light indeed.  In addition, the 
proposition that fleeting confusion cannot be effectively cured at any 
point in a transaction is confusing in its own right.  Consumers who 
prefer to rent videos from Blockbuster were free to seek that store out, 
and to leave Video Busters if they were drawn in by an incorrect 
perception that the two entities were affiliated.  Consumers who found 
the Video Buster offerings attractive and desirable, and who remained 
there to rent movies rather than seeking out a competing Blockbuster, 
arguably benefited from any misperception that led them to enter.  The 
judge’s ruling saved the first group of consumers a few minutes, but 
deprived the second group of opportunities for beneficial transactions, 
while conceding that no one was confused when exiting the premises.  
While some observers might agree with this outcome, explaining why 
trademark law requires it proves problematic. 
At least according to some courts, consumer confusion cannot be 
cured, much less avoided, by the use of disclaimers.174  Ironically, the 
 
 173. Blockbuster Entm’t Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 513 (E.D. Mich. 
1994). 
 174. “House marks” are a related concept.  A house mark is an umbrella source-
identifying mark that may be used on a range of different products in addition to 
product-specific trademarks.  House marks are sometimes given substantial weight in 
trade dress infringement cases.  See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 
F.2d 1117, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 
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evidentiary burden on a defendant attempting to prove a disclaimer is 
effective at preventing or alleviating consumer confusion can be 
much heavier than the burden on a plaintiff asserting that confusion is 
likely to occur.175  However, this makes perfect sense if one’s analysis 
starts with the assumption that consumers are incurably stupid. 
D.  Confusion, Sophistication, and Class 
The sophistication of purchasers is one factor that courts will usually 
consider when making a likelihood of confusion determination.176  In a 
trademark dispute involving a petroleum trading company, a court found 
that even sophisticated oil traders dealing in large quantity transactions 
were likely to be initially confused about whether there was a connection 
between the defendant and the plaintiff based on a perceived similarity 
between their trademarks.177  Apparently, the court took judicial notice 
 
F.2d 1033, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992).  However, in other cases, likelihood of confusion has 
been found despite the use of a house mark.  See, e.g., Americana Trading Inc. v. Russ 
Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992); Gen. Foods Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 
191 U.S.P.Q. 674, 682 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
 175. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 832 
F.2d 1311, 1316 (2d Cir. 1987).  But see Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 
214 F.3d 658, 672 (5th Cir. 2000); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 
1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 1987). 
Like fraudulent speech, speech that misleads or creates confusion is not protected 
under the First Amendment.  Where the allegedly infringing speech is at least partly 
literary or artistic, however, and not solely a commercial appropriation of another’s 
mark, the preferred course is to accommodate trademark remedies with First 
Amendment interests.  One obvious mode of accommodation is a disclaimer that 
will officially dissociate the junior user of the mark from the senior user’s product.  
Disclaimers have frequently been approved by this court and others when 
trademark and First Amendment interests intersect. 
Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 672 (citations omitted). 
 176. “The sophistication of the buyers” is the eighth of the “Polaroid Factors” 
articulated by the Second Circuit for the purpose of evaluating likelihood of confusion 
between nonidentical good or services.  Derived from the holding in Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), they have close analogues in 
other circuits.  See Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (describing the “Helene Curtis” factors of the Seventh Circuit); E. & J. Gallo 
Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing the 
“Sleekcraft” factors of the Ninth Circuit); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. 
Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1992) (describing the “Scott Paper” factors of the 
Third Circuit); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 
1992) (describing the “Pizzeria Uno” factors of the Fourth Circuit); Coherent, Inc. v. 
Coherent Techs., Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991) (describing the “Beer Nuts” 
factors of the Tenth Circuit); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc. 
931 F.2d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing the “Frisch’s” factors, of the Sixth 
Circuit); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 
1986) (describing the “Roto-Rooter” factors of the Fifth Circuit); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up 
Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (describing the “Squirtco” factors of the Eighth 
Circuit); see also GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 96, at 391–93. 
 177. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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that even experienced businesspeople might neglect to ask or ascertain 
with whom they were considering conducting commerce, or speaking to 
on the phone. 
The sophistication of purchasers is even less highly esteemed by 
judges when, rather than transacting important business, individuals are 
simply purchasing goods and services for their own consumption.178  
The standard, facially economic, class neutral analysis is that consumers 
are least likely to pay careful attention to inexpensive purchases and 
therefore would be most likely to be confused by similar trademarks on 
the same or similar low cost products.179  However, at other times the 
 
 178. See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 204–05 (3d Cir. 1995). 
   Much as courts are required to police the boundaries of similarity within 
which a jury may be permitted to find a likelihood of confusion under the 
Lanham Act, courts must also establish the perimeters of ordinary care that 
constrain likelihood of confusion.  The following non-exhaustive 
considerations should guide a court’s determination of the standard of ordinary 
care for a particular product.  Inexpensive goods require consumers to exercise 
less care in their selection than expensive ones.  The more important the use of 
a product, the more care that must be exercised in its selection.  In addition, 
“the degree of caution used . . . depends on the relevant buying class.  That is, 
some buyer classes, for example, professional buyers . . . will be held to a 
higher standard of care than others.  Where the buyer class consists of both 
professional buyers and consumers, . . . . the standard of care to be exercised 
by the reasonably prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the least 
sophisticated consumer in the class.” 
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).  
 179. See, e.g., BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 
215–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
   In conducting this analysis, this Court notes the distinction case law 
recognizes regarding the likelihood of confusion involving expensive versus 
inexpensive goods.  The ordinary, reasonably prudent and reasonably informed 
customer is expected to be more discerning and less likely to be confused in 
inverse proportion to the price of the product.  Thus, greater likelihood of 
confusion is presumed in the case where relatively inexpensive items are 
purchased. 
   The price of the products here in contention may not be great, but seems 
sufficiently high to reduce the buyers’ clicking impulse and to serve to define 
more narrowly one segment of the relevant web market to the more interested, 
probable purchasers of the parties’ products.  Defendants’ registration fee for 
each entrant is $19.95.  The unit price of plaintiff’s videocassettes, DVDs and 
merchandise, though it not entirely clear from the record, could be under 
$20.00 per item. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 
941 (10th Cir. 1983) (“Buyers typically exercise little care in the selection of inexpensive 
items that may be purchased on impulse.  Despite a lower degree of similarity, these 
items are more likely to be confused than expensive items which are chosen carefully.”) 
(citing Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 191 (5th 
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sophistication of the consumers themselves appears to be at issue, rather 
than the price-driven levels of attention paid to particular purchases.  
Consider the analysis articulated in a case involving competing 
“horizontal fly” men’s underwear, where a court wrote: 
Generally, the more sophisticated the average consumer of a product is, the less 
likely it is that similarities in trade dress and trademarks will result in confusion 
concerning the source or sponsorship of the product. . . .  The purchasers of 
relatively inexpensive goods are held to a lesser standard of purchasing care and 
do not give much thought to the purchase of such inexpensive goods.180 
This court’s language makes it sound like people with few financial 
resources are inherently the least discerning consumers and thereby 
more susceptible to confusion.  Yet there is no indication that this court 
based its conclusion on credible empirical research or any actual 
evidence whatsoever.  Instead, this analysis seems rooted in instinct and 
personal opinion. 
It is certainly possible that poor people are easily confused and 
unsophisticated in their purchasing habits.  It is at least equally 
plausible, however, that the exact opposite is true—that individuals 
with few economic resources pay careful attention to how they spend 
their scarce and highly-valued dollars, while wealthy people are 
comparatively more apt to spend small amounts of money somewhat 
carelessly or recklessly.  One might expect courts to require specific 
and persuasive evidence about consumer behavior before weighing in 
on this issue, but they do not appear to do so.  Instead, judges 
sometimes make very loaded judgments, seemingly on their own 
volition.  Consider this characterization, in the context of a dilution 
case, of the low level of sophistication of people who attend 
performances of a circus: “[C]onsumers of Ringling’s product do not 
have a high level of sophistication.  Unlike the attorneys in Mead 
Data, who identified the LEXIS mark with the LEXIS service and 
 
Cir. 1981); Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (D. Kan. 1977)); 
ConAgra, Inc. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 784 F. Supp. 700, 736 (D. Neb. 1992) (taking 
the position that, generally, consumers of low-cost goods are less careful, and therefore, 
more likely to be confused by a similarity in marks); Uncle Ben’s, Inc. v. Stubenberg 
Int’l, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1310, 1313 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (“Further, the fact that we are here 
dealing with relatively inexpensive food products means that the average purchaser may 
exercise less care in the purchasing decision.”); NutraSweet Company v. K & S Foods, 
Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1964, 1967 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (“We further note that the respective 
products are low-cost impulse-type items where the purchasing decision is not likely to 
be as careful as it would be with a higher-priced product.”).  But see L.A. Gear, Inc. v. 
Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that “[p]urchasers 
in discount stores are sufficiently sophisticated, we believe, to know whether they are 
buying the cheaper copies or the expensive originals”). 
 180. Munsingwear, Inc. v. Jockey Int’l, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1146, 1151–52 (D. 
Minn. 1994), aff’d, 39 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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made conscious, knowledgeable decisions to purchase the product, 
Ringling’s consumers commit no such deliberate, reflective and 
willful acts.”181  Since the defendant would have benefited from a 
finding that circus goers were highly sophisticated, it is extremely 
unlikely that the defendant made this argument to the judge.  This 
means that either Ringling Brothers specifically urged the court to 
find that its own patrons were unsophisticated, inattentive, and 
impulsive in their ticket buying, or that the court made this unflattering 
and textually unsupported determination on its own. 
Articulated judicial perceptions about particular sorts of consumers 
demonstrably vary, sometimes dramatically, even within similar 
factual situations.  Wine consumers, for example, are viewed 
somewhat schizophrenically by judges.  In one case a district court 
found that “wine drinkers tend to be older, wealthier, and better 
educated than the adverage population.”182  However, a different 
district court in a different case concluded that “the average 
American consumer is unlearned in the selection of wine.”183  In so 
doing, it relied on a prior court’s opinion, which stated as follows: 
“[T]he average American who drinks wine on occasion can hardly 
pass for a connoisseur of wines.”184  This judge distinguished the 
determination by yet another court that “the wine-buying public—
insofar as their selection and purchase of wine is concerned—is a 
highly discriminating group,”185 with the somewhat snide, startling, 
and completely unsupported assertion that, “with all due respect to 
Alabama, it would seem common knowledge that wine was not a 
widely appreciated beverage in the South in 1959.”186 
In counterfeiting situations in which cheap “knock offs” appropriate 
the actual, identical trademarks of upscale goods, deeming their 
purchasers as “confused” is almost certainly an analytic stretch; presumably, 
consumers who buy luxury items, such as designer perfumes, luggage, 
 
 181. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows 
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 182. Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 183. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 465 
(N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 184. Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc. 569 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 185. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Ben R. Goltsman & Co., 172 F. Supp. 826, 830 n.2 
(M.D. Ala. 1959). 
 186. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 782 F. Supp. at 465. 
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jewelry, or watches, at low prices from street vendors know that the 
trademarks are not used legitimately.  Nevertheless, it is hard to 
begrudge a mark holder a cause of action against abject counterfeiters, as 
the unauthorized use of identical marks on identical goods is the 
prototypical act of infringement against which the Lanham Act was 
enacted to protect.187  Additionally, a plausible argument can be made 
about whether the consumer purchasing luxury goods from street 
vendors at astonishing discounts might be confused, mistaken, or 
deceived about whether the goods are counterfeit, or legitimate in the 
trademark sense, but illegitimate in a chain of acquisition context, which 
is to say, stolen. 
Less doctrinally coherent cases arise when the “knock off” goods at 
issue look like more expensive products in form and appearance but bear 
dissimilar trademarks.  Courts will often concede that consumers are not 
confused about what they are purchasing, but instead express concern 
that the lesser merchandise enables those in possession to confuse 
observers into thinking they have spent money (or have the money to 
spend) on expensive goods.  This is generally framed as one variety of 
post-sale confusion. 
Concerns about post-sale confusion led to a finding of trademark 
confusion in Hermès International v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue, 
Inc.188  The court found that because the defendants did not use the name 
“Hermès” on their products, and openly acknowledged to customers that 
their products were copies of Hermès designs, they “had not deceptively 
attempted to ‘pass off’ or ‘palm off’ their products as genuine 
Hermès.”189  However, the defendants had still “attempt[ed] to encourage 
consumer confusion in the post-sale context” and were therefore guilty 
of trademark infringement.190  As construed by the Hermès court, 
trademark law protects unwary observers from mistakenly assuming, 
based on a cursory inspection, that a handbag carried by another person 
was Hermès if she was actually toting a less expensive or elite 
pocketbook.  The court held: “[A] loss occurs when a sophisticated 
 
 187. See, e.g., Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th 
Cir. 1993); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 
1992); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 
1992); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 1992); 
Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Techs., Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1225 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 
1991); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 
1986); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF Inc. v. 
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. 
Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 188. Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 189. Id. at 107. 
 190. Id. (alteration in original). 
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buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it off to the public as the genuine 
article, thereby confusing the viewing public and achieving the status of 
owning the genuine article at a knockoff price.”191  This post-sale confusion 
principle thus facilitates trademark actions against “goods [that] offer 
consumers a cheap knockoff copy of the original manufacturer’s more 
expensive product,” illegitimately allowing a buyer to acquire the prestige 
of owning what appears to be the more expensive product.192 
The “doctrine of illegitimate prestige” was also invoked in a dispute 
between two clock manufacturers, where the court concluded: 
[S]ome customers would buy plaintiff’s cheaper clock for the purpose of 
acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’ 
homes would regard as a prestigious article.  Plaintiff’s wrong thus consisted of 
the fact that such a visitor would be likely to assume that the clock was [the 
more expensive] clock.193 
While it is clear that owning items bearing elite trademarks can 
signal affluence and good taste, it is less apparent that the Lanham 
Act countenances using trademark rights to “protect” exclusivity in 
conspicuous consumption,194 or that trademark law is even necessary 
to perform this role.  One suspects that people who actually care how 
much someone else paid for a wrist watch easily discern the 




 191. Id. at 109. 
 192. Id. at 108; see also McCarthy, supra note 22, at 3338 (arguing that “in light of 
the dual aim of trademark law to protect the interests of both the public and the 
trademark owner, the use of a trademark likely to cause confusion among the general 
public in a post-sale context should be actionable under federal trademark law”). 
 193. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre 
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 194. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 406–08 (asserting that confusion is irrelevant in 
the case of prestige goods, and that liability analysis seems to rest on the court’s feeling 
that the ordinary rule of competition should not apply to prestige goods because 
otherwise a producer will not be able to maintain the artificial scarcity necessary to 
preserve the status of a prestige good); Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When 
Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain—with an Example from the 
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1392 (1993). 
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E.  Gendered Confusion195 
In pondering the curious tendency of judges to disparage purchasers, 
 
 195. Trademark law might not strike the casual observer as having particularly 
compelling gender-related dimensions, at least in comparison to areas such as family law 
and employment law, but neither should gender neutrality be presumed.  The Author 
strongly recommends to the reader a rather astonishing and compelling article: Elizabeth 
Warren, What Is a Women’s Issue?  Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-
Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19 (2002).  Warren persuasively asserts that 
politically active women tend to ignore supposedly gender-neutral business issues that, 
in fact, profoundly affect many women.  Her particular focus is on bankruptcy law, but 
her more general observations and critiques would apply to trademark law as well. 
Given the fluid and extraordinarily subjective nature of trademark infringement 
determinations as discussed herein, a court could take the opportunity to advance its 
vision of social justice and gender equality when resolving trademark disputes.  This was 
attempted in 1979 when a federal district court found a limited right for the Philadelphia 
Jaycees to continue to call themselves the “Jaycees” even after the national organization 
revoked its charter because it had begun admitting women as members, as the long as the 
prefix “Philadelphia” was always used and the group made clear in the printed material 
that it disseminated that it was not affiliated with the national Jaycees.  U.S. Jaycees v. 
Phila. Jaycees, 490 F. Supp. 688, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 
1981).  However, after referencing “the halcyon days of the 1920s” in which “the United 
States Jaycees limited membership to young men,” the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, concluding: 
This case . . . centers on the infringement of trademark rights.  The exclusion 
of women is wholly independent of the protection provided by the Lanham Act 
to trademarks.  The action terminating the Philadelphia charter for admitting 
women to membership was not dependent on the Lanham Act. Nor would a 
decision in this Lanham Act case favorable to the Philadelphia Jaycees alter 
the fact of the discrimination; it would not restore the Philadelphia chapter’s 
affiliation or change the National’s membership policy. 
U.S. Jaycees v. Phila. Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 1981).  The appellate court 
appeared ignorant of, though probably affirmatively chose to ignore, the impact that 
allowing the Philadelphia club to continue calling itself Jaycees might have had on the 
national organization’s willingness to compromise on the gender segregation issue and 
accept female members. 
In 1986, a similar trademark dispute arose involving the Kiwanis, provoking a federal 
district court judge to write: 
   It is somewhat astonishing in the year 1985 to hear an officer of a well-
known international organization (boasting more than 300,000 members) say 
that it is fine for women “to help make the pancakes” but not for them to be 
members of the organization sponsoring the sale of those pancakes.  The issue 
squarely presented by this case is whether such a blatant and admitted sexist 
attitude, and the discriminatory membership policy arising from it, are entitled 
to the protection of a United States District Court.  For Kiwanis International 
asks this court to enjoin a local chapter from using the Kiwanis name and logo 
solely because that local has admitted a woman into its ranks. 
Kiwanis Int’l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1382 (D.N.J. 1986) 
(emphasis in original), rev’d, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted). 
The Kiwanis Ridgewood had accepted a female member and despite pointed 
instructions by the national organization, refused to revoke her membership.  Kiwanis 
International then filed suit in federal court under the Lanham Act, claiming that Kiwanis 
Ridgewood had forfeited its license to use the Kiwanis marks, and sought preliminary 
and permanent injunctions prohibiting Ridgewood’s continued use of the mark.  In 
response, Kiwanis Ridgewood filed suit in New Jersey Superior Court seeking an 
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one notices that many of the most demeaning conceptions of consumers, 
and of their intelligence and discriminatory powers (or lack thereof), 
tend to be articulated in trademark cases in which the underlying goods 
and services are primarily designed for, marketed to, or purchased by 
women.  Women are perceived to do most of the shopping, and this 
perception is accurate.196  While court-made trademark law often presumes 
 
injunction against International’s license revocation and a declaration that the woman at 
issue was a bona fide member of the Ridgewood club.  Kiwanis Ridgewood asserted in 
its complaint that the revocation would violate the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination.  Id. at 1381.  After removal to federal court, the district court held that 
Kiwanis Ridgewood was a place of public accommodation and therefore prohibited from 
restricting membership on the basis of sex under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination.  Id. at 1387–90.  The court further held that Kiwanis International was 
precluded from enforcing its illegal discriminatory membership restrictions against 
Ridgewood, concluding: 
   To suggest that this case involves solely the right of Kiwanis to protect its 
name and logo because of a violation of its constitution or bylaws is to ignore 
reality.  What is truly at issue here is whether Kiwanis can, directly or 
indirectly, enforce its policy of discrimination against women with the 
imprimatur of this court.  This opinion concludes that it cannot.  Kiwanis’ 
trademark rights are subject to the right of women to be free of discrimination, 
as indeed they should be. 
Id. at 1395.  However, as with the district court opinion in the Jaycees case, this too was 
reversed by an appellate court; in this case, it was reversed on the grounds that Kiwanis 
Ridgewood did not constitute a place of public accommodation.  Kiwanis Int’l v. 
Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 196. See, e.g., “Radical Change” Hits Supermarket Industry, CHAIN DRUG REV., 
July 2, 2001, at 37 (“Supermarket shoppers are overwhelmingly female, 77%, according 
to the 2001 edition of Chain Drug Review’s ‘Where Consumers Shop—and Why’ 
survey.  Average shoppers range in age from 35 to 65, with 75% matching that profile, 
and they visit a supermarket once a week.”); Cele Otnes & Mary Ann McGrath, 
Perceptions and Realities of Male Shopping Behavior, J. RETAILING, Spring 2001, at 
111, 112. 
   Long associated with the domestic sphere, shopping primarily has been 
regarded as a feminine activity.  Witkowski (1999) observes that “as early as 
200 years ago, American society already had begun to concede that the 
acquisition and use of domestic goods was within a woman’s sphere of 
responsibility.”  Nava (1997) notes that when department stores opened in the 
early 20th century, it was women who patronized them and “decoded and 
encoded the changing images of class” symbolized in store merchandise.  
Reekie (1992) argues that even on the more “sexually ambiguous” floors of 
early department stores, women constituted the majority of customers. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
According to a January 2001 study by MarketResearch.com, women’s 
footwear and sports apparel sales will hit $39 billion by 2005. And, because 
women buy athletic wear for boyfriends, husbands and kids, as well as for 
themselves, they account for 81% of all athletic apparel purchases, according 
to the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association. 
David Sokol, Where the Boys Aren’t, SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Nov. 1, 2002, available 
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that all consumers of a particular class of goods or services require 
protection from deceptive or confusing trademarks,197 it is when the 
consumers are likely to be female that paternalistic intervention, supposedly 
on the consumers’ behalf, is often considered most necessary and appropriate. 
This Author’s strong impressionistic reaction, provoked by exposure 
to numerous written opinions in the context of teaching courses in 
trademark law, is that judges will more readily find sufficient consumer 
confusion likely where the underlying products or services are female 
oriented in some manner.  As a consequence, trademark holders seeking 
broad protections may be more willing to litigate infringement cases 
involving goods and services with feminine aspects as straightforward 
confusion issues because they would have a greater expectation of 
success in convincing a court that female consumers are more likely to 
be confused by allegedly similar trademarks.  Where the product or 
service is more male identified, trademark holders may either adopt a 
more attenuated or nuanced theory of confusion (for example, initial 
interest confusion, or the possibility of confusion) or strategically focus 
their energies on trademark dilution claims, which can be supported by, 
but do not require proof (or even argument) that the challenged mark or 
use creates confusion among consumers. 
1.  Certain Consumers Are Presumed to Be Exceptionally                 
Easily Confused 
Hey, whatever happened to the women’s liberation movement? 
The what? 
You know.  The women’s movement.  Why aren’t people interested anymore? 
Oh, that.  You see, what happened is, it became tainted. 
By what? 
By its close association with women.198 
 
at 2002 WL 8859009.  See generally THOMAS HINE, I WANT THAT!: HOW WE ALL 
BECAME SHOPPERS (2002) (describing why people shop and how people use shopping to 
gain acceptance and establish their place in society). 
 197. The original justification for recognizing enforceable rights in trademarks was 
premised on the idea that trademarks could simultaneously profit both consumers and 
producers of goods and services.  See Leaffer, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
   A reliable, stable, and efficiently structured trademark system benefits 
consumer and business interests alike.  Trademarks serve the interests of 
consumers because they reduce search costs and allow buyers to make rational 
purchasing and repurchasing decisions with speed and assurance.  Just as 
important, a strong trademark system creates incentives for firms to create and 
market products of desirable qualities, particularly when these qualities are not 
observable before purchase. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 198. ALIX KATES SHULMAN, DRINKING THE RAIN 90 (1995). 
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The “reasonable person” construct in tort law historically was (and 
some would argue still is) masculine, both conceptually and 
linguistically the “reasonable man.”199  The gender of the “reasonably 
prudent consumer,”200 however, is perceptually tied to the products or 
services with which disputed trademarks are associated.  Where the good 
or service is intuitively linked to women as primary purchasers and 
consumers, a trademark holder’s burden of convincing the court that 
another mark is likely to cause confusion (and is therefore infringing, or 
dilutive, or possibly both) observationally seems to be an easier one to 
meet in many cases.201  This watered down standard is, however, almost 
 
 199. See, e.g., Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769, 770. 
   Until the late 1970s the law’s measure of reasonableness was openly and 
exclusively male.  For example, the still influential American Law Institute’s 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965, refers to the negligence 
standard of care as that of “the reasonable man.”  While in recent years “the 
reasonable person” has, for the most part, replaced the reasonable man as the 
standard by which the law and its players measure conduct, I will show that the 
reasonableness standard continues to be male. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The 
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 
1404 (1992). 
   The reasonable man standard remains an entrenched and pervasive standard 
by which courts measure potentially illegal conduct.  Tort law, criminal law, 
and employment discrimination law all employ this standard to determine 
whether conduct is appropriate.  That conduct is acceptable if it is “reasonable” 
is one of those “neutral” principles with which everyone can agree.  As one 
critique points out, “[t]he notion that reason is divorced from ‘merely 
contingent’ existence still predominates in contemporary Western 
thought . . . .” 
   The standard actually incorporates two different, although interrelated, 
requirements: first, that conduct be “reasonable,” and second, that conduct be 
that expected of a “man.”  By “reasonable man,” of course, the standard 
purports to be universal, to include all “mankind,” and in practice courts have 
applied it to women as well as men. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original). 
 200. This phrase has been used in several trademark cases.  See, e.g., Entrepreneur 
Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[t]he test for 
likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ in the marketplace is 
likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks”) 
(quoting Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 
1998)); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1060 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 201. Dianne Klein asserted a similar gender based analytic disparity in the context 
of tort law, writing: 
   While a first-year law student and the mother of a young son and daughter, I 
was constantly struck by the frequent appearance in the torts casebook of boys 
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always articulated in a putatively gender neutral way, so that it creates 
puddles in the jurisprudence that sometimes splash and dampen 
standards in trademark litigation concerning even “male” goods and 
services. 
The very first time a court decided to expand trademark rights such 
that they could be enforced against related but noncompeting goods 
(rather than just against the same or similar products) was in the context 
of breakfast foods in 1917 and is still referred to as the “Aunt Jemima 
Doctrine.”202  The court concluded that buyers of pancake batter would 
likely become confused by the use of the same trademark on pancake 
syrup and erroneously assume that the goods came from the same 
source.203  “Perhaps they might not do so, if [Aunt Jemima] were used 
for flatirons,”204 the court observed, signaling quite clearly that they 
believed that the likely confused pancake batter and syrup purchasers 
were also consumers of flatirons, which is to say, female. 205 
 
suffering injuries as the result of their own or another boy’s seeming 
foolhardiness.  Both through their own negligence, and that of others, boys 
seemed continuously to find themselves in harm’s way.  I naturally wondered 
if this phenomenon simply reflected the truth of the proverb that “boys will be 
boys” and, therefore, engage in more risky and dangerous play, or whether 
there was a more complicated relationship between boys’ exposure to risk, 
consequent litigation, and tort law negligence concepts. 
   A closer look reveals that the current understanding of “the reasonable man 
[or person] standard,” a central device of tort law, includes an uneasy 
incorporation of the economists’ notion of “risk aversion,” a deviation from 
ideally rational “risk neutrality,” that both reflects and reproduces structures of 
gender hierarchy and stereotyping.  Exceptions to uniform rules regarding the 
standard of care reflect the same gendered understanding, including protection 
or even subsidy for the risk-seeking or foolhardy behavior of boys.  
Inefficiencies are tolerated when they support modes of behavior in which men 
believe themselves to have an interest.  Yet the systematic risk-aversion of 
women, which is well-established and may have far more pervasive 
consequences for both the efficiency and equity goals of tort law, is not 
acknowledged.  In domains where men are known to be risk-averse, however, 
reasonableness is identified with risk aversion. 
Diane Klein, Distorted Reasoning: Gender, Risk-Aversion and Negligence Law, 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 629, 629 (1997). 
 202. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 211 (D. 
Md. 1988). 
 203. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409–10 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 204. Id. at 410. 
 205. Judge Learned Hand concurred in the Aunt Jemima case and then used the 
freshly baked “Aunt Jemima doctrine” in the context of consumers arguably more likely 
to be male, holding that the Yale trademark that identified the source of locks could not 
be used by a competitor on flashlights.  Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 
(2d Cir. 1928).  However, he did so with little enthusiasm, writing: 
[T]he fact that flash-lights and locks are made of metal does not appear to us to 
give them the same descriptive properties, except as the trade has so classed 
them.  But we regard what the trade thinks as the critical consideration, and we 
think the statute meant to make it the test, despite the language used. 
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A contemporary court might be willing to overlook seemingly very 
similar trademarks on virtually identical products if the packaging of the 
products (the contexts in which the marks appeared) were quite 
different.  When Nabisco alleged that their “Cream of Wheat” cereal 
mark was infringed by Quaker Oats’ use of “Creamy Wheat” on a very 
similar rival foodstuff, a court concluded it was unlikely that Nabisco 
would be able to demonstrate that consumer confusion was likely  
because even though Nabisco and Quaker Oats were competing for the 
same consumers, the differences between the product packages were 
more significant than their similarities, and therefore consumers 
probably would not buy Creamy Wheat believing that it was Cream of 
Wheat.206  Similarly, another court concluded that consumers could 
 
Id.  He thus blamed the confusion conclusion he reluctantly endorsed on “the trade.”  
About the Aunt Jemima case Glynn Lunney has written: 
 During the course of the twentieth century, courts, and to a lesser extent 
Congress, gradually broadened the scope of the trademark owner’s exclusive 
use right.  Expansion with respect to use of the mark on different goods, for 
example, began in 1917 when the Second Circuit ruled that the Aunt Jemima 
Mills Co. was entitled to exclude another from using “Aunt Jemima” as a mark 
on pancake syrup.  Aunt Jemima had itself only used the mark with respect to 
self-rising flour, but the court found that the defendant’s syrup, though 
different, was sufficiently related “that the public, or a large part of it . . . 
would conclude that [the defendant’s syrup] was made by the [plaintiff].”  
Although the Aunt Jemima court retained confusion as to source as the 
relevant test, its recognition that use of the trademark on related goods could 
create actionable confusion opened the door to claims of infringement based 
upon such use.  After opening the door to such claims, the Second Circuit 
found it almost impossible to define any sensible stopping point.  If the 
defendant’s goods were not identical, they might nonetheless be sufficiently 
related that consumers would likely believe that the plaintiff had produced 
them.  If not so related to create confusion as to source, consumers might 
nonetheless believe that the plaintiff had sponsored the defendant’s goods or, 
given the complexities of corporate ownership, that the plaintiff and defendant 
were somehow affiliated.  In short, by opening the door to infringement claims 
with respect to noncompeting goods, the Second Circuit found itself on the 
often-invoked, but rarely encountered, slippery slope.  Although no less a jurist 
than Learned Hand set himself the task of identifying the appropriate stopping 
place, the court was unable to do so.  In Polaroid Corp. v Polarad Electronics 
Corp., the Second Circuit eventually abandoned the same goods limitation 
almost entirely, merely incorporating proximity of goods as a factor to be 
considered in resolving the likelihood of confusion issue. 
Lunney, supra note 1, at 392–93 (citations omitted). 
 206. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Quaker Oats Co., 547 F. Supp. 692, 699 (D.N.J. 1982).  
Another decision that is very respectful of consumer intelligence and discretionary 
powers is BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 215–16 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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successfully differentiate between the “Tallia” and “Italia” trademarks 
even though both were associated with clothing.207 
However, it is unusual for courts to presume that consumers are 
observant and shrewd enough to distinguish between two disparate 
cereal boxes or clothing retailers.  The theory of consumer-as-idiot 
prevails in many trademark infringement cases, often seeming glaringly 
pretextual, invoked only to comport with the doctrinal requirements 
necessary to reach the outcome that the trademark holder desires and the 
court apparently endorses.  Where the benchmark consumer is likely to 
be perceived as female, this predisposition seems to be exacerbated.  
Illustrations include determinations that consumers cannot distinguish 
between the “Nailtiques” and “Pro-Techniques” marks on bottles of nail 
polish,208 or between an over-the-counter drug called “Premesyn PMS,” 
intended to relieve premenstrual syndrome symptoms, and a prescription 
drug, “Premarin,” used in estrogen replacement therapy to treat the 
symptoms of menopause.209  In this Author’s estimation, most women 
can tell one brand name from another and have no difficulty whatsoever 
in distinguishing between over-the-counter and prescription drugs, or 
between premenstrual syndrome and menopause.  Admittedly, this 
Author’s opinion is experiential, intuitive, and transcendently subjective, 
yet so are the vague presumptive foundations upon which judges in 
trademark cases often base their legal analyses. 
In a recent case in which the relevant consumers were “shoppers,” the 
court upheld a jury verdict finding that the mySimon Internet-based 
comparison shopping service infringed a trademark held by the Simon 
Property Group, which used the name “Simon” in connection with its 
real space mall development, mall management, and retail shopping 
services.210  This verdict was affirmed despite the fact that the only 
survey evidence in the case “tend[ed] to show virtually no threat of 
actual confusion between the two companies[,] . . . . a ‘completely 
negligible’ likelihood of confusion with under 2 percent of respondents 
indicating relevant confusion.”211  The judge clearly felt that judicial 
 
 207. Hartz & Co. v. Italia, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 5657, 1998 WL 132787, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1998); see also Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 
293, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that Plaintiffs’ trademark was not infringed by 
noncompeting products in adjacent markets because there was no likelihood of 
confusion, defendants’ use was in good faith and reasonable, and plaintiffs were not 
injured). 
 208. Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Scis. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1998 
(S.D. Fla. 1997). 
 209. Am. Home Prods., Corp. v. Chattem, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 3671, 1986 WL 6167, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1986). 
 210. Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., No. IP 99-1195-C H/G, 2001 WL 
66408 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 2001). 
 211. Id. at *15. 
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intuition outweighed the evidence and ruled accordingly. 
In another well-known case, one jeans maker, Lois Sportswear, was 
enjoined from using a stitching pattern on the back pockets of the 
upscale designer denim pants it marketed because the configuration was 
held to be substantially similar to Levi’s trademark stitching pattern, “a 
fanciful pattern of interconnected arcs.”212  The court announced that 
similar back pocket stitching on defendant’s wares would confuse 
consumers, despite the fact that the defendant’s jeans were designer 
jeans and therefore sold to a different market segment than Levi’s jeans, 
and the designer jeans bore very disparate, exceeding dissimilar labels, 
hang tags, and product features.213  This conclusion was premised upon 
the stated concern that an individual’s eyes might sweep the backside of 
another who was wearing a pair of the defendant’s jeans, notice the back 
pocket stitching design, and erroneously conclude the fanciful pattern of 
interconnected arcs indicated a connection between the source of those 
designer jeans with the Lois Sportswear labels and the makers of 
Levi’s.214  Framed as “post-sale confusion as to source,” the court 
 
 212. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
 213. Id. at 877–78 (Miner, C.J., dissenting). 
[T]he evidence is clear that Lois employs a variety of temporary and 
permanent labels distinguishing its jeans from those of Levi.  For instance, 
Lois jeans are sold with “hang tags” displaying the Lois brand name and the 
trade symbol of a bull.  There are two stitched-on cardboard tags, one 
measuring approximately five inches by three inches and the other measuring 
approximately one inch by three inches.  Both tags display the Lois brand 
name and bull symbol as well as the legend “imported from Europe” in 
conspicuous print.  Affixed permanently to Lois jeans are various identifying 
features: a two inch by one inch leather tag attached to the left rear pocket 
bearing the brand name and bull symbol; a sizing and care tag stitched to the 
inner waist seam bearing the Lois brand name and indicating that both the 
fabric and product are made in Spain; a brass button on the waistband bearing 
the Lois brand name; and a quarter circle leather or fabric patch, stitched to the 
right front pocket, bearing the bull symbol. 
Id. 
 214. Id. at 874. 
We are trying to determine if it is likely that consumers mistakenly will 
assume either that appellants’ jeans somehow are associated with appellee or 
are made by appellee.  The fact that appellants’ jeans arguably are in a 
different market segment makes this type of confusion more likely.  Certainly a 
consumer observing appellee’s striking stitching pattern on appellants’ 
designer jeans might assume that appellee had chosen to enter that market 
segment using a subsidiary corporation, or that appellee had allowed 
appellants’ designers to use appellee’s trademark as a means of reaping some 
profits from the designer jeans fad without a full commitment to that market 
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assumed this allegedly anticipated harm was of adequate magnitude to 
support injunctive relief.215  The court’s qualitative view of the 
purchasers of the defendants’ designer jeans can be surmised from the 
following: While the text of the opinion states that “[t]he district court 
found, and the parties do not dispute, that the typical buyer of ‘designer’ 
jeans is sophisticated with respect to jeans buying,”216 an appended 
footnote acerbically notes that: “[i]t is quite possible of course to draw 
the opposite inference from the fact that these buyers are willing to pay 
almost $100 for a pair of jeans.”217 
On occasion, adult shoppers are explicitly presumed to be less 
perceptive and discerning then their young children.  One of the most 
startling cases in this regard involved fish shaped snack crackers.218  
 
segment.  Likewise, in the post-sale context a consumer seeing appellants’ 
jeans on a passer-by might think that the jeans were appellee’s long-awaited 
entry into the designer jeans market segment.  Motivated by this mistaken 
notion—appellee’s goodwill—the consumer might then buy appellants’ jeans 
even after discovering his error.  After all, the way the jeans look is a primary 
consideration to most designer jeans buyers. 
Id. 
 215. Id. at 871. 
We agree with the district court, however, that the two principle areas of 
confusion raised by appellants’ use of appellee’s stitching pattern are: (1) the 
likelihood that jeans consumers will be confused as to the relationship between 
appellants and appellee; and (2) the likelihood that consumers will be confused 
as to the source of appellants’ jeans when the jeans are observed in the post-
sale context.  We hold that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (1982), 
as interpreted by our Court, was meant to prevent such likely confusion. 
Id. 
 216. Id. at 875. 
 217. Id. at 875 n.5. 
 218. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1999). 
   In spring 1998, Nickelodeon Television Network approached Nabisco to 
explore a possible joint promotion for Nickelodeon’s new cartoon program, 
“CatDog.”  In August 1998, Nabisco and Nickelodeon entered a Joint 
Promotion Agreement (“JPA”), giving Nabisco the right to produce cheese 
crackers in shapes based on the CatDog cartoon.  The agreement required 
Nabisco to print on its packages that “CatDog and related titles, logos and 
characters are trademarks of” Nickelodeon’s parent, Viacom International, Inc.  
Nabisco’s CatDog product was intended to compete with other animal-shaped 
cheese crackers marketed to children. 
   The star of the CatDog cartoon program is the CatDog—a two-headed 
creature that is half cat and half dog.  Each half of the CatDog has a distinct 
personality.  The fish is the favorite food and the symbol for the cat half; the 
bone is the preferred meal and emblem for the dog half.  Other characters that 
are featured on the cartoon include a mouse, a rabbit, a squirrel, and several 
dogs.  In its first three months, the CatDog show garnered a 3.9 Nielsen rating, 
making it close to the most widely watched program for children. 
   Pursuant to its agreement with Nickelodeon, Nabisco developed a CatDog 
snack that consists of small orange crackers in three shapes: half the crackers 
in a package are in the shape of the two-headed CatDog character, one-quarter 
in the shape of a bone, and one-quarter in the shape of a fish.  The fish-shaped 
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Pepperidge Farms, makers of Goldfish crackers, objected to the presence 
of fish shaped crackers in packages of “CatDog” crackers produced by 
Nabisco to exploit the popularity of the Nickelodeon network cartoon by 
the same name.219  Nabisco had developed a CatDog snack that consisted of 
small orange crackers in three shapes: Half the crackers in a package 
were in the shape of the two-headed CatDog character, one-quarter in 
the shape of a bone, and one-quarter in the shape of a fish.220  In 
concluding that the fish crackers would improperly “lessen the 
distinctiveness” of Pepperidge Farm’s product, the court acknowledged 
that the children at whom the Nabisco crackers were pitched would 
likely know the difference, but asserted that their parents would be 
markedly less astute, writing: 
   Nabisco argues that . . . children will have no difficulty recognizing the 
Nabisco product as a reference to the CatDog and will thus keep the two marks 
separate and distinct.  Even if Nabisco is correct in that surmise, it seems to us 
to have only moderate importance, for two reasons.  First, while children may 
be the primary ultimate consumers of the crackers, they are generally not the 
purchasers.  Adult purchasers of crackers may be less sophisticated than 
children in recognizing the differences between the two fish.  Even if, in the 
minds of children, the addition of Nabisco’s CatDog family to the cheese 
cracker landscape does not lessen the distinctiveness of Pepperidge Farm’s 
mark in its Goldfish, it is likely to do so among adults who will have less 
awareness of Nickelodeon’s CatDog and of the differences between the two 
competing crackers.221 
This conclusion contrasts dramatically with the much more typical 
(and intuitive) assumption generally made by courts that children are 
more easily confused than adults.222  It was, however, necessary to 
 
cracker closely resembles Pepperidge Farm’s Goldfish cracker in color, shape, 
and size, and taste, although the CatDog fish is somewhat larger and flatter, 
and has markings on one side.  The CatDog product was to be sold in boxes 
featuring the CatDog and showing fish and bones in the background. 
Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 220–21.  The Court further noted: 
   Nabisco claims some protection from the fact that its fish shape is not 
arbitrary but acts as a reference to the fish in Nickelodeon’s CatDog story.  
The weakness in its argument lies in the fact that when the Nabisco crackers 
are served in a bowl, consumers who are not familiar with the Nickelodeon 
entertainment and its cross licensing with Nabisco will see simply crackers 
very similar to Pepperidge Farm’s fish (together with other shapes) and will 
not know that it celebrates Nickelodeon’s CatDog entertainment. 
Id. at 221–22. 
 222. See, e.g., Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th 
BARTOW.DOC 9/16/2019  3:49 PM 
 
786 
justify the outcome of the case, as the lower court had previously 
ascertained that Pepperidge Farm had “failed to show a likelihood that 
its target consumers, children in the 6–12 year-old age group, will be 
confused by the Nabisco product.”223  Implicit in the Second Circuit 
analysis is the belief that children will either not be present when snack 
 
Cir. 2001). 
As we noted above, the principal at an elementary school testified that when 
she wore the Duffy costume at a school rally, the children shouted “Barney.  
Barney.  Barney,” and parents testified that when they rented the Duffy 
costume for their children’s birthday parties, the children believed that the 
person dressed as Duffy was in fact Barney.  In addition, Lyons offered 
newspaper clippings that evidenced actual confusion between Duffy and 
Barney, not only by the children who were the subject of the articles, but by 
the reporters themselves, who erroneously described Duffy as “Barney.” 
Id.; Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1407, 1418 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“The 
Court must also consider the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised 
by the purchaser. Under this analysis, adults would presumably be less prone to 
confusion than young children.”); Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 
953 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (“Finally, the fact that small children, incapable of reasoning, may 
have been confused by the Chicken’s act, does not amount to actual confusion.”); 
Harlem Wizards Entm’t Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1084, 1098 
(D.N.J. 1997) (“Actual confusion is not the same as clear mistake or misidentification on 
the part of consumers, many of whom it turns out were children.  Moreover, there is no 
evidence that these purported instances of actual confusion could have any effect on 
consumer purchasing decisions.”); Three Blind Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk, Inc., 892 F. 
Supp. 303, 312 (D. Mass. 1995) (“Stewart has also been asked to autograph defendant’s 
goods on several occasions, including once by a group of children on a golf course.  
Stewart has presented six examples of actual confusion.”); Geoffrey Inc. v. Stratton, 16 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1691, 1696 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (“The category of a buyer protected by 
trademark law against this confusion includes not only the careful or discriminating 
buyer, but also the ignorant, the inexperienced, and the gullible.  In this case, it is not 
only children but also adults who may be confused.”) (citation omitted); Original 
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (“While there are differences in the parties’ products and retail outlets, 
the purchasers of the parties’ items are often substantially similar.  The evidence also 
suggests that young children were more likely to be confused than others.”); Bulk Mfg. 
Co. v. Schoenbach Prods. Co., 208 U.S.P.Q. 664, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
[T]he Court does not find that the manufacturer’s name is prominently 
displayed so that prospective purchasers of the machine would be alerted to the 
different origin, especially in view of the almost identical appearance of the 
machines.  Second, the designation of the manufacturer could not prevent 
confusion among children who purchase the “eggs” dispensed from the 
vending machines, and who could hardly be expected to place any significance 
on the designation, even if they could read it. 
Id.; Gen. Foods Corp. v. Mellis, 203 U.S.P.Q. 261, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The 
sophistication of the buyers of these products cannot be considered high; the consuming 
universe to which the products are directed is that of children.”); Blake Publ’n Corp. v. 
O’Quinn Studios, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. 848, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The nature of the 
market to which the two magazines appeal further enhances the likelihood of confusion.  
Children under 16, who comprise a substantial portion of plaintiff’s readership, are not 
likely to bring a great deal of care and sophistication to their purchasing decisions.”). 
 223. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 211 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 
191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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crackers shaped like cartoon characters are purchased or will be unable 
to dispel the confusion of accompanying adults.  A contrary (though 
admittedly similarly intuitive) argument is that purchases of snack 
crackers shaped like cartoon crackers are unlikely to be made by adults 
at all, unless children are present and urging their specific acquisition. 
Though the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ostensibly decided the 
case on trademark dilution grounds, it did so only after conflating 
confusion with dilution,224 writing: “Consumers’ actual confusion of the 
junior and the senior mark may also be a factor in finding dilution. . . .  
Confusion lessens distinction.  When consumers confuse the junior mark 
with the senior, blurring has occurred.”225  This confusion, the court decided, 
was likely to arise once the crackers were removed from their packaging, 
such as when served to adults as snacks accompanying cocktails.226  
How often Catdog crackers were likely to be served to grown ups at 
cocktail parties was not specified. 
In a dispute between the producers of Tylenol and a competitor 
marketing a dental analgesic it labeled Tempanol, the court stated that to 
prove trademark dilution, the “plaintiff must simply show that there is a 
mental association by the reasonable consumer between the two 
names.”227  The judge decided that the reasonable consumer was likely 
to make this detrimental and actionable association because “[b]oth 
marks in issue begin with the letter ‘T,’ both have three syllables with 
the accent on the first syllable, and the last syllable of both is ‘nol.’”228  
He further explicitly noted that he believed consumers were likely to 
purchase pain relievers in an unsophisticated manner, without any 
significant time or thought.229  In describing the “great renown” of the 
 
 224. The court also made the remarkable assertion that “[a] mark can be famous 
without being at all distinctive, as in the cases of American Airlines, American Tobacco 
Company, British Airways, Federated Department Stores, Allied Stores or the First 
National Bank of whatever.”  Id. at 227–28.  This is in conflict with bedrock trademark 
law and doctrine that requires a trademark to have either inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness if it is to be protectable under the Lanham Act.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 
1052 (2000) (providing in part that “nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration 
of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in 
commerce”).  Section 43(c)(1) discusses dilution of the “distinctive quality” of a mark 
and lists factors for “determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous.” 
 225. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 221. 
 226. Id. at 220–21. 
 227. McNeil Consumer Brands, Inc. v. U.S. Dentek Corp., 116 F. Supp. 2d 604, 
608 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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Tylenol mark, he wrote: 
The name even found its way into the script of the 1980 popular movie 
“Airplane,” when the traffic controller, in describing the endangered passenger 
plane, announced, “Well, it’s a big pretty white plane with a red stripe, curtains 
at the windows, wheels, and it just looks like a big Tylenol.”230 
Assumptions about female shoppers surface even when an underlying 
product is targeted at males, if a judge believes that the goods will be 
purchased for men by women.  In Tailor Tee v. Steadman Manufacturing 
the court wrote: 
   With reference to the marketing of the product although there is evidence that 
appellant’s goods are sold in women’s specialty shops, the record also reveals 
that the products of both parties are sold in department stores although in 
different departments of the stores.  A more significant factor in this connection 
is the fact that women not only buy for themselves but, according to the record, 
they purchase a substantial percentage of the underwear for the adult male 
members of their families and between 90 and 95% of the undergarments of 
their male youngsters.  Obviously under these circumstances, a female 
purchaser of tee shirts could very easily become confused as to the origin of 
these garments when one manufacturer uses the trademark Tailor-Tee and the 
other, Tailored T.231 
When female consumers are also assumed to be racial minorities, a 
variety of conjectures may influence judgments about likelihood of 
consumer confusion.  In one case, despite the fact that there was no 
evidence of actual confusion caused by the coexistence of Sheer Essence 
pantyhose and Essence magazine, and notwithstanding a determination 
by the Patent and Trademark Office that there was no likelihood of 
confusion between the two marks,232 a court decided that confusion in 
the marketplace was likely, apparently premised on that fact that both 
products were targeted to black women.233 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Tailor Tee, Inc. v. Stedman Mfg., Co., 286 F.2d 612, 614 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
 232. Ithaca Indus., Inc. v. Essence Communications, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 
(W.D.N.C. 1986). 
   The record shows that the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
determined that there was no likelihood of confusion between the mark 
SHEER ESSENCE, used on pantyhose, and any other registered mark, except 
Bancroft’s ESSENCE registration for pantyhose, which developed to have 
been cancelled and passed Ithaca’s application for publication on June 21, 
1983.  At the time this determination was made there was of record 
Defendants’ Registration (‘774) for ESSENCE for a magazine and (‘615) for 
ESSENCE for T-Shirts. 
Id. 
 233. Id. at 1209. 
[T]he Court finds and concludes that in view of the present use by ECI of its 
mark ‘615 ESSENCE “for clothing—namely, T-shirts” and its mark ‘902 
ESSENCE STYLE “for a retail mail order service for women’s clothing and 
accessories” there is a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace.  ECI is now 
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2.  Ungendered or Male Consumers and Assumptions of Astuteness 
“Unlikely indeed is the hapless Internet searcher who, unable to find 
information on the schedule of upcoming NASCAR broadcasts or ‘Dukes 
of Hazzard’ reruns, decides to give up and purchase a computer network 
maintenance seminar instead.”234 
 
While trademark jurisprudence on the whole does not present a very 
optimistic view of the intelligence or gullibility of consumers, many 
opinions implicitly suggest that the typical female shopper is especially 
easily fooled and lacking in powers of discernment.  While it bears 
repeating that courts often express low opinions about the intelligence, 
discretion, and observational powers of shoppers even where the context 
seems wholly gender neutral, some judges reserve their lowest 
expectations for presumptively female consumers, who are apparently 
assumed to be a cohort of dull-witted, easily confused girls. 
In the context of competing or related goods or services, the threshold 
at which courts are willing to assume “ungendered” or even predominantly 
male consumers are likely to be confused certainly may be a low one at 
times.  For example, one wholesale oil company, Pegasus Petroleum, 
was forced to change its moniker simply because it was named for the 
mythological creature that happened to be used in picture form as a logo 
by Mobil, which uses a red “flying horse” symbol in conjunction with its 
retail gasoline sales.235  To reach its conclusion that consumer confusion 
was likely if the marks continued to coexisted, the court accepted 
Mobil’s assertion that seeing the textual words “Pegasus Petroleum” 
made observers think that the entity must be related to Mobil Oil 
because Mobil sometimes uses a graphic red flying horse logo, but the 
court did not require Mobil to proffer any evidence demonstrating how 
 
actually engaged in selling by mail order women’s apparel and accessories and 
these goods, like Ithaca’s pantyhose, are directed specifically to the black 
woman’s market.  It would be easy for customers to assume that sheer 
pantyhose sold under the name SHEER ESSENCE and other apparel and 
accessories sold under the name of ESSENCE STYLE, all for black women, 
were made and sold by the same company. Ithaca will be enjoined from the 
use of the word essence in the sale of its pantyhose. 
Id. 
 234. The Network Network v. CBS Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
 235. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(decribing the likelihood of confusion between Mobil’s “flying horse” symbol and 
Pegasus Petroleum’s use of the word “Pegasus” as a mark). 
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frequently this might occur, if at all.236 
However, there are many examples of courts having a much higher 
estimation of consumer discretionary abilities when the marked good or 
service is directed at a male target audience.  When Terri Welles wanted 
to (accurately) describe herself on a website as a former “Playmate of 
the Year,” she was found to have a right to do so despite the objections 
of Playboy Enterprises, Inc., which claims “Playmate of the Year” as a 
trademark.  The court wrote: 
“[O]ne might refer to . . . ‘the professional basketball team from Chicago,’ but 
it’s far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago 
Bulls.”  Likewise, given that Ms. Welles is the “Playmate of the Year 1981,” 
there is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe herself and her 
services without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases.  To describe herself 
as the “nude model selected by Mr. Hefner’s magazine as its number-one 
prototypical woman for the year 1981” would be impractical as well as 
ineffectual in identifying Terri Welles to the public.237 
Note that the illustrative example the court employs in the opinion 
references a male basketball team.  While Welles certainly appears to be 
a woman, the court clearly assumed her goods and services would be 
marketed to men. 
Mead Data Central, the company that (then) owned Lexis, the 
computerized legal research service, and held “Lexis” as a registered 
trademark, sued Toyota for trademark dilution when Toyota launched a 
line of luxury cars under the Lexus trademark.  Exhibiting a level of 
respect for attorneys not always observed among federal judges, the 
court concluded that the recognized “knowledgeable sophistication” of 
attorneys238 meant that they would probably be able to distinguish 
between Lexus, an expensive car, and Lexis, an online legal research 
database.  As a result, Mead lost its dilution claim.  Similarly, in PPG 
Industries v. Clinical Data,239 the plaintiff was deemed to have failed to 
prove dilution because it did not establish the likelihood of consumer 
 
 236. In analyzing the likelihood of confusion created by the defendant’s use of 
Pegasus Petroleum, the court seemingly held the intelligence of the man who selected the 
mark against him, writing: 
Mr. Callimanopulos is obviously an educated, sophisticated man who, from his 
prior shipping business, was familiar with the flying horse and from his own 
background and education and awareness of Greek mythology could not have 
escaped the conclusion that the use of the word “Pegasus” would infringe the 
tradename and symbol of the plaintiff. 
Id. at 258. 
 237. Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1079 (S.D. Cal. 
1999), aff’d, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
 238. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 
1026, 1031–32 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 239. PPG Indus., Inc.  v. Clinical Data Inc., 620 F. Supp. 604, 608–09 (D. Mass. 
1985). 
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confusion, that its goodwill and reputation had been detracted from, or 
that the uniqueness and individuality of the “PPG” mark had diminished, 
as a result of defendant’s use on medical diagnostic equipment.240  The 
court assumed, no doubt correctly, that “medical professionals familiar 
with this sophisticated technology” could easily tell the difference 
between the defendant’s medical devices and the industrial coatings and 
finishes manufactured by the plaintiff. 
In a trademark case involving a domain name dispute, the mark 
holder, Opryland USA, Inc., registered “TNN” as a service mark for The 
Nashville Network, a cable network that broadcasts country music and 
country lifestyle programs.  The defendant domain name holder, The 
Network Network (“Network”), maintained a website at “tnn.com” 
related to training information for technology professionals pertaining to 
the establishment and maintenance of computer networks.  The judge 
observed that both parties had devoted a lot of time to the issue of 
“whether intrepid Internet explorers, in search of information about 
Nashville’s programming, are potentially confused when they alight, 
inadvertently, on Network’s website.”241  After considering the parties’ 
arguments, the court very sensibly concluded that “[t]here is a difference 
between inadvertently landing on a website and being confused.”242  
This judge’s perception of the relative astuteness of web surfers at issue 
can be surmised from the following passage from the written opinion: 
“The Court can conceive of few, if any, circumstances in which a person 
of average intelligence, seeking information on NASCAR racing 
schedules, would be seriously confused upon reaching Network’s 
website which, by its terms, offers ‘Strategic Planning, design, 
implementation, and management of Broadband Voice/Data/Video 
Networks.’”243 
When the owner of an upscale restaurant called Jake’s brought suit 
against the proprietors of Jake and Oliver’s House of Brews, a court 
concluded that while customers for both establishments came from the 
greater Philadelphia area, a “restaurant goer” could easily recognize the 
differences between the two eateries, noting: 
 
 240. Id. at 609. 
 241. The Network Network v. CBS Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 
2000). 
 242. Id. at 1155. 
 243. Id. 
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JAKE’S is considered to be a fine dining establishment where one might go for 
a special occasion such as a graduation celebration, an engagement or 
something of that nature. . . .  JAKE AND OLIVER’S, on the other hand, is a 
more casual dining experience which customers attend for the variety of beers 
that it has on tap . . . , as well as the food it serves.244 
Where two trade associations, the Self-Insurance Institute of America, 
Inc. and the Software and Information Industry Association, used similar 
trademarks, the fact that both used trademarks that incorporated the 
letters “SIIA” was not found likely to cause consumer confusion.245  In a 
suit brought against the creators and distributors of a movie entitled 
“Starballz,”246 the court decided that Lucasfilm’s trademark infringement 
claims were weak because it was unlikely that the public would confuse 
the wildly successful “Star Wars” cinematic series with the defendants’ 
animated pornographic film.  In still another case, consumers were 
deemed unlikely to confuse the mark “New York-New York $lot 
Exchange,” which was used as the name of a players club by a Las 
Vegas casino, with the New York Stock Exchange.247 
All of the “confusion is unlikely” outcomes described in this section 
seem intuitively correct, but contrast dramatically with decisions such as 
those referenced previously, in which consumers are deemed effortlessly 
duped, bewildered, and befuddled.  Comparing these cases suggests 
courts consider people who wear finger nail polish, patronize grocery 
stores, carry handbags, buy analgesics aimed at menstrual pain or fever, 
shop at malls, and purchase designer jeans marketed to women are much 
more easily confused than people who access Internet pornography, buy 
luxury cars, work with industrial coatings, follow NASCAR racing, 
maintain computer networks, eat out at a “House of Brews,” or review 
mailings from trade associations.  While both men and women can and 
undoubtedly do engage in all of these pursuits, the former are more 
stereotypically female, while the latter activities perceptually skew 
toward males. 
 
 244. Cooper v. Dearhearts, Inc., No. 96-8172, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8163, at *6 
(E.D. Pa. June 11, 1997). 
 245. Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, 208 F. Supp. 2d 
1058, 1060–61 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that Self-Insurance Institute of America, Inc. 
and defendant, Software and Information Industry Association, are trade associations).  
According to the trademark registration, plaintiff’s registered mark was a composite 
mark that included “SIIA” and the eagle design.  Defendant uses a composite mark that 
included “SIIA,” “Software and Information Industry Association” and a circle design.  
Id. 
 246. Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
 247. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 555 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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F.  One Appellate Review Saga: Disputes and Nuts 
Some judges who resist the notion that consumers are easily confused 
learn the hard way that resistance can be futile.  One stunning example 
of a valiant but failed attempt to credit consumers with basic common 
sense concerns a trademark dispute involving nuts marketed to beer 
drinkers that evolved into a prolonged and heated dispute about the 
“correct” scope of trademark protection between district court and 
appellate court judges in the Tenth Circuit.  In 1981, the company that 
held the “Beer Nuts” trademark sued a competitor that had begun 
marketing peanuts as “Brew Nuts” in a package that also bore the image 
of an overflowing beer stein.  After noting significant differences in the 
respective retail containers,248 the district court concluded, “[T]he 
product packaging and wording are sufficiently unique so as to preclude 
any likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the competing 
products.”249  Specifically addressing the breadth of the protection to 
which the Beer Nuts mark was entitled, the court wrote: 
 
 248. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 520 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D. Utah 
1981), rev’d, 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983). 
 Is there a likelihood of confusion as to origin of the competing products?  I 
find there is not. 
 While the peanut product is similar and the markets overlap in those areas of 
the United States where Clover Club Foods Company operates, (generally the 
Intermountain West), the product packaging and wording are sufficiently 
unique so as to preclude any likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the 
competing products. 
 First, the home office of each vendor is plainly stamped on each package: 
Bloomington, Illinois and Kaysville, Utah, respectively.  The distinctive logo 
of each is prominently displayed—plaintiff’s Beer Nuts, Inc.® and defendant’s 
distinctive Clover Club mark used by it on hundreds of products. 
 Second, the color scheme of the package is readily distinguishable as is the 
unique design of each package.  The eye of this Court is not confused, nor is 
the eye of the consuming public likely to be. 
 Third, the term Beer Nuts® as displayed on plaintiff’s products performs at 
least three discreet functions: (1) It identifies the source of the goods. Beer 
Nuts, Inc. is the name of the originating company; (2) It refers to the product 
inside the package—usually a sweet and salted peanut, and (3) It describes or 
suggests use or purpose. 
 The term “Brew Nuts,” in contrast, has but two discreet functions: (1) It 
refers to the product inside the package; and (2) It suggests or describes 
purpose or use. 
 Source or origin of product is indicated by the Clover Club logo confirmed 
by home office identification, all as set forth on the package. 
Id. 
 249. Id. 
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Clover Club’s use of the words “Brew Nuts” is a description of its product 
rather than a trademark, and recognition of the mark “Beer Nuts” does not 
convey a monopoly for preparing sweetened and salted peanuts for use with 
beer or other beverage, nor does it invest the power in Beer Nuts, Inc. to keep 
any other vendor from describing a similar product.  Beer Nuts, Inc. retains its 
right to use its specific and unique mark on its products to the exclusion of 
others, but the scope of the law’s protection extends no farther.250 
Beer Nuts, Inc. appealed, and in 1983 a three-judge panel on the Tenth 
Circuit reversed and remanded, ruling that the district court should not 
have relied on side-by-side package comparisons when determining 
whether consumers were likely to experience confusion.251  Instead, after 
noting that the “prospective purchaser does not ordinarily carry a sample 
or specimen of the article he knows well enough to call by its trade 
name, he necessarily depends upon the mental picture of that which 
symbolizes origin and ownership of the thing desired,”252 the district 
court was instructed to “determine whether the alleged infringing mark 
will be confusing to the public when singly presented.”253 
On remand in 1985, the original district court judge wrote, with 
obvious frustration and some acid:254 
 In order to make a finding regarding “the degree of similarity between the 
designation and the trademark . . . in appearance,” the court must make a 
comparison.  Conceptually, it is impossible to make a comparison in a vacuum; 
the court must compare the BREW NUTS package with something.  Comparing 
the BREW NUTS package with the BEER NUTS® package is the most obvious 
comparison, but the Tenth Circuit has now ruled that such a comparison, if that 
is all that is done, is inappropriate. 
 The Court of Appeals seems to have directed this court to compare the 
BREW NUTS package with a hypothetical customer’s mental picture of BEER 
NUTS®.  First, the court must determine what a hypothetical prospective 
purchaser’s mental picture of BEER NUTS® would be.  Second, the court must 
compare that picture with the BREW NUTS package to determine whether that 
same hypothetical prospective purchaser would be confused about the source of 
Clover Club’s BREW NUTS.255 
 
 250. Id. at 400 (footnote omitted). 
 251. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th Cir. 1983). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 605 F. Supp. 855, 858–59 (D. Utah 
1985), rev’d, 805 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 255. Id. 
   The court has examined the probability of confusion with regard to four 
groups of potential purchasers: those who have not heard of either BEER 
NUTS® or BREW NUTS, those who are aware of both BEER NUTS® and 
BREW NUTS, those who have heard of BREW NUTS but not BEER NUTS®, 
and those who have heard of BEER NUTS® but not BREW NUTS.  The only 
group of potential customers that face the potential of confusion over the 
source of BREW NUTS is the group that has heard of BEER NUTS® but not 
BREW NUTS.  Those who know nothing about BEER NUTS cannot be 
confused into believing that BREW NUTS comes from Beer Nuts, Inc.  In 
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After performing the analysis the appellate panel had delineated, the 
district judge again concluded that consumer confusion was unlikely, 
writing: 
   The plaintiff asserts that the BEER NUTS® trademark and the BREW NUTS 
package are so similar that a hypothetical customer is likely to be misled by 
Clover Club’s package.  The court disagrees.  The plaintiff’s position assumes 
that the hypothetical customer will ignore the well known Clover Club® 
trademark, will ignore the expansive nature of the word “brew,” will translate 
the picture of the stein into the word “beer,” will equate the word “brew” with 
the word “beer,” and then will probably believe that the product comes from the 
plaintiff.  This court is not prepared to assume that much, fully recognizing that 
others may find it perfectly reasonable to find a likelihood of confusion if they 
make different assumptions about the hypothetical prospective purchaser.256 
The court also noted that the plaintiff had not offered a shred of 
evidence that actual confusion had occurred, despite the fact that the 
products had been competing in the same retail channels for over three 
years.257  When the plaintiff again appealed, another Tenth Circuit panel 
again reversed and decided the issue itself rather than remand again,258 
writing: “The district court considered the appropriate factors in its 
 
addition, those who are familiar with both will not be confused because they 
would recognize that the two products come from different sources. 
Id. 
 256. Id. at 861. 
 257. Id. at 864. 
   BREW NUTS and BEER NUTS® were marketed in the same area for at 
least three years.  Both companies sold tens of thousands of packages of their 
nuts in the same area during those three years.  Throughout the trial, not a 
single witness testified that he or she had been confused by the BREW NUTS 
package.  In addition, there was no survey evidence indicating actual confusion 
(or even a likelihood of confusion).  To the contrary, Robert J. Brewster, vice-
president of Beer Nuts, Inc., testified that he had no personal knowledge of an 
instance of actual confusion between BREW NUTS and BEER NUTS®.  The 
court finds that this evidence supports the conclusion that confusion about the 
source of BREW NUTS is unlikely. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 258. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1986). 
   Generally, we do not agree with the position taken by courts that treat the 
issue of likelihood of confusion as a matter of law; we favor remand to the 
district court for determination of this issue as a question of fact.  However, in 
the present case, we are faced with an unusual situation.  This is the second 
appeal in the case.  The district court has already been instructed as to the 
applicable law and has failed to properly apply it.  There is no dispute 
regarding the underlying facts.  Therefore, under the circumstances of this 
case, we decline to remand the case a second time, and instead decide the 
likelihood of confusion question. 
Id. at 923 n.2 (citations omitted). 
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analysis of the likelihood of confusion, but because it did not afford the 
BEER NUTS trademark the scope of protection to which it is legally 
entitled, its analysis was erroneous.”259  The opinion was primarily based 
on the perceived similarities between the marks, rather than the 
perceived stupidity of consumers, but the court pointedly noted: 
The district court noted that BREW NUTS and BEER NUTS are both relatively 
inexpensive snack foods.  Furthermore, Clover Club’s president admitted that 
Clover Club’s BREW NUTS are purchased as impulse items in that they are not 
generally on a shopper’s grocery list.  According to this evidence and the law of 
this case, the district court should have concluded that the two products are 
purchased with little care and are thus likely to be confused.260 
One implication of this final resolution is that, for all practical 
purposes, the Beer Nuts mark holder has a monopoly over beer 
references and beer synonyms on retail nut packaging.  Precisely how 
the mark holder earned or acquired such expansive trademark rights is 
never explicitly articulated—it certainly did not pioneer the idea of 
eating nuts with beer.  But there seems to be an underlying assumption 
by the Tenth Circuit that by marketing and advertising Beer Nuts, the 
mark holder will increase demand for nuts by beer drinkers and all of 
these additional sales should belong to the Beer Nuts producers alone.  
By deeming beer drinking consumers “confused” by competing nuts, the 
court gave Beer Nuts a market segment monopoly and did so without 
requiring proof of a single instance of actual consumer confusion. 
V.  CONFUSION, DILUTION, AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Neither noncommercial use of a trademark, nor commercial use of a 
mark in a descriptive (rather than trademark) sense can infringe upon or 
dilute traditional trademark rights.  Under the Lanham Act, unauthorized 
entities are free to speak about the trademarks of others in 
noncommercial or commercial-but-nontrademark ways.  For example, a 
 
 259. Id. at 925.  The court held: 
   The district court’s finding that there is no likelihood of confusion is 
erroneous.  Both BEER NUTS and BREW NUTS are trademarks identifying 
the source of the products, and Clover Club’s use of the BREW NUTS mark 
constitutes infringement if it is likely to be confused with the BEER NUTS 
mark.  There is clearly similarity between the trademarks.  Moreover, the 
similarities in the products and marketing methods, the degree of care 
exercised by consumers and the inference of intent on the part of Clover Club 
suggest that the products are likely to be confused.  When all of the relevant 
factors are considered together, we must conclude that there is a likelihood of 
confusion between the marks and, as a consequence, Clover Club’s use of the 
words BREW NUTS with an overflowing stein as a trademark constitutes 
infringement of the BEER NUTS trademark. 
Id. at 928. 
 260. Id. at 926–27 (citation omitted). 
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published novel in which a character specifically drinks Coca-Cola 
rather than simply soda, or wears Lee Jeans rather than generic pants 
as part of the narrative, is not infringing the trademark rights of the 
pertinent mark holders.  As one commentator articulated: 
   What trademark law gets you is the exclusive right to make trademark use of a 
word on the products you sell in those markets in which you have actually done 
business.  Dell Computers has an exclusive right to use the mark Dell as a 
trademark for computer hardware in connection with the sale of Dell-brand 
computer hardware.  It can’t stop Dell publishing from using the mark “Dell” on 
books, even books about computing.  It can’t stop Compaq computers from 
advertising that its machines are a better value than Dell’s.  It can’t stop New 
Line Cinema from making a movie in which the bad guy is a pornographer who 
uses a Dell Computer as the server for his x-rated web site.  What it can do is 
stop anyone from making commercial use of the word “Dell,” or a word similar 
to Dell, in a way that is likely to confuse or deceive consumers.261 
Similarly, she noted, “Procter and Gamble’s registered trademark 
gives it no right to prevent anyone from discussing ‘Tide’ the mark, 
‘Tide’ the detergent, or tide, the lunar phenomenon.”262  One court has 
written that “trademark laws exist not to ‘protect’ trademarks, but . . . to 
protect the consuming public from confusion, concomitantly protecting 
the trademark owner’s right to a non-confused public.”263  However, 
trademark laws can be used to inhibit speech any time protecting a 
trademark (or shielding consumers from confusion) strikes a court as being 
more important than a conflicting interest in unrestrained expression.264 
Traditional federal trademark law doctrinally averted collision with 
free speech interests by authorizing judicial intervention only in contexts 
 
 261. Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name 
System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 153–54 (2000). 
 262. Litman, supra note 31, at 1721. 
 263. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 264. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1711–12 (1999). 
Trademark laws have been used to preclude artists from painting in the same 
style as another, to prevent an author from using the term “Godzilla” in the 
title of his book about Godzilla, to prevent a comic book from featuring a 
character known as Hell’s Angel, to prevent a satirical political advertisement 
from using the “Michelob” trademark to help make its point, to prevent a 
tractor manufacturer from making fun of its competitor’s logo in an 
advertisement, to prevent a movie about a Minnesota beauty pageant from 
using the title “Dairy Queens,” to prevent a political satire of the O.J. Simpson 
case called “The Cat NOT in the Hat!” to prevent individuals from setting up 
web pages critical of a company or product, and to prevent a theme bar from 
calling itself “The Velvet Elvis.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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in which consumers were likely to be confused.  Anti-dilution statutes, 
however, protect trademarks from the “likelihood of injury to business 
reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark” absent even 
arguable or pretextual confusion as to the source of goods or services.265  
Dilution has been interpreted by some courts to create a cause of action 
when there is “blurring” of a trademark’s positive connotations by dissonant 
or unfavorable usage,266 and dilution has also been found when the 
affirmative associations of a mark were deemed “tarnished” through 
unwholesome or unsavory mental associations.267  Therefore, as one 
commentator articulated: “The underlying premise of anti-dilution law is 
that the primary value of a trademark lies in its ability to convey positive 
meaning to the public.”268  As is explained below, numerous courts have 
explicitly held that parody of a mark constitutes trademark infringement 
or dilution,269 while others have elevated free speech rights over 
trademark interests.270 
 
 265. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 266. See, e.g., Ahearn, supra note 106, at 904–11. 
 267. See, e.g., Robert S. Nelson, Unraveling the Trademark Rope: Tarnishment and 
Its Proper Place in the Laws of Unfair Competition, 42 IDEA 133, 153–55 (2002). 
 268. Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the 
Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech 
Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 533–34 (1997). 
 269. See, e.g., Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1633 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(holding that “Plaintiff has established that its mark will be diluted either through 
blurring or parody.  Therefore, Plaintiff has shown actual success on the merits”); see 
also Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542, 1543 (N.D. 
Cal. 1996) (allowing the issuance of a temporary restraining order in favor of Anheuser-
Busch Inc. against a defendant who wanted to distribute T-shirts marked with the word 
“Buttwiser”); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 126 (N.D. Ga. 
1981) (holding that a picture of figures resembling the plaintiff’s trade characters 
“Poppin” Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh” engaged in sexual intercourse and fellatio violated 
state antidilution statute because despite the lack of actual damages, likelihood that the 
defendants’ presentation could injure the business reputation of the plaintiff or dilute the 
distinctive quality of its trademarks); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 
1183, 1192–93 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 270. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 508 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228–29 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the mark “Mike,” as a parody, did not present a likelihood of confusion as 
to source, affiliation, or sponsorship with the mark “Nike”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & 
L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 317, 321 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a T-shirt design 
parodying Budweiser trademark fit a conventional definition of trademark parody by 
mimicking “the characteristic turns of phrase on the Budweiser label by applying them to 
the beach”).  The Budweiser label stated: “This is the famous Budweiser beer.  We know 
of no brand produced by any other brewer which costs so much to brew and age.  Our 
exclusive Beechwood Aging produces a taste, a smoothness, and a drinkability you will 
find in no other beer at any price.” Defendant’s T-shirt design replaced this language 
with the following: “This is the famous beach of Myrtle Beach, S.C.  We know of no 
other resort in any state which lays claim to such a rich history.  The unspoiled beaches, 
natural beauty, and southern hospitality compose a mixture you will find on no other 
beach in any state.”  At the bottom of the Budweiser label is the statement that 
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A.  Barbie Dolls, Girl Scouts, and Full-Figured Women 
It was argued above that trademarks on products and services pitched 
at women obtain enhanced protections by invoking the specter of the 
very easily confused female consumer, who is deemed likely to be 
fooled by competitors if a court does not intervene.271  Once speech 
concerns enter a trademark dispute, however, almost the opposite effect 
can be detected.  When the plaintiff trademark is associated with 
something unequivocally feminine, some courts actually seem less 
willing to offer the sweeping “confusion prevention” and “positive 
meaning” protections that other masculine or ungendered trademarks 
enjoy.  While female-oriented products may be rigorously protected 
from confusing behaviors by competitors, they are not always shielded 
from employment in communicative acts, regardless of how disparaging 
a use may be in nature or effect.  Quite the contrary: Speech mocking 
and maligning female-identified trademarked symbols is in some 
instances accorded surprisingly strong First Amendment protections, 
rendering these marks unusually vulnerable to unauthorized uses and 
associations.272 
 
Budweiser beer is “Brewed by our original process from the Choicest Hops, Rice and 
Best Barley Malt.”  Berard’s T-shirt design replaced this language with “Myrtle Beach 
contains the Choicest Surf, Sun, and Sand.”  Also, where Anheuser-Busch placed the 
“King of Beers” trademark under the Budweiser label, Berard substituted “King of 
Beaches.”  Berard’s design also replaced the Anheuser-Busch slogan “This Bud’s for 
You” with “This Beach is for You.”  Id. at 319; Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday 
Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1989). 
[T]he parody cover of Spy Notes, although it surely conjures up the original 
and goes to great lengths to use some of the identical colors and aspects of the 
cover design of Cliffs Notes, raises only a slight risk of consumer confusion 
that is outweighed by the public interest in free expression, especially in a form 
of expression that must to some extent resemble the original. 
Id.; L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987); Lucasfilm 
Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Lyons 
P’ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 953 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that a 
“good-faith intent to parody is not an intent to confuse”); Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records 
Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1407, 1419–20 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 
622 F. Supp. 931, 933–35 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 271. See supra Part IV.F. 
 272. Again, the Author agrees with this determination.  It is the disparities in 
treatment of various trademarks that is the subject of concern.  A pithy encapsulation of 
the normative claims of this Article is as follows: All consumers should be treated like 
men, and all trademarks like Barbie. 
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1.  Barbie 
Barbie273 is typically invoked conversationally to convey negative 
sentiments.274  Frequently attacked as a symbol of superficiality and 
materialism,275 the doll has been accused of promoting negative body 
images in girls276 and being “an insta-symbol of everything that’s wrong 
with our culture’s well-worn images of femininity and beauty.”277  In a 
biography, Joan Kennedy referred to Barbie278 “in order to indicate that 
 
 273. Mattel, Inc. v. Adventure Apparel, No. 00 Civ. 4085, 2001 WL 1035140, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001). 
  Mattel is the world’s largest manufacturer of toys, games and playthings.  
One of Mattel’s most successful products is the Barbie doll which is one of the 
most popular toys in existence.  Mattel has caused numerous Barbie related 
trademarks to be registered in the . . . United States Patent and Trademark 
Office on the Principal Register. 
Id. 
 274. See, e.g., Alyson Lewis, Playing Around with Barbie: Expanding Fair Use 
for Cultural Icons, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 61, 76 (1999). 
When people see Barbie, some see an economic powerhouse marketed by Mattel, 
others see a social icon that programs young girl’s into thinking that Barbie is the 
perfect woman.  Feminist and cultural scholars alike have critiqued Barbie for 
promulgating an impossible feminine mystique.  True, she is plastic.  However, 
even Mattel admits that she is marketed more as a person than as a doll. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 275. Something Fishy: Website on Eating Disorders, Exploring the Role Society 
and the Media Play in the Development of an Eating Disorder, at http://www.something-
fishy.org/prevention/society.php (last visisted Feb. 20, 2004). 
Barbie-type dolls have often be[en] blamed on playing a role in the 
development of body-image problems and Eating Disorders.  Not only do these 
dolls have fictionally proportioned, small body sizes, but they lean towards 
escalating the belief that materialistic possessions, beauty and thinness equate 
happiness.  Barbie has more accessories available to purchase than can be 
believed, including Ken, her attractive boyfriend.  She has an assortment of 
jobs including: Potty-training her sister Kelly, princess and more recently, 
Dentist (in which she wears a mini-skirt and has enough hair that her patients 
would choke).  While I personally do NOT believe every girl that has a 
Barbie-type doll is at risk of disordered eating, I do believe it helps to 
perpetuate an ideal of materialism, beauty, and being thin as important 
elements to happiness in one’s life. 
Id. (emphasis in original); see also What’s Working for Girls in Illinois, Barbie As Icon, 
at http://www.aauw-il.org/wwfg/archive/Spr2_3.htm (last visisted Feb. 20, 2004) 
(criticizing Barbie products for emphasizing female gender roles centered around 
physical attractiveness). 
 276. See Kate Leary, Barbie’s Legacy: Body Image and Eating Disorders, JOHNS 
HOPKINS NEWS-LETTER, Nov. 15, 1996, available at http://www.jhu.edu/~newslett/11-
15-96/Features/Barbie’s__Legacy._Body_Image_and_Eating_Disorders.html (arguing that 
the Barbie dolls’ physical proportions help stress unrealistic images of women’s ideal 
body type, thereby contributing to the development of eating disorders); Lewis, supra 
note 274, at 77 (writing that “[w]hether Mattel likes it or not, people see this 12” plastic 
doll as a reflection of society’s problem with body image”). 
 277. See, e.g., Ophira Edut, Barbie Girls Rule?, BARBIOLOGY, at http://www. 
adiosbarbie.com/bology/bology_barbiead.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2003). 
 278. “When I campaign alone I’m approachable.  Women talk to me, complain, but 
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she was treated like a beautiful but empty-headed accessory.”279  In an 
episode of the sitcom Ally McBeal, being called “Barbie” was portrayed 
as a gross insult to professional women.280  The way the Barbie social 
construct affects the psyches of women or young girls is well beyond the 
scope of this Article, but it is worth considering how her designation and 
impact as a cultural icon affects how nonpermissive communicative uses 
of the Barbie trademark intersect with trademark law. 
In March of 1997, a Danish musical group called Aqua released a 
song entitled “Barbie Girl,” in which female and male vocalists pose as 
Barbie and Ken, the two popular dolls produced by Mattel.  The 
singers refer to Barbie as a “blond bimbo girl,” who loves to party and 
whose “life is plastic.”  During the course of the musical work, Aqua 
sings lyrics that include phrases such as the following: “You can brush 
my hair, undress me everywhere”; “I’m a blond bimbo girl, in a fantasy 
world”; “You can touch, you can play, if you say ‘I’m always yours’”; 
and “Make me walk, make me talk, do whatever you please, I can act 
like a star, I can beg on my knees.”  Ken sings lyrics such as: “Kiss me 
here, touch me there, hanky panky”; and “Come jump in, bimbo friend, 
let us go do it again, hit the town, fool around, let’s go party.”281 
 
when I’m with Ted I’m a Barbie doll.”  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive 
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
397, 397 (1990) (quoting M. CHELLIS, THE JOAN KENNEDY STORY: LIVING WITH THE 
KENNEDYS 191 (1986)). 
 279. Dreyfuss, supra note 278, at 400. 
 280. See Lewis, supra note 274, at 77. 
 281. The full text of the lyrics is reportedly as follows: “Barbie Girl” by Aqua:  
  - Hi Barbie! 
  - Hi Ken! 
  - Do you wanna go for a ride?  
  - Sure Ken! 
  - Jump in . . .   
I’m a Barbie girl, in a Barbie world.  
Life in plastic, it’s fantastic!  
You can brush my hair, undress me everywhere  
Imagination, life is your creation 
Come on Barbie, let’s go party!  
I’m a blonde single girl, in a fantasy world.  
Dress me up, make it tight, I’m your dolly 
You’re my doll, rock and roll, feel the glamour in pink 
Kiss me here, touch me there, hanky-panky  
You can touch, you can play, if you say: “I’m always yours” 
(uu-oooh-u)  
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party! 
(Ah ah ah yeah)  
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The song was commercially released and heavily promoted.  The 
album containing the song sold 1.4 million copies in the United States 
alone.282  In response, trademark holder Mattel brought suit, alleging 
among other causes of action that its Barbie trademark was infringed by 
use of the word “Barbie” in the song “Barbie Girl” and its accompanying 
video.283  Mattel claimed that this unauthorized use of its mark would 
lead to confusion among consumers and harm to the Barbie product line 
itself because Aqua’s song associated its doll with “antisocial themes 
such as promiscuity, lewdness, and the stereotyping and ridiculing of 
young women.”284 
The defendant band successfully argued that Barbie is a powerful 
symbol in contemporary American civilization and that their use of the 
trademark in their song to invoke her social meaning was protected by 
the First Amendment.  The district court specifically held: 
   [T]he First Amendment concerns raised by prohibiting a parody of a popular 
consumer product weigh against granting a preliminary injunction.  Presumably, 
some consumer confusion is inevitable when a few people fail to realize that 
one product is parodying another.  This fact should not be used to censor 
criticism of or social comments on icons in our popular culture . . . .285 
Many people would strongly agree with this outcome, this Author 
most emphatically included, given the fact that it is appropriately 
anchored by freedom of speech considerations.  The question that it raises, 
however, is why there appears to be a broader right to invoke the social 
 
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party! 
(uu-oooh-u)  
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party! 
(Ah ah ah yeah) 
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party! 
(uu-oooh-u)  
Make me walk, make me talk, do whatever you please 
I can act like a star, I can beg on my knees. 
Come jump in, bimbo friend, let us do it again,  
Hit the town, fool around, let’s go party 
You can touch, you can play, if you say: “I’m always yours.”  
You can touch, you can play, if you say: “I’m always yours”  
-Oh, I’m having so much fun!  
-Well, Barbie, we’re just getting started  
-Oh, I love you Ken! 
Aqua, Barbie Girl, on AQUARIUM (MCA Records 1997). 
 282. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1407, 1408 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 283. Mattel actually featured a song about Barbie by Brian Wilson, “Living Doll,” 
for the purpose of promoting “California Dream” Barbie.  See Brian Wilson Session, at 
http://www.cabinessence.com/brian/boots/bws.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (providing a 
description and track listings for the “Brian Wilson Sessions” including “Living Doll 
(a.k.a. ‘Barbie’)”); WFMU, Barbie/Beach Boys, at http://www.wfmu.org/MACrec/barbie.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (providing a brief description of the “Barbie” song’s origin). 
 284. Mattel, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1409. 
 285. Id. at 1418. 
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meaning of Barbie in a commercial context, without authorization by the 
mark holder,286 than for other trademarks.287  After Mattel appealed this 
decision to the Ninth Circuit, the affirming opinion cogently elucidated 
 
 286. The only context in which this does not necessarily appear to be true is that of 
Internet web sites and domain names.  See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., 
55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that “barbiesplaypen.com” was 
confusingly similar to the mark “Barbie” because: “(1) both contain the name ‘barbie;’ 
(2) the name ‘Barbie’ on the front page of the web site and the logo BARBIE both have 
approximately the same font, slant, size, etc.; (3) both BARBIE and ‘barbiesplaypen.com’ 
are inextricably associated with the verb ‘play,’ in the broad sense of the term”); Mattel 
Inc. v. Jcom Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1467, 1469 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that defendants’ 
use of the term Barbie’s Playhouse using the font and color most commonly associated 
with the Barbie trademark, plus the use of a doll-like figure similar to the form of a 
Barbie doll on the bottom of the web site, diluted plaintiff’s trademark).  Mattel’s 
success with Internet trademark litigation is often linked to it ability to scare web site 
operators rather than persuade judges.  See Rosemary Coombe & Andrew Herman, 
Trademarks, Property, and Propriety: The Moral Economy of Consumer Politics and 
Corporate Accountability on the World Wide Web, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 597, 602–04 
(2000). 
Barbie Doll Benson, former Miss Nude Canada, has used the Barbie Doll stage 
name for sixteen years, but it was only when she produced a Web page that 
Mattel complained.  In another example, . . . a cultural critic who dedicated his 
site to the Barbie icon’s semiotics and deconstruction, was threatened by the 
corporation and removed his imagery.  His “Distorted Barbie” however was 
widely reduplicated in mirror sites designed to subvert Mattel’s legal action. 
. . . Barbie doll collectors have dozens of Websites as well as on-line Barbie 
auctions.  Mattel has tried to shut down dozens of these sites and attempted to 
usurp the collectors’ community by creating a commercial alternative that 
offers officially licensed “nostalgia dolls” and other paraphernalia. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 287. Cases in which trademark rights have been held subsidiary to speech rights 
generally involve what the courts define as noncommercial uses.  See, e.g., L.L. Bean, 
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that High Society 
magazine’s two-page article entitled “L.L. Beam’s Back-to-School-Sex-Catalog,” which 
displayed a facsimile of L.L. Bean’s trademark and featured pictures of nude models in 
sexually explicit positions using products, was use of “plaintiff’s mark solely for 
noncommercial purposes[,] . . . an editorial or artistic, rather than a commercial, use of 
plaintiff’s mark”); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900 
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that although the defendants’ film tarnished the plaintiffs’ 
family of marks, trademark dilution did not apply to noncommercial use of a mark such 
as a parody or satire, and, as such, the plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on their 
trademark dilution claim); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 932–35 
(D.D.C. 1985) (denying the claim of the owners of the trademark “Star Wars” who 
alleged injury from public interest groups that used the term in advertisements to present 
their views on President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and stressing that the 
sweep of a trademark owner’s rights extends only to injurious, unauthorized commercial 
uses of the mark by another, and since the defendants did not affix plaintiff’s trademark 
to any goods or services for sale, and were not in competition with plaintiff, there was no 
infringement). 
BARTOW.DOC 9/16/2019  3:49 PM 
 
804 
the reason that First Amendment values trump trademark holders’ 
interest in controlling their marks as a general matter,288 but after 
gratuitously mentioning Barbie’s origins as “a doll that resembled a 
‘German street walker,’”289 the court’s analysis relied heavily on the fact 
that Barbie is “a cultural icon.”290  One gets the distinct impression from 
the opinion that the freedom to speak about a trademark is linked to the 
particular mark’s cultural importance and societal visibility.291  The 
court specifically articulated the conflict between trademarks and speech 
rights as follows: 
The problem arises when trademarks transcend their identifying purpose.  Some 
trademarks enter our public discourse and become an integral part of our 
vocabulary. How else do you say that something’s “the Rolls Royce of its 
class”?  What else is a quick fix, but a Band-Aid?  Does the average consumer 
know to ask for aspirin as “acetyl salicylic acid”?  Trademarks often fill in gaps 
in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to our expressions.  Once 
imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word in our 
language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.292 
The difficulty with this exposition is that it gives no guidance about 
how to ascertain when any given trademark has transcended its 
identifying purpose, entered our public discourse, become an integral 
part of our vocabulary, filled gaps in our vocabulary, or added a 
contemporary flavor to our expressions.  The “when” appears critical 
because it seems clear from the text of the decision that only when these 
thresholds of cultural permeation are reached by a particular mark that it 
is “imbued with expressive value,” “assumes a role outside the bounds 
of trademark law,” and is an available part of the lexicon beyond the 
control of the mark holder.  In other words, one reading of the freedom 
of speech analysis articulated here is that only well-known, iconic 
trademarks must yield to the public’s expressive interests, and speakers 
have to guess about which trademarks are well-known and iconic. 
The opinion further states: “Were we to ignore the expressive value 
that some marks assume, trademark rights would grow to encroach upon 
 
 288. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).  
“Simply put, the trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse 
whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying 
function.”  Id. 
 289. Id. at 898. 
 290. Id.  “She remains a symbol of American girlhood, a public figure who graces 
the aisles of toy stores throughout the country and beyond.  With Barbie, Mattel created 
not just a toy but a cultural icon.”  Id. 
 291. A “literary expert” in this case later published an essay which used Barbie as a 
dramatic foil because she was asserted to be the “perfect example of the struggle to own 
the cultural conversation.”  See Richard A. Lanham, Barbie and the Teacher of 
Righteousness: Two Lessons in the Economics of Attention, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 499, 511 
(2001). 
 292. Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900 (citation omitted). 
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the zone protected by the First Amendment.”293  Yet which marks are 
“some marks,” and how a speaker determines which marks have entered 
this First Amendment “zone,” is never explained.  Neither a logical basis 
for differentiating between marks is offered, nor a doctrinal justification 
for attributing expressive values only to some of them.  The court does 
not seem to believe that First Amendment limitations adhere equally to 
all trademarks, but offers no information about how to assess whether a 
particular mark is susceptible to free speech.  If Aqua had written a song 
about Raggedy Ann—perhaps something along the lines of “I’ve got 
looped yarn hair and triangle nose, and a tattooed heart beneath my 
clothes,” or maybe lyrics alluding to the fact that she had a wad of cloth 
stuffed into her head in place of a brain—would the outcome of the case 
have been the same?  What about Chatty Cathy, also a Mattel product,294 
or Mrs. Beasley,295 the doll made popular thirty years ago by the Buffy 
character on the television show Family Affair, but now largely faded 
from the public consciousness?  Do they remain iconic enough to be 
imbued with expressive value? 
In a law review note arguing “that the commercial use of social icons, 
or symbols, should be allowed as a means by which our culture 
necessarily communicates,”296 one commentator focused on Barbie as a 
prime example of the problematic effect of intellectual property 
protections on social critiques made in the form of commercial 
speech.297  While her observations about the chilling effects that threats 
of copyright and trademark litigation can have on such speech were 
astute and well taken, the author clearly neither felt nor anticipated any 
restrictions on her ability to invoke the semiotic power of Barbie for the 
purposes of her legal scholarship.  Like Joan Kennedy, the Ally McBeal 
writers, and the band Aqua, she intuitively understood that Barbie is, in 
some respects, a very vulnerable trademark.  It is invoked without 
authorization by Mattel in cyberspace with great frequency, as Yochai 
 
 293. Id. at 900. 
 294. See The Original Chatty Cathy Collectors Club, at http://www.ttinet.com/ 
chattycathy (last visited Apr. 24, 2004). 
 295. See The Select Collection, Collectible Dolls, at http://www.seniors-place.com/ 
shopping/speccolcollectdolls.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2004) (describing the collectible 
Mrs. Beasley doll); see also Bill Morgan, Family Affair’s Biggest Little Star, Apr. 1997, 
at http://tvtoys.com/library/beasley (describing the history of the collectible Mrs. Beasley 
doll). 
 296. Lewis, supra note 274, at 63. 
 297. Id. at 63. 
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Benkler observed in another context, writing: 
Here is what Google produces when we search for “Barbie”: We see 
barbie.com, with “Activities and Games for Girls Online!”, and we see 
barbiebazaar.com, with “Barbie, Barbie dolls, Barbie doll magazine, etc.,” but 
then very quickly we start seeing sites like adiosbarbie.com, “A Body Image 
Site for Every Body.” We see more Barbie collectibles, but then we see “Armed 
and Dangerous, Extra Abrasive: Hacking Barbie with the Barbie Liberation 
Organization.” Further down we see “The Distorted Barbie,” and all sorts of 
other sites trying to play with Barbie.298 
2.  The Girl Scouts 
The Girl Scouts have also had their trademark nonpermissively 
utilized for free speech purposes, despite attempts to use trademark law 
to “protect” the Scouts’ image.  In Girl Scouts of United States v. 
Personality Posters Manufacturing Co.,299 the defendant was sued for 
distributing a poster that consisted of a smiling girl dressed in the well-
known green uniform of the Junior Girl Scouts, with her hands clasped 
above her protruding, clearly pregnant abdomen.  The caveat “Be 
Prepared” appeared next to her hands.  In a well reasoned and arguably 
courageous opinion, the court held that the Girl Scouts has failed utterly 
to establish the requisite element of customer confusion, writing: 
Even if we hypothesize that some viewers might at first blush believe that the 
subject of the poster is actually a pregnant Girl Scout, it is highly doubtful that 
any such impression would be more than momentary or that any viewer would 
conclude that the Girl Scouts had printed or distributed the poster.  But it is the 
role of the court to rule on evidence, not on hypothesis; and of evidence not a 
scintilla has been presented supporting the allegation of confusion or its 
likelihood. . . .  Plaintiff’s affidavit goes no further than to state that “Plaintiff 
has received telephone calls from members of the public expressing their 
indignation concerning defendant’s said poster”; but indignation is not 
confusion.  To the contrary, the indignation of those who have called would 
appear to make it clear that they feel that the Girl Scouts are being unfairly put 
upon, not that the Girl Scouts are the manufacturers or distributors of the object 
of indignation.300 
The Girl Scouts’ trademark rights have been found subsidiary to First 
Amendment considerations in other commercial contexts as well,301 
 
 298. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of 
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1259–60 (2003). 
 299. Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969). 
 300. Id. at 1231. 
 301. Girl Scouts v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1112, 
1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that “this Court is unable to find that there is a likelihood 
of confusion between Plaintiffs’ protected trademarks and Defendants’ children’s books 
sufficient to overcome the First Amendment value of protecting creative works such as 
Defendants’ books”). 
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despite the fact that (unlike Barbie) Congress provided the Girl Scouts’ 
“emblems, badges, marks, and words” with special statutory protections.302  
This contrasts dramatically with the virtual inviability accorded another 
specially protected mark, “Olympics.”303  In the Gay Olympics case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the fact that an athletic association 
claimed an expressive, as opposed to a purely commercial, purpose in 
using the word “Olympic” did not give it a First Amendment right to use 
the word contrary to the wishes of the United States Olympic Committee 
because “Olympics” enjoyed protections broader than ordinary trademarks.304 
3.  Full-Figured Women 
Trademarks linked to jeans designed for larger proportioned women 
were also required to yield to parody.  In Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg 
 
 302. 36 U.S.C. § 80305 is entitled “Exclusive right to emblems, badges, marks, and 
words” and provides: 
The corporation has the exclusive right to use all emblems and badges, 
descriptive or designating marks, and words or phrases the corporation adopts, 
including the badge of the Girl Scouts, Incorporated, referred to in the Act of 
August 12, 1937 (ch. 590, 50 Stat. 623) [unclassified], and to authorize their 
use, during the life of the corporation, in connection with the manufacture, 
advertisement, and sale of equipment and merchandise.  This section does not 
affect any vested rights. 
36 U.S.C. § 80305 (2000). 
 303. Amateur Sports Act, id. § 220506.  But see Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. 
Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1119–22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a nonprofit 
organization’s distribution of posters featuring the word “Olympic” and Olympic 
symbols as a means of soliciting contributions for its cause, the opposition to plans to 
convert the Olympic Village in Lake Placid into a prison after the 1980 Winter Games, 
was not a commercial use of “Olympics” and therefore not violation of section 110 of 
the Amateur Sports Act). 
 304. In S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534 
(1987), the Court interpreted the Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220506, in a manner 
that gave the USOC exclusive rights in the word “Olympic.”  The Court held that unlike 
normal trademark holders, the USOC did not have to prove that an unauthorized use was 
confusing and that alleged infringers were not permitted to assert the fair use defense.  
See also Kelly Browne, Note, A Sad Time for the Gay Olympics: San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987), 56 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1487, 1524 (1987) (arguing that the Court failed to properly balance free speech 
and property rights in its holding and analysis); Kellie L. Pendras, Comment, Revisiting 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee: Why It Is Time to 
Narrow Protection of the Word “Olympic,” 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 729, 761 (2002) 
(arguing that the Court ruling is contrary to the expressive freedoms embedded in the 
First Amendment).  Smell a rat?  More recently use of term “Rat Olympics” by a 
“Behavioral Learning Principles” course at Nebraska Wesleyan University was objected 
to by the U.S. Olympic Committee.  See Will Potter, Ratted Out, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Feb. 14, 2003, at A9. 
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Wyld, Ltd.305 (and given the name of the defendant, the reader can 
already see where this is going), JORDACHE mark and horse appliqué 
marks placed on the right rear pocket to provide source identification for 
plus size denim jeans were found not to be infringed by a competitor’s 
use of the name LARDASHE in similar script lettering stitched into the 
right rear pocket of their plus size jeans, together with a pig appliqué.306  
Like Barbie and the Girl Scouts, the Jordache mark was deemed 
susceptible to unauthorized usage that was successfully defended as free 
speech. 
B.  I’m Pink, Therefore I’m Spam 
There are “ungendered” cases in which arguably commercial uses of 
trademarks were held noninfringing or nondilutive.  For example, in 
Hormel Foods Corp, v. Jim Henson Productions, the court refused to 
enjoin the use of a character named Spa’am in the movie Muppets 
Treasure Island, despite Hormel’s allegations concerning its Spam 
trademark for luncheon meat.307  The court seemed to hold little regard 
for Hormel’s product, referring to it as a “processed, gelatinous block,”308 
and asserting that Hormel should be inured to ridicule, sarcastically 
noting: 
Although SPAM is in fact made from pork shoulder and ham meat, and the 
name itself supposedly is a portmanteau word for spiced ham, countless jokes 
have played off the public’s unfounded suspicion that SPAM is a product of less 
than savory ingredients.  For example, in one episode of the television cartoon 
Duckman, Duckman is shown discovering “the secret ingredient to SPAM” as 
he looks on at “Murray’s Incontinent Camel Farm.”  In a recent newspaper 
column it was noted that “[I]n one little can, Spam contains the five major food 
groups: Snouts. Ears. Feet. Tails. Brains.”  In view of the more or less 
humorous takeoffs such as these, one might think Hormel would welcome the 
association with a genuine source of pork.309 
However, one clearly articulated basis for the holding was the court’s 
belief that, though perhaps Hormel was too pigheaded to realize it, the 
Henson invocation of the Spam trademark and related associations was 
actually constructive in nature;310 because Spa’am was a positive 
 
 305. Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48 (D.N.M. 1985). 
 306. Id. at 55.  “There is an additional aspect to the Lardashe name and mark which 
compels the conclusion that its use does not infringe upon the Jordache name and marks: 
the aspect of parody.”  Id. 
 307. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
 308. Id. at 501. 
 309. Id. (citations omitted). 
 310. The court wrote: 
Spa’am, however, is not the boarish Beelzebub that Hormel seems to fear.  The 
district court credited and relied upon the testimony of Anne Devereaux 
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character, he was not portrayed as unhygienic, and that a simple comic 
reference to the fact that Spam was made from pork would not, in the 
court’s estimation, damage its image.311  This diverges considerably 
from the “Barbie Girl” court’s willingness to disregard the unsavory 
depiction of Barbie characteristics in the disputed song.312  The 
spamming jurists sought to reassure Hormel that the contested Spa’am 
character did not reflect negatively on its product, while the “Barbie 
Girl” court straightforwardly concluded that the First Amendment 
includes the right to bash Barbie. 
C.  For-Profit Parody When the Target Is Not Female 
The typical case in which an unauthorized use of a trademark is 
protected by the First Amendment is one in which the use is fairly 
unambiguously noncommercial.  For example, in the “Bally sucks” case, 
a disgruntled former health club member was held to have a First 
Amendment right to post negative consumer commentary about Bally 
Total Fitness, Inc. on a website posted at www.ballysucks.com because 
it was a completely noncommercial venture.313  Had the defendant 
attempted to sell posters or tee shirts proclaiming that Bally sucked, 
there is some suggestion in the opinion that the court might have been 
more protective of the Bally trademark.314  In a political commercial in 
 
Jordan, an expert in children’s literature, to find that Spa’am is a positive 
figure in the context of the movie as a whole—even if he is not “classically 
handsome.”  Indeed, Spa’am is a comic character who “seems childish rather 
than evil.”  Although he is humorously threatening in his first appearance, he 
comes to befriend the Muppets and helps them escape from the film’s villain, 
Long John Silver.  By film’s end, “Spa’am is shown sailing away with the 
other Muppets as good humor and camaraderie reign.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 311. Id. at 504. 
 312. See supra notes 275–86 and accompanying text. 
 313. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998). 
 314. Id. 
[N]one of the cases that Bally cites involve consumer commentary.  In Coca-
Cola, the court enjoined the defendant’s publication of a poster stating “Enjoy 
Cocaine” in the same script as Coca-Cola’s trademark.  Likewise, in Mutual of 
Omaha, the court prohibited the use of the words “Mutant of Omaha,” with a 
picture of an emaciated human head resembling the Mutual of Omaha’s logo 
on a variety of products as a means of protesting the arms race.  Here, 
however, Faber is using Bally’s mark in the context of a consumer 
commentary to say that Bally engages in business practices which Faber finds 
distasteful or unsatisfactory.  This is speech protected by the First Amendment. 
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which Ralph Nader mimicked MasterCard’s “Priceless” advertising 
campaign, MasterCard’s motion for a temporary restraining order 
against Nader was denied because the ad was found to be a parody of 
MasterCard’s commercial, as well as a comment on campaign financing.315  
It was a distinctly noncommercial parody because Nader was not selling 
anything except his own Presidential candidacy. 
These free speech friendly outcomes stand in stark contrast to those in 
cases framed as “for-profit parody” disputes.  When there is a commercial 
aspect to a trademark parody that does not involve deriding Barbie or 
mocking other putatively deserving targets, courts seem more likely to 
favor strong trademark protections over speech interests.316  In Elvis Presley 
Enterprises v. Capece317 the Fifth Circuit held that calling a nightclub 
“The Velvet Elvis” infringed marks held by Elvis Presley Enterprises 
because, when considered as a whole, the nightclub’s advertising practices, 
service mark, and décor caused a likelihood of confusion as to source, 
affiliation, or sponsorship.318  The gaudy, campy nightclub was intended 
to parody “a time or concept from the sixties—the Las Vegas lounge 
scene, the velvet painting craze and perhaps indirectly, the country’s 
fascination with Elvis.”319  In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific 
Graphics, a court found that the “Hard Rain” logo on tee shirts which 
meant to humorously reference the damp climate of the Pacific 
Northwest, was an infringement of the “Hard Rock” logo associated 
with the Hard Rock Café, also used extensively on tee shirts.320 
In Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Company of Boca, Inc.,321 the defendants 
argued unsuccessfully that their ten dollar bottle of popcorn would not 
likely be confused with plaintiff’s Dom Perignon Champagne and that 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 315. Mark Hamblett, Judge Backs Nader’s Parody of MasterCard Ad, LAW.COM, 
Sept. 12, 2000, at http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid= 
ZZZTZRDA2DC. 
 316. But see Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1993), in 
which the court very astutely determined that consumers were not likely to be confused 
by tee shirts parodying “The Black Dog” which featured “The Dead Dog” and “The 
Black Hog,” holding in pertinent part: 
Color notwithstanding, a dog and a hog are two very different creatures, 
unlikely to be confused in the average person’s mind.  Likewise, it can hardly 
be suggested that a typical consumer will not distinguish the macabre 
overtones of “The Dead Dog” from the more salutary connotations of “The 
Black Dog.” 
Id. at 55. 
 317. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 318. Id. at 204. 
 319. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 795 (S.D. Tex. 1996), 
rev’d, 141 F.3d 188. 
 320. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 
1462 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
 321. 725 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
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this was simply a “classic parody” protected under the First Amendment.322  
The court ruled that the speech was purely commercial, and therefore 
unprotected.  Because the defendant was selling a product, the defendant 
did not base the parody upon artistic or political expression, and the 
underlying purpose of the parody was economic gain.323 
Yet another comparable case involved publication of a parody of The 
Cat in the Hat, a Dr. Seuss book, that was entitled The Cat NOT in the 
Hat,324 in which the defendant author mimicked Dr. Seuss’s literary and 
artistic style to comment on the O.J. Simpson murder trial.  The 
defendant was unable to use a parody defense to defeat a claim for 
injunctive relief premised on both copyright and trademark law 
violations because the accused work did not parody or comment upon 
Dr. Seuss, but merely appropriated the intellectual property of Dr. 
Seuss’s estate, to comment upon something else.325  The court explicitly 
held that the claim of parody is no defense “where the purpose of the 
similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for defendant’s 
own commercial use.”326 
A diaper bag with green and red bands and the wording “Gucchi 
Goo,” that was “allegedly poking fun” at Gucci was found to infringe 
the well-known Gucci name and the design mark.327  The use by a 
competing meat sauce of the trademark “A.2” as a “pun” on the famous 
“A.1” trademark was similarly held infringing,328 offering precedential 
support for the contention that parody is no defense “where the purpose 
of the similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for the 
 
 322. Id. at 1322–23. 
 323. Id. at 1323–24. 
 324. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405–06 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
In a traditional trademark infringement suit founded on the likelihood of 
confusion rationale, the claim of parody is not really a separate “defense” as 
such, but merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are 
not likely to be confused as to the source, sponsorship or approval. . . . 
. . . [T]he claim of parody is no defense “where the purpose of the similarity is 
to capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for the defendant’s own 
commercial use.” 
Id. (quoting Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 
1462 (W.D. Wash. 1991)). 
 327. Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
 328. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D. Conn. 1991). 
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defendant’s own commercial use.”329  Merchandise bearing a design 
using the words “Mutant of Omaha” and an accompanying logo 
depicting a side view of a war-bonneted and emaciated human face was 
deemed likely to likely to cause confusion as to the source of the goods 
and about whether there was any involvement by or association with the 
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company.330  To the defendant’s claim that 
he had a right to make political commentary, the court responded: 
There are numerous ways in which Novak may express his aversion to nuclear 
war without infringing upon a trademark in the process.  Just as Novak may not 
hold an anti-nuclear rally in his neighbor’s backyard without permission, neither 
may he voice his concerns through the improper use of Mutual’s registered 
trademark.  Under these facts, the First Amendment provides no defense.331 
Liability in all of the above cases was premised squarely on likelihood 
of confusion determinations.  Where a court cannot bring itself to make 
that finding even for instrumental, outcome determinative purposes, an 
alternate theory can emerge with which to stop for-profit parodists.  In 
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets,332 the Sixth Circuit held that 
the defendant violated (then-host of the Tonight Show) Johnny Carson’s 
right of publicity because the defendant “intentionally appropriated his 
identity for commercial exploitation” by using the Carson-identified 
“Here’s Johnny” phrase to promote its product.  The court held that the 
defendants could not use the “Here’s Johnny” phrase based upon a right 
of publicity theory, rather than a traditional likelihood of confusion test.  
According to the court, the defendants did not violate the confusion test 
because it was unlikely that the public would believe that Johnny Carson 
endorsed or promoted the company’s product.333  Nevertheless, the judge 
found an alternative legal mechanism to halt apparently offensive 
communicative commercial behavior. 
D.  For-Profit Parody: Sex, Drugs, Rock & Roll, and Beer 
When courts find parodies, satire, and other nonpermissive uses of 
trademarks objectionable for content-based reasons, they are very likely 
to find either trademark infringement, trademark dilution, or sometimes 
both.  Courts have energetically enjoined unauthorized commercial uses 
or invocations of trademarks which include sex and drug references, and 
anything found to be “unwholesome.” 
 
 329. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 109 F.3d at 1405–06; see supra note 325. 
 330. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986). 
 331. Id. at 911. 
 332. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 333. Id. at 833–34. 
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In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,334 a 
trademark was found to be damaged by the unauthorized use of a 
“strikingly similar” mark in a pornographic film entitled “Debbie Does 
Dallas.”  The plaintiff was described as the “Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dallas Cowboys 
Football Club, Inc.,”335 linguistically characterizing the cheerleaders as a 
commercial entertainment service owned by, and aimed at, men.  The 
court rather scathingly characterized the disputed use of the mark as 
follows: 
In November 1978 the Pussycat Cinema began to show “Debbie Does Dallas,” 
a gross and revolting sex film whose plot, to the extent that there is one, 
involves a cheerleader at a fictional high school, Debbie, who has been selected 
to become a “Texas Cowgirl.”  In order to raise enough money to send Debbie, 
and eventually the entire squad, to Dallas, the cheerleaders perform sexual 
services for a fee.  The movie consists largely of a series of scenes graphically 
depicting the sexual escapades of the “actors.”  In the movie’s final scene 
Debbie dons a uniform strikingly similar to that worn by the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders and for approximately twelve minutes of film footage engages in 
various sex acts while clad or partially clad in the uniform.336 
The court noted with apparent horror that “Defendants advertised the 
movie with marquee posters depicting Debbie in the allegedly infringing 
uniform and containing such captions as ‘Starring Ex Dallas Cowgirl 
Cheerleader Bambi Woods,’”337 despite the fact that “Bambi Woods, the 
woman who played the role of Debbie, is not now and never has been a 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader.”338  Clearly appalled by the film, and 
perhaps feeling protective and paternal toward the Dallas Cowboy 
Cheerleaders’ image in commerce, the court articulated the trademark 
confusion standard very broadly, holding: 
In order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that the owner of the mark 
actually produced the item and placed it on the market.  The public’s belief that 
the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark 
satisfies the confusion requirement.  In the instant case, the uniform depicted in 
“Debbie Does Dallas” unquestionably brings to mind the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders.  Indeed, it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen 
defendants’ sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from 
plaintiff’s cheerleaders.  This association results in confusion which has “a 
 
 334. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
 335. Id. at 202. 
 336. Id. at 202–03 (footnote omitted). 
 337. Id. at 203. 
 338. Id. at 203 n.2. 
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tendency to impugn [plaintiff’s services] and injure plaintiff’s business 
reputation . . . .”339 
Concluding that “trademark laws are designed not only to prevent 
consumer confusion but also to protect ‘the synonymous right of a 
trademark owner to control his product’s reputation,’”340 the court 
affirmed the Dallas Cowboy’s Football Club’s right to control the 
reputation of its product, the cheerleaders, in commerce, though one 
might conclude the reputation of true concern had more to do with 
sexuality than trademarks.  Though the immediate target of this parody 
was an organization of female cheerleaders, the parody was deemed to 
effect and demean a male-oriented product, an owned accessory to an 
NFL franchise football team. 
In General Electric Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co.,341 General Electric 
objected to the defendant’s use of a humorous but ribald “Genital 
Electric” monogram on underpants and T-shirts that it marketed.  The 
court found actionable infringement after remarkably concluding that 
“there is great probability of confusion among the general public of 
plaintiff’s trademarks and defendant’s imitation.”342  Alternatively, in 
The Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., the court found 
consumer confusion was unlikely, but still enjoined the defendant’s 
publication of a parody in which the Pillsbury Doughboy participated in 
sexually explicit satirical drawing.”343  The court held that the cartoon 
diluted the distinctive value of Pillsbury’s all-American iconic value and 
injured the company’s business reputation.344 
When New Line Cinema produced a feature film satirizing beauty 
contests in rural Minnesota that portrayed them as jealous backbiters, 
suggested the participants tend to suffer from eating disorders, and 
contained “off-color humor and content,” it was enjoined from calling 
the movie “Dairy Queens.”345  The dairy treat retailer that holds the 
“Dairy Queen” trademark successfully argued that the title “Dairy 
Queens” would “cause the public to associate its trademarked name with 
the unwholesome content of the film . . . [an] association [that would] 
create negative impressions and confuse its customers, thereby 
demeaning and disparaging its mark.”346 
 
 339. Id. at 204–05 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 340. Id. at 205. 
 341. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979). 
 342. Id. at 1037. 
 343. The Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 135–36 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728–29 
(D. Minn. 1998). 
 346. Id. at 729. 
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A different sort of purity was at issue in Chemical Corp. of America v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., in which the slogan for a floor wax containing 
insecticide, “Where there’s life . . . there’s bugs,” was held to infringe a 
beer marketing slogan, “Where there’s life . . . there’s Bud.”347  The 
court held that “the use of the ‘bugs’ slogan would cause confusion in 
the minds of the public as to the source of the floor wax product and 
would damage the ‘public image’ of [Anheuser-Busch] by associating in 
the minds of the public the idea of bugs with a food product.”348 
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., a court enjoined the 
defendant’s merchandising of posters that partially reproduced a 
“familiar ‘Coca-Cola’ trademark and distinctive format” except for the 
substitution of the script letters “ine” for “-Cola,” so that the poster read 
“Enjoy Cocaine.”349  The court wrote: 
Although it contends that the word “Coca-Cola” as such does not appear 
anywhere on the poster one would have to be a visitor from another planet not 
to recognize immediately the familiar “Coca” in its stylized script and 
accompanying words, colors and design.  Indeed, defendant’s assertion that “the 
poster was intended to be a spoof, satirical, funny, and to have a meaning 
exactly the opposite of the word content” would be meaningless except in the 
context of an immediately recognizable association with the “Coca-Cola” 
trademark.  This is buttressed by the only change made in the new poster, i.e., 
“Raid-Mark” in place of “Trade-Mark”—a clear indication of defendant’s 
predatory intent, however humorous defendant considers it.350 
The court further opined: “To associate such a noxious substance as 
cocaine with plaintiff’s wholesome beverage as symbolized by its 
‘Coca-Cola’ trademark and format would clearly have a tendency to 
impugn that product and injure plaintiff’s business reputation . . . .”351 
 
 347. Chem. Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 
1962). 
 348. Id. at 436.  This case apparently made an impression on Justice Breyer who 
asked during a recent oral argument in a trademark dilution case before the Supreme 
Court whether a necessary element of dilution is “tarnishment” of reputation, “giving the 
example of ‘Bugweiser’ bug spray, which might not lead Budweiser consumers to 
believe that their beer has Deet in it, but which might nevertheless lead them to think, 
according to Breyer: ‘Budweiser.  Yuck.’”  Lithwick, supra note 123. 
 349. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 
1972). 
 350. Id. at 1187. 
 351. Id. at 1189.  Similarly, in Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d 
Cir. 1994), a television commercial for a competing lawnmower tractor that humorously 
invoked the famous Deere trademark (“a proud, majestic deer”), in the form of a cartoon 
deer that was cowardly and afraid, was held to be violation of the New York antidilution 
statute.  The court wrote, “Alterations of that sort, accomplished for the sole purpose of 
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Trademark holders sometimes triumph over speech interests even 
when the message is not prurient in nature.  Where a company 
commercially produced and distributed religious tract cards and window 
display stickers which closely resembled Master Charge credit cards, 
and bore the legend “Give Christ charge of your life,” the court found 
trademark infringement and dilution and admonished the defendant to 
“utilize numerous means of conveying their commendable religious 
message without the apparent appropriation of the plaintiff’s marks.”352 
Thus, amalgams of trademark infringement and trademark dilution 
theory have been used by courts to impede or silence speech related uses 
of trademarks simply because they are commercial in some respect.  
Where the unauthorized use implicates something a court finds 
unsavory, such as sex, drugs, or bugs, trademark law is readily invoked 
to “protect” the images and reputations of the marked goods and 
services.  Where a court feels perhaps that a product such as Barbie or 
Spam deserves by its very nature to be satirized, or simply values a 
broad construction of the First Amendment, marks can be parodied or 
otherwise used for speech purposes even in commercial contexts.  
Courts have abjectly failed to consistently articulate any logical 
framework for balancing speech rights againt trademark interests.  This 
creates great uncertainty for potential speakers and allows some judges 
to react to their personal inclinations, sterotypes, and biases by 
overprotecting trademarks at the expense of freedom of speech. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The educational and informational assistance trademarks provide to 
consumers is often overstated, while the benefits of strong trademark 
protections to mark holders are generally underestimated by judges and 
commentators.  “Protecting consumers” is even less supportable a 
justification for broadly enforceable trademark rights when consumers 
 
promoting a competing product . . . risk the possibility that consumers will come to 
attribute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with 
inferior goods and services.”  Id. at 45; see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1036–39 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding that a 
merchandiser of “Garbage Pail Kids” stickers and products injured the owner of Cabbage 
Patch Kids mark because of the likelihood of confusion as to origin, approval, 
endorsement, or other association of defendant’s products and mark with plaintiff’s); DC 
Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus. Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115–16 (N.D. Ga. 1984)  
(finding that the holder of Superman and Wonder Woman trademarks was damaged by 
use of similar marks by singing telegram franchisor, and that defendant violated the 
Lanham Act by using costumes similar to those used by characters in plaintiff’s comic 
books); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839–40 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) (holding that defendant’s diaper bag labeled “Gucchi Goo” injured Gucci’s mark). 
 352. Interbank Card Ass’n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 135 (M.D.N.C. 1977). 
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are incorrectly and illegitimately assumed to be idiots.  Unless a mark 
holder offers persuasive evidence to the contrary, courts must reject the 
specter of the gullible, harried, ignorant, and stupid consumer as a 
standard by which to measure likelihood of confusion.  Instead, courts 
should consistently embrace something along the lines of the 
“reasonably careful purchaser,” with the approximate purchasing 
sophistication of the judge deciding the issue—a creature far more 
intelligent and discerning than the consumers currently manifest in 
trademark jurisprudence.  In sum, because it strengthens trademarks 
without achieving any corresponding social benefit and is an improper 
invocation of the judicial notice doctrine, the courts should be a little 
less eager to find confusion likely simply because confusion somewhere, 
somehow, on someone’s part is arguably possible. 
Speech protected by the First Amendment that criticizes, parodies, 
mocks, or otherwise references or invokes trademarked goods and 
services should not be chilled or silenced by trademark law.  
Subordinating speech rights to trademark interests not only contravenes 
important constitutional principles, but also prevents consumers from 
receiving certain types of information about these marks, placing these 
decisions in conflict with stated goals of the Lanham Act. 
Both free speech rights and efficient commerce would best be served 
if courts entertained trademark infringement claims only where either 
identical or exceedingly similar marks are used commercially in a 
trademark sense, on directly competing or closely related goods and 
services.  Dilution claims should not silence speech that would otherwise 
be free.  Expansive property-like trademark monopolies should be allowed 
only if they can be justified on the basis of sound public policy.  
Protection of consumers from confusion as it is presently effectuated 
does not provide such a justification.  If judges are going to insist upon 
constructing broad penumbras of intangible commercial property rights 
around enforceable trademarks, these rights ought to attach consistently 
and predictably to all trademarks within a particular mark class or 
strength category.  All consumers should be considered classless and 
genderless, and all trademarks should be treated like Barbie, freely 
available for unfettered expressive uses—even strange, sexist, sexually 
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